Why does America need an aggressive policy? The root causes lie in the economy The economy in the 1980s America's economy was in a deep recession until the end of 1982. By 1983, inflation subsided, the economy recovered, and the United States entered an extended period

The Foreign Policy of Russophobia I hope the Russians understand that our House of Representatives often passes threatening resolutions in an attempt to please the most powerful and that this has nothing to do with the thoughts and actions of the American government. Last week this House

Domestic and foreign policy

Ukraine Needs External Assistance (interview with E. Lucas for the Ukrainian online publication http://silske.org/, hosted by V. Gatsenko, June 5, 2014) Will new sanctions against Moscow be of any use? Will the Ukrainian economy grow after the agreement with the IMF? These and other questions in an exclusive

Does America need a foreign policy? Henry Kissinger

(No ratings yet)

Title: Does America Need a Foreign Policy?
Author: Henry Kissinger
Year: 2001
Genre: Foreign educational literature, Foreign journalism, Politics, political science

About "Does America Need a Foreign Policy?" Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger was an American statesman, diplomat, and expert in international politics who served as National Security Adviser to the President of the United States from 1969-1975 and as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973, Kissinger is one of the most respected political scientists in the world.

In his book Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Henry Kissinger analyzes American foreign policy at a turning point in its history at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.

On our site about books, you can download the site for free without registration or read online book"Does America Need a Foreign Policy?" Henry Kissinger in epub, fb2, txt, rtf, pdf formats for iPad, iPhone, Android and Kindle. The book will give you a lot of pleasant moments and a real pleasure to read. Buy full version you can have our partner. Also, here you will find the latest news from the literary world, learn the biography of your favorite authors. For novice writers, there is a separate section with useful tips and tricks, interesting articles, thanks to which you can try your hand at writing.

1. Kissinger G. Does America need a foreign policy, p.207

Crusade of American Democracy

Beginning of intervention: 1961-1965

"A moment - and the fruits of the construction of socialism disappeared"

R. Frickland, political scientist

On April 30, 1975, an American helicopter landed on the roof of the American embassy in Saigon. Moments earlier, Saigon had been taken by the Liberation forces. The remnants of the American contingent in Vietnam were leaving the country in a hurry, and a helicopter was called to evacuate them. Vietnamese troops, meanwhile, occupied the presidential palace of Independence, where the leaders of the pro-American South Vietnamese regime hastened to transfer full power to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Thus was put an end to the protracted, bloody US war in Vietnam. But before that, there were almost 10 years of incessant struggle: a fierce dispute between a bomb and a projectile, an airplane and a rocket. “If the war in Indochina has been started, it must be won, and if it cannot be won, then it must be abandoned,” said former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The United States was sure that it would not take even six months before they would march victoriously through Hanoi; this self-confidence of power, in fact, dragged the States into the Vietnam War.

An important milestone in the history of the American imperialist campaign against Vietnam was the signing of the Geneva Accords, according to which Vietnam was divided into 2 states - South and North Vietnam - along the 17th parallel, which, as another former US Secretary of State D. Rusk said, “was the border between capitalism and socialism" and which the US could not afford to collapse. By that time, the Americans had already firmly believed in the "domino theory", according to which Vietnam was the core of the entire Southeast Asia, with the loss of which a chain reaction could begin throughout the region. As a result, America would lose influence in many countries that it has long considered its fiefdom. That is why the Kennedy administration decided to send the first military advisers to Vietnam in 1961. However, the systematic intervention of America in the affairs of Indochina began long before Kennedy took the presidency. Even during the Franco-Vietnamese war of 1946-1954. The United States provided military assistance to the French, as they were unable to carry out the crusade alone. When it became clear that the Europeans would suffer an inevitable defeat in Southeast Asia, the United States first tried to influence the course of peace negotiations and disrupt the signing of agreements on Vietnam in Geneva, and then decided to assume the authority to “reject communism” in Indochina. This is evidenced by Pentagon documents declassified in 1971, from which it followed that on the eve of the meeting on Indochina in Berlin, where the conditions for holding a meeting in Geneva were considered, President Eisenhower approved the document "On the tasks of the United States in Indochina and on their course regarding from Southeast Asia”, which spoke about the negative consequences of “losing the war in Indochina”. At the same time, the United States sought to expand the circle of participants in the war. However, the increase in the activity of the United States in this region did not meet with the enthusiasm of its allies; even the French government, in a joint communique with the United States, emphasized that "nothing that can contribute to the success of Geneva should be missed." The European states also supported the countries participating in the Non-Aligned Movement: they called for the conclusion of an urgent ceasefire agreement based on the recognition of the full independence of the Indochinese states. Obviously, the progressive countries of Europe and other regions, with the defeat of the imperialist aggression of France in Indochina, considered the incident settled, but the United States had a different opinion on this matter. America's first step in Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the Geneva Accords was the creation of an aggressive SEATO bloc, aimed primarily at the socialist countries, designed to suppress any national liberation movement and served as an instrument for pursuing an aggressive course towards Indochina. The departure of the French from Southeast Asia finally untied America's hands, and therefore the new US President D. Kennedy, who declared Vietnam "a suitable springboard for demonstrating [American] power," launched the penetration of the American contingent into Indochina.

The combination of missionary zeal (the desire to ensure the life of the people of the SE in conditions of freedom and democracy) and the inability to even imagine the possibility of a different view of the world order - the overlap of these factors played a fatal role in this case, predetermining the participation

US in the Vietnam War. Even under Eisenhower, America tried to change the composition of the South Vietnamese government, starting from its very top - first of all, by eliminating the inactive Bao Dai. The emperor was replaced by the dictator Ngo Dinh Diem. Time passed, the number of US military advisers in Vietnam increased, but things still did not move forward: not only did Diem reluctantly follow the advisers' orders, he, moreover, decided to use his position in order to deploy a clan a dictatorship based on the reactionary elite of the landlord-comprador and bureaucratic circles. The United States did not like this "amateur activity", and therefore Ngo Dinh Diem was replaced by a military junta specially selected by the Americans - after which the United States began to contribute to the creation of a democratic system and the development of capitalism in a country completely devoid of a middle class. Truly, this US venture was doomed to failure from the very beginning! Moreover, the assigned tasks had to be solved in the face of fierce resistance from Vietnamese patriots, as well as the presence in neighboring countries [Laos and Cambodia] of channels for unlimited supply of them with everything they needed.

The United States would have experimented with the image of the South Vietnamese government for a long time if the life of American President D.F. Kennedy had not tragically ended in Dallas, Texas at the end of November 1963, after which former Vice President L. Johnson became interim acting president USA. Presidential elections were scheduled for 1964, which largely determined the fate of the Vietnamese campaign.

It is worth noting that all the key moments of the Vietnam War, one way or another, echoed the presidential elections. In 1964, then US presidential candidate L. Johnson assured voters that "Democrats don't want American boys fighting for Asian boys"; "they're not going to send American boys 9,000 to 10,000 miles away to do what Asian boys have to do for themselves," and finally, "as long as he [Johnson] is president, there will be peace for all Americans." That was the moment when, by abandoning the Kennedy course, Johnson could eliminate the US presence in Southeast Asia. On this, coupled with the promise to build a "great society", his election program was built. But the words were followed by open intervention and escalation. A similar story will happen to R. Nixon in 1968, when the situation in Indochina becomes critical. His campaign also touched on Vietnam: Nixon promised to "save American blood and continue to actively intervene in the affairs of the world." His policy of "Vietnamizing" the war involved pulling out of Vietnam and replacing the local US Army leadership with the Saigon regime. But meanwhile, the war dragged on for another 5 years. Nixon won his re-election in 1972 only thanks to some improvement in the situation - oddly enough, the American public continued to believe the words of its leaders, despite the fact that they were followed by severe disappointment. In other words, the candidates lulled the Nation's vigilance with their sweet speeches, and then tried to "crank out" as many operations as possible in Indo-China before a new wave of popular discontent rolled over.

But back to the 1964 elections, Johnson assured that the Americans would not fight for the Asians. Yet Johnson, often accused of being soft-spoken by his political rivals in the campaign, was well aware that nothing puts the voter in a better mood than a display of United States military might. Already at the end of 1963, the United States carried out an operation in Indochina, code-named "34A", which involved the deployment of armed bands to the territory of the DRV in order to start an "uprising" there. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, in the company of the CIA, decided to put into practice the concept of counterguerrilla operations in the framework of "psychological warfare", at that stage implying the operation of armed groups in Vietnam.

q R. McNamara - Secretary of Defense of the administration of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (1961-1968);

McNamara was a close associate of the Kennedy brothers, the so-called "wunderkinds" or "wonder boys." The "court" of President Kennedy was made up of young, talented and promising politicians, and the post of Secretary of War was a tasty morsel, especially in the context of the Cold War. McNamara was able to prove himself during the Caribbean crisis, where he worked side by side with President Kennedy. That is why the Vietnamese conflict was initially left to the mercy of R. McNamara.

After the assassination of D. Kennedy, McNamara, like many other "Couriers of Camelot", passed "by inheritance" to L. Johnson. And, despite the fact that the president subsequently claimed that "from the very beginning he would have expelled all the leadership inherited from Kennedy, with the exception of D. Rusk," McNamara retained his post. And it wasn't just reputation; rather, Johnson did not see another suitable candidate (Johnson hated other "court officials"), or he was satisfied with the results of the US military presence in Southeast Asia, and McNamara fully fit into the picture of the escalation process in Vietnam.

r Of course, McNamara's activities as Minister of Defense were not limited to Vietnam. Surprisingly, already in 1964, when Washington began to get bogged down in Southeast Asia, McNamara, who demanded constant financial injections into the US Armed Forces, stated that “... the goal of the United States is to create a sufficiently large strike force to ensure the destruction together or separately of the USSR, China and other communist satellites and ... in addition, destroy their military capabilities in order to practically limit the damage to the United States and its allies. And in 1967, he reported: "The United States has the ability, even after they have received the first coordinated strike, to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker." As for the Soviet Union - one of the two superpowers of the world! - then McNamara proposed to destroy 20-25% of its population and half of its industry. The plans are incredible in their ambition. What then could the US militaristic "machine" do with tiny Vietnam? And then what stopped her?

In matters of Vietnam, McNamara at first did not hesitate to experiment, deploying a "psychological war" or, for example, building a "McNamara belt" - a kind of response to the "paths of Ho Chi Minh." However, the more seriously America got bogged down in Vietnam, the closer his methods approached the brink. McNamara soon issued an order for "reporting the dead" - regarded by society as unheard of cynicism. Spurred on by accusations against him by some of the participants and mere outside observers of those events, McNamara explained that this method established a criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of military operations. "... This approach is really creepy, but when you hold the post of Minister of Defense, when you are interested in military success and when there is a" war to bleed, "then it is important to know whether the enemy is bleeding or not." However, it is worth noting that such reporting unleashed the hands of American assassins in military uniform, encouraging them to kill right and left.

One way or another, the nation connected the atrocities of American soldiers in Southeast Asia with the name of the Minister of War. Nominated different versions, for example, about the “Project 100,000,” when 100,000 young people with an unhealthy psyche, a criminal past, or drug addicts were allegedly ordered by McNamara to join the US Army, and that, they say, the Secretary of Defense turned the US Armed Forces into a penal colony. In all likelihood, the population of the United States found it hard to believe that the heinous crimes in Indochina were committed by sane people - their compatriots.

Be that as it may, at the very moment when the US position in Southeast Asia became critical, McNamara resigned, replacing his ministerial chair with a position in a bank. This is where the sharp analytical mind of a politician really came in handy. While working at the World Bank, McNamara seems to have found himself. After reading his book, dedicated to his entire political career and Vietnam in particular, one gets the impression that R. McNamara was simply minding his own business as Secretary of Defense. However, there is something that distinguished one of the “Couriers of Camelot” from the rest (who also did not always sit rightfully in their place). One of the few participants in this whole story, he drew conclusions from the humiliating defeat of the United States: in his book, he analyzes step by step every action taken by him personally (and not only) in which mistakes were made. But this hardly means that McNamara, like other "heroes" of the Vietnamese conflict, does not regret that the United States was beaten in Southeast Asia.

The armed groups operating in the DRV were called upon to “frighten” the local population and issue a final warning to them. However, the North Vietnamese easily dealt with the gangs. Washington was seriously angry: it no longer made sense to act secretly, and the United States went on an open intervention.

The restrained tactic turned into an outright provocation: Washington announced that two American destroyers had been "attacked" in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. Actually, this was the reason for the beginning of direct US intervention in the affairs of Vietnam. Long before that, the United States (through the efforts of M. Bundy's apparatus) had already prepared a resolution according to which the president was delegated the authority to conduct military operations against the DRV.

NB On August 7, 1964, the infamous Tonkin Resolution was adopted by a majority (88 votes to 2 in the Senate and unanimously in the House of Representatives). It is the adoption of the Tonkin Resolution that can be considered the official beginning of the most unsuccessful, inglorious US military campaign.

At first, Johnson and the company were afraid to start an escalation in Southeast Asia, because aggression against Vietnam could lead to a clash with China (aggression developed near Chinese borders). And only when the States were completely convinced that such a threat did not exist, they went ahead. On March 8, 1965, the first American marines appeared in the port of Da Nang. In the same year, the United States launched several massive strikes on the territory of the DRV. Against a tiny, compared to the United States, state, the full power of American militarism was thrown: in addition to the fact that selected troops trained in jungle combat were sent to Indochina, the United States tested new weapons and new doctrines in Vietnam. In the Vietnamese skies, the valiant American aircraft operated, and the number of helicopters that the army had at its disposal was amazing.

Washington believed that victory in Southeast Asia was not far off, so the US tasks in Indochina were quite simply formulated:

Washington decided not to abandon the course taken by Kennedy. At the same time, Johnson argued that he was guided by moral imperatives, and not at all by national interests, in his desire to prevent the communist takeover of Southeast Asia, for altruism is the basis of American foreign policy: “We will provide assistance to any country in Southeast Asia that asks us to protect its freedom.... In this there is nothing in the region for which we can fight for possession - be it territory, military presence or political ambition. Our only desire ... is to provide the peoples of Southeast Asia with the opportunity to live in peace and create their own destiny with their own hands.

But, oddly enough, the South Vietnamese did not seek to build their future on their own. The idea of ​​creating strategic settlements failed. The Americans tried in vain to force the South Vietnamese to take up arms and fight. And the farther, the angrier Johnson became (his ideas did not work) and the more soldiers arrived in Southeast Asia (the ideas had to be implemented at any cost). The escalation was gaining momentum.

However, already at the initial stage of the war, America encountered unforeseen difficulties, which were determined by the fact that American leaders in the SE had to constantly rotate the composition of the Saigon elite, bringing to power one or another military junta. Another problem unexpectedly became the inability to defeat the Vietnamese national liberation movement in a short time: by 1965, the Vietnamese liberation army had already come close to Saigon and inflicted several sensitive blows on the US Army. The US forces were dozens of times superior to the forces of the patriots, but in reality everything turned out to be not so simple.

Strength and impotence: 1965-1968

The Vietnam War put a lot in its place. Of course, it cannot be argued that it showed the world the "true face" of the United States of America: aggressive notes in US foreign policy sounded even during the "Korean boom" of 1950-53. and even earlier. But it revealed the deep-seated problems of the American state, in particular, its excessive self-confidence - doctrinal self-confidence and self-confidence of force. The American historian G. Kolko, having analyzed the reasons for the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, came to the following conclusion: “Our confidence in our rightness dates back to the time of the emergence of the republic, however, in those years we were weak, we fought with weak peoples - the Spaniards, Mexicans, Indians in the Americas. We are not accustomed to counting the costs in foreign policy…. Who would have thought that our overwhelming power would not prevail in Vietnam? L. Johnson expresses a habit of avoiding calculations and is a victim of the American demand for success.”1 But in 1965, foreign policy humiliation was not yet threatened by the United States, although the failures at the initial stage of intervention in Vietnam forced Johnson and his retinue to partially reconsider their views on the situation in Indochina .

The New Deal of 1965 testified to the change of mood in Washington:

As we can see, the defeats at the first stage of the war somewhat sobered Washington, forcing it to abandon its previous demonstration of its altruism, expressed in statements that “the only desire [of the United States] is to provide the peoples of Southeast Asia with the opportunity to live in peace and create their own destiny with their own hands.” Now this component of the Pentagon doctrine was given only 10%. And the 70% allocated to prevent a humiliating defeat demonstrates the fact that the United States realized that the war would be protracted and that already at that stage it could not be 100% certainty that it will end in favor of the United States.

Soon, the famous "wunderkinds" began to leave Johnson: at the end of 1965, M. Bundy resigned, whose place was immediately taken by W. Rostow; McCone was soon replaced by R. Helms as director of the CIA; and a little later, McNamara also left the office, replaced by A. Schlesinger.

r Thus, at the very beginning of his presidency, Johnson, who wanted to get rid of the "fragments of Camelot" - the legacy of D. Kennedy, managed to step on the same rake: getting rid of countless advisers - "Kennedy" (albeit not all), who only interfered to him, insisting on an escalation of the Vietnam War, Johnson overnight surrounded himself with a new army of advisers - mostly, again, Vietnam consultants.

Kennedy, by the way, also elevated Rostow to the rank of his advisers. But, unlike Johnson, who was elated that he had finally hired "his personal intellectual," Kennedy described Professor Rostow as follows: "He has an abyss of ideas, but 9 out of 10 will lead to disaster." However, W. Rostow, among other things, was Camelot's chief specialist in counterguerrilla warfare. His impressive creation "Partisans and how to fight them" ("Guerilla war: The Guerilla - and How to fight Him") clarified the essence of any national liberation movement and offered a set of measures for the implementation of counter-guerrilla actions. Johnson, on the other hand, was in power at a time when Kennedy remained above all else in national thinking and emotions, and the president himself was in the same mood. 4 Otherwise, how can one explain his passion for counterguerrilla warfare and the creation of a circle of “his own intellectuals” around him? The spirit of "Kennedyism" was still strong, but Johnson really wanted to distinguish himself with something "of his own." And if in domestic politics Since the president continued to develop the course of creating a "Great Society", in foreign policy he, with the active assistance of his advisers, preferred the escalation of the conflict in Southeast Asia. And this meant that the United States was preparing to move from strategic research to the use of “naked military force.”5

At that time, the 600th US Army + about a million SE soldiers were already fighting in Indochina.6 Chemical weapons were used everywhere, in particular, the orange drug. The American command decided that, since the Viet Cong could not be surpassed in the jungle, it would be better to simply destroy the rainforest along with all living creatures in it. existed and back side medals: many US military themselves suffered from their own chemical weapons. Between 1965 and 1968 several major operations were carried out; American bombers monthly dropped up to 50,000 tons of bombs and up to 1.7 million shells into Vietnamese territory. By 1967, the US command had over a million American soldiers under its command, as well as soldiers of the puppet army. As for public opinion, then the Vietnamese campaign had not previously aroused sympathy even among the closest allies of the United States, since civilians were killed as a result of fierce battles. However, something soon happened that shocked the whole world.

By that time, genocide had become an integral part of the conduct of combat by American soldiers: massacres were carried out at every turn; the Americans did not hesitate to use their superiority in arms over sometimes unarmed civilians. After the extermination strategy stigmatized the United States for years, the actions of the American soldiers began to be explained by the McNamara order, which introduced "accounting for the dead", thereby revealing the effectiveness of military operations. General Westmoreland apparently approved of such brutal methods. " The best way to fight - to attack and kill the Viet Cong,” he said. 8 Under this motto, the US Marines in 1965 burned 150 houses in a Vietnamese village south of Da Nang. And there were many such war crimes. The tragedy of Songmy on March 16, 1968 was not an exception, but rather an ordinary episode of the war.9

On the eve of Judgment Day, Lieutenant W. Colley was ordered to carry out a "cleansing" of the Viet Cong villages of Milay. The soldiers of the American division, having landed in this area, did not find the partisans, but the order had to be followed. Therefore, Colli ordered to drive all the inhabitants to the irrigation canal at the edge of the village, and then gave the order to shoot indiscriminately ...

The massacre did not last long: after the destruction of 567 villagers and the burning of the killers in military uniform, the trail went cold ...

The truth about Songmy became known thanks to the letters of Private Reidenauer, which he sent to influential officials. At the Song My trial, Brigade Commander Collie Henderson gritted his teeth: "Every brigade in Vietnam had its own Song My, but not every one had its own Reidenauer talking about it." Today, at the site of this terrible crime, there is a monument that reminds us of how inhuman and cruel people can be.

Of course, the massacres in Vietnam could not but outrage humanity. Therefore, R. Nixon, who later replaced L. Johnson as President of the United States, decided not to ignore the events in Milay, and soon W. Colley was brought to trial - the only one from that same 9th division. However, through the efforts of the American media and with the help of some prominent US political figures, in 1974 Colley (the only American soldier convicted of war crimes!) Was released and later rehabilitated. Moreover, the platoon lieutenant was far from the only military man who turned from an executioner into a hero. Today W. Colley lives in Columbus, Georgia, he sells jewelry and sleeps peacefully at night.10 Unlike the soldiers of his platoon…

Despite the fact that the brutal massacre of Song My was only an episode of the entire Vietnamese tragedy, it was she who demonstrated the incredible strength of the United States Army, and at the same time reflected the groundlessness of the attempts of the American military to "crush the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong", so that later " march through Hanoi." Enraged by their impotence, the “crusaders of democracy” sent blows right and left, shelling the jungle at random, hoping to catch the “hated communist”, and if they got into the hands of a Vietnamese - a civilian or a partisan - it didn’t matter - they shot him at point blank range.

But even this demonstration of incredible destructive power did not change the state of affairs in the war: the escalation did not produce the expected results, and the McNaughton-McNamara plan to prevent a "humiliating defeat for the United States", starting in 1968, took a central place in the foreign policy of the administration of the new President R . Nixon. L. Johnson, "a victim of the national demand for success" and an unconditional "victim of Vietnam", could not get out of the shadow of the Kennedy brothers, which pursued him throughout his entire term of office. He simply could not betray the interests of J. Kennedy, whose image was still preserved in the minds of the nation; most likely, this forced him to abandon his views and agree to maintain the presence, and then to the escalation of the US Armed Forces in Southeast Asia. In addition, by 1968, Johnson had lost a good half of his cabinet, including Secretary of Defense McNamara, perhaps the most ardent supporter of escalation at that time. He knew that his days in the White House would not be long: "I knew from the beginning that I would be crucified wherever I went," he said. Johnson was sure that if he had not escalated in his time, he would have been accused of "allowing democracy to fall into the hands of the communists."11

But the escalation did not produce the expected results, and the Johnson administration soon found itself in a dilemma: either continue to increase the size of the US military in Southeast Asia, or start looking for a way out of the Vietnamese impasse. Johnson was forced to abandon the 200,000 troop increase requested by the Pentagon: new escalation steps would have provoked a new wave of protests not only in American society, but throughout the world.12 The decisive factor was the fact that by 1968 in the United States, the movement against the Vietnam War overtook the Negro movement. Dissatisfaction with the war was shown not only by the people, but also by the soldiers: many of them committed acts of disobedience, resistance to officers (some privates did not hesitate to kill their officers), as well as minor sabotage, expressed in inexplicable breakdowns of equipment. Student youth were at the forefront of the civil anti-war movement. Thanks to the development of higher education in the United States, tens of thousands of students lived on college campuses. In October 1967, more than 50,000 demonstrators gathered outside the Pentagon as part of the fight against conscription. The conscripts defiantly destroyed the summons, seized the documentation of the recruiting stations. Young people who did not want to serve in the “valiant” army of the United States of America left the country: up to 10,000 Americans settled in Canada alone13. Sociological surveys among students revealed an explosive situation in American universities and colleges: 81% expressed dissatisfaction with the administration of universities, and more than 50% even expressed serious doubts about the correctness of US foreign and domestic policy. The right-wing organizations, which took upon themselves the obligation to repulse the youth, could not cope, the propaganda did not work.

Soon, Martin Luther King himself, the ideological leader of the "black" movement, supported the dissatisfied. He called the United States "the greatest rapist in the world today", and compared the testing of new types of weapons in Vietnam and the use of torture with Nazi experiments (concentration camps and torture). “To put the war in Asia, pursuing dubious national interests, above the needs at home ... worse than a blind policy, this is a provocative policy,” he said in one of his speeches14. The growing dissatisfaction with not only the foreign, but also the domestic policy of the state forced L. Johnson to convene an emergency meeting of political figures, with whom he began to get stuck in Indochina; among them were M. Bundy, M. Taylor, G. Lodge and others. At one time, each of them supported the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, but now they all unanimously spoke in favor of starting negotiations. In principle, Johnson could bite the bit, which he did more than once, and continue to stick to his line. But he didn't.

On March 31, 1968, Johnson gave the order to limit the bombardment of the territory of the DRV south of the 20th parallel, and soon announced a complete cessation of the shelling of the territory of the DRV from the sea. At the same time, the readiness of the United States to begin negotiations with the DRV was announced, and already on April 3 the leadership of the DRV gave its consent to enter into negotiations. Nevertheless, Johnson failed to end the war on his own - the credit of trust given to him by the Nation ended. The 1968 elections were held without his participation (Johnson did not even begin to put forward his candidacy). L. Johnson was close to the end of the war at a stage when the size of the army and discontent in society had not yet passed their peak, but at the same time he realized that he had not justified the hopes placed on him. The nation, meanwhile, believed the words of the new president about a speedy and, if possible, dignified end to the conflict. However, the war continued.

"In the quagmire": 1968-1973

By 1968, the Vietnam War had acquired special significance for the United States, both within its Asian policy and on a global scale. In this regard, L.B. Johnson declared: "If we are driven out of Vietnam, no nation will ever again trust American promises or American patronage." America's failures in Indochina, the failure of the United States to achieve either military or political success in the region - all this seriously undermined their prestige. At the same time, the material costs of the United States for the war in Vietnam turned out to be so large that they became one of the reasons for the crisis not only in the US economy, but also in the system of monetary and financial relations throughout the world. Such was the legacy left by L. Johnson to R. Nixon when the latter took office as President of the United States of America in January 1969.

The defeat of the escalation policy was a sobering lesson for Washington: the United States realized the futility of its hopes for victory in Indochina, and therefore the administration of the new President R. Nixon was forced to start looking for a way out of the Vietnamese crisis. In July 1969, on the island of Guam, Nixon set out new strategy United States in Indochina, dubbed the "Guam Doctrine", which was designed to mitigate Negative consequences American "over-involvement" in Vietnam and save US political prestige in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The famous "Guam Doctrine" of Nixon in relation to Vietnam2, in general, fit into 3 theses:

1) instead of confrontation - the era of negotiations;

2) withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia;

3) "Vietnamization" of the war;

· "Vietnamization of the war" - meant a change in the US military strategy in Indochina: the US planned to finally teach the army of the South Vietnamese puppet regime to fight in order to transfer powers to the Saigon government and begin the gradual withdrawal of its armed forces from the territory of Vietnam. In parallel with the withdrawal of troops, the beginning of the negotiation process on a political settlement with the SV was also considered.

"Vietnamization" was a set of military, political, and socio-economic measures funded by the United States and designed to ensure the normal functioning of the Saigon regime to continue the fight against the Liberation forces even after the withdrawal of American troops from the region. At the same time, the United States tried to maneuver in the four-party talks in Paris, making diplomatic demarches, trying to impose conditions of a political settlement favorable to the United States and Saigon on the DRV3. Priority in the policy of "Vietnamization" was given to the military aspect, since Washington still did not lose hope of achieving victory, albeit through the hands of a puppet regime.

Obviously, the political program of the newly minted, 37th US president was significantly influenced by the elections, during which he was elected to this post. However, the people of the United States had already taken a sip from the cup of disappointment when the previous head of the White House, L. Johnson, assured voters that he “did not want American youths to fight for Asian youths” and that “as long as he is president, there will be peace for all Americans,” did not keep his word. Nixon desperately needed the support of the masses, and for this it was necessary to calm these masses, especially since the bloody events of Song My had received publicity the day before.

And Nixon really began withdrawing troops from Vietnam! Already in the spring of 1969, 65,000 soldiers returned to the States, and in April 1970, Nixon announced the withdrawal of another 150,000 military personnel within a year, and then, without much delay, all the rest4. Washington was confident that the “Vietnamization” of the war was going well: the Saigon henchmen were supposed to safely take the places of the American command, and the return of the soldiers to their homeland was to stabilize the situation in American society. The Americans themselves hoped that this trend would continue, and that the government had made a reasonable decision to stop "persecuting" the surrender of Vietnam. But it was not there….

The Nixon administration did not abandon the original goals at all; she simply revised the methods of achieving them, slightly supplementing the doctrine:

4) "psychological warfare"

5) "pacification of the southern regions"

· "Psychological warfare" - consisted of a series of operations similar to Songmy. It was under Nixon that the United States dealt the most powerful blow to Vietnam, causing the most damage.5 However, as the numbers show, the United States also suffered the most losses during this period. We can safely say that this method of psychological warfare did not justify itself: Ho Chi Minh never came to Paris, “begging for peace”6. The program of "psychological warfare" also included the systematic "intimidation" of the leadership of the DRV, up to the threat of a nuclear war. US Army Commander Westmoreland suggested the use of "small tactical nuclear bombs" in order to "inspire something in Hanoi in the surest way." However, in this case, the prospect of a nuclear confrontation between the US and the USSR, and possibly a new world war, loomed very clearly. Thus, Washington's hands were tied.

Psychological "treatment" was also carried out in the ranks of the Saigon officers (a corps of about 100 thousand people): the personnel were drilled in the spirit of anti-communism, devotion to the ideals of the free world - American ideals. However, even after instilling in the South Vietnamese the need to fight, the American command never taught them this: despite the impressive number of equipment (artillery, armored, air force), the capabilities of the SE were small. The constant reliance on American aid was their “greatest weakness.”7

· Another remedy - "Pacification" of the South - gave, perhaps, much more results than any of the above. The “pacification” of the southern, rural areas of Vietnam consisted in the introduction of a military-police regime in the SE. The forces of the local police, at the mercy of the CIA, by the mid-70s. increased to 122 thousand people. The purpose of the "appeasement" program was to limit the activities of the patriots in the South. It was planned to deprive the patriots of access to human resources, food, and thereby force them to abandon the armed struggle. At the same time, the Americans "fought for the hearts and minds" of the peasantry8 and even promoted agrarian reform. By 1969-71. the policy of "appeasement" gave results: the patriots found themselves in a difficult position, primarily due to changes in the mood of the peasantry. However, contrary to the hopes of the United States and Saigon, this policy did not affect the military-political situation in Vietnam and did not lead to the success of "Vietnamization" in general.

In March 1970, Washington, with the help of the CIA, achieved a coup in Kampuchea - the pro-American group Lon Nol came to power there. The US provided a new client army of 220 thousand people, but this did not strengthen their positions in Southeast Asia. Then Kissinger proposed expanding the scale of the war by invading Cambodia, and the president supported this idea. Nixonger's new campaign was justified, of course, by Wilsonian ideals - promoting the principles of freedom and respect for the neutrality of the state, as well as the burning desire of the United States to "cure" it [the state] of the "red infection". And so, wishing Kampuchea well, the US Army invaded the bombed-out land. And already in the summer of 1971, Washington made an attempt to isolate the patriotic forces of the SE, Cambodia and Laos from the DRV, in order to deal with them one by one later. The best forces of the Saigon army (almost 45 thousand people), with the support of American aviation, invaded the territory of Laos along road No. 9, trying to cut off the routes along which human and material supplies were carried out from the DRV - the famous "Ho Chi Minh trail". But thanks to the active actions of the Vietnamese patriots, the Saigon invaders were defeated near the river. Benhai on the 17th parallel. In the winter of the same year, the largest operation of the American-Saigon troops "Chenla - 2" ended in their unconditional defeat.

The failures of the Saigon weapons could not but worry Washington: financial injections into the region were increasing, equipment and personnel were constantly arriving, but this did not bring success. Dissatisfaction in American society intensified: the people did not want to invest in a war that not only does not bring the desired result, but also discredits the United States in the eyes of the rest of the world! The answer was brewing, and Washington received it: by 1970, due to student unrest and demonstrations, 450 universities and colleges were closed, troops were sent to 21 campuses.

NB May 4, 1970 at the university in Kent, pc. Ohio, the National Guards shot a crowd of students: 4 killed, 10 wounded - this is the result of an attempt to "calm down" the youth, who did not want to become "cannon fodder" for an unnecessary war in the future. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration welcomed the actions of the national guard, students were blamed for the bloody events of May 4, control over universities was strengthened. "Most of the professors should have been shot too," they used to say in the States.9

In addition, in the 70s. Thousands of those who until recently had been that same “cannon fodder” began to arrive in the country every week - soldiers whom Nixon, as promised, returned to their homeland. But how were they received in their native land? On the streets they were greeted with cries of “Weaklings!”, “Beating!”, Asked: “How many babies have you killed?” In addition, a story surfaced with an order to count the dead. The authority of the army was fading before our eyes: no one wanted to serve, because participation in such an unpopular war would not add respect, and not every young American has a cherished dream - to perpetuate his name on a few cm². marble at Arlington National Cemetery.

In total, the United States drove almost 6.5 million of its soldiers and advisers through Southeast Asia. In total, the US Armed Forces lost about 60,000 soldiers in Indochina11, while the rest returned home. But what kind of people they were!

Many of the soldiers who went through Vietnam were never able to return to normal life: someone got drunk, someone suffers from drug addiction, someone completely lost his mind, shaking nervous system, watching countless executions and making his way through the jungle, now and then shuddering from any rustle in anticipation of a surprise attack [the guerrillas more than once gave the Americans a "hospitable welcome" in the thickets of the rainforest]12. American heroes who went overseas to fight for justice returned home branded as ruthless killers. “We were forced to count corpses, we were forced to kill,” said war veterans13. Many war crimes in the spirit of Song My were made public in the United States and outside the country, and the massacre of Vietnamese babies (Viet Cong?!) shocked the whole world.

Vietnam veterans mentally again and again return to the events of those years. Private Simpson confessed: “Yes, I killed ... I am tormented by nightmares: murdered children constantly stand before my eyes. Now I don’t let anyone near me and I don’t love anyone. My love died in Seongmy.”14 “I died in Vietnam,” said another veteran, “I used to be loyal to the Marine Corps, now I don’t care about the United States.” About 100,000 soldiers have returned home crippled, and almost 50,000 live in fear of dying from cancer: the drug orange, used to defoliate the jungle, turned out to be deadly15.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that, as a rule, representatives of the failed, lower classes fought in Vietnam. Subsequently, there was even a saying, they say, "fools fought, and the smartest ones sat out the war, taking advantage of the delays." How right General MacArthur was when he warned L. Johnson that “the time is dangerously close when many Americans will not want to fight for their country”16. The prophecy came true, but Johnson ignored this remark at the time, and Nixon, it seems, missed the moment the army began to collapse. But it was already too late anyway.

With such baggage, R. Nixon approached the next elections in 1972. Watergate was just looming on the horizon, the situation needed to be saved.

First of all, Nixon finally abandoned the idea of ​​​​a fix - by all means to end the war in his favor - and considered negotiations the only way to get out of the quagmire in which the United States was drawn. No joke, all the previous imperialist expansions of the United States ended in the shortest possible time, and, moreover, with an unconditional victory. The Vietnam War has become the longest and most controversial in US history, but it is still too early to sum up its results.

During the election campaign, “all-knowing statistics” played into Nixon’s hands: by the end of his first presidency, instead of 300 coffins a week (as was the case under Johnson), 3-4 were delivered from Vietnam to his homeland. The withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia was controversial, and negotiations with the DRV, according to Kissinger, were nearing a successful conclusion. Contact was also established with the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the Nation decided to give Nixon another chance - he won re-election.

But Nixon did not triumph: the last months of the Vietnam War, as well as the last months of his presidency, he worked under the guns of television cameras (Watergate!). During this time, the United States undertook the last bombing of Vietnamese soil, which resulted in numerous casualties, but in the process lost 16 B-52 aircraft, which cost $ 9 million each - an unacceptable level of losses for the US Air Force! Nevertheless, Nixon managed to somewhat stabilize the US position in Vietnam. In May 1972, Nixon issued a strong-willed decision to blockade the coast of the DRV and mine its ports in order to disorganize the rear of the patriots' offensive. This gave positive results for the United States: they not only stopped the advance of the Viet Cong in the direction of Saigon, but also achieved the conclusion of a peace treaty on their own terms. However, the final meeting in Paris took place without Nixon's participation: for him, as for the United States of America, the war was over.

NB On January 27, 1973, the signing in Paris of the Agreement on Cessing the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam fixed the defeat of the American imperialist aggression in Southeast Asia, and also formalized the withdrawal of US troops from Southeast Asia. On March 18, 1973, the last American soldier left Vietnamese soil17.

So, the American "crusaders of democracy" suffered a crushing defeat in Indochina. Nixon, like his predecessors, could not avoid it, although he gave this task priority. But Nixon, upon his ascension to the presidency, had to revise much of his previous experience, and soon managed to develop a new universal recipe for American foreign policy:

r It is noteworthy that Nixon proclaimed this course back in 1968 as part of his foreign policy doctrine. As we remember, after that he launched large-scale operations in Cambodia and Laos, which did not bring the United States anything but losses. Does this mean that the United States simply physically cannot remain indifferent to the fate of other states, and they simply need to fight on foreign soil? Or was the US fighting for itself in this war?

In 1985, R. Nixon wrote an impressive book, taking as the title the slogan of the anti-war movement "Vietnam No More". After much lamenting that the United States had been beaten in Southeast Asia, he ended the story with the words: “In Vietnam we made an attempt and failed in upholding a just cause. "No more Vietnam" might mean we won't try again. This must mean that we will not be defeated again.”19 Nixon tried his best to get out of Vietnam with dignity, but, like his predecessors, did nothing to make the people of America understand why the US was fighting in Indochina. He ended the longest and most inglorious war in US history, but, like so many before and since, he learned nothing from that defeat. And this means that the United States will make a similar mistake more than once in other regions. This means that history will repeat itself.

Notes to Part I

Chapter I. Beginning of intervention: 1961-65

1. Kissinger G. Does America need an external…, p.278

The “domino theory” is the “creation” of President D. Eisenhower, who, in his address to the public on April 7, 1954, stated that “Indochina represented the first in a series of standing domino chips, the fall of which would disable all the others - Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, would undermine the defense of Japan, would threaten Australia and New Zealand ”(History of Diplomacy, p. 341).

3. History of diplomacy, book 1., p.335

4. ibid., p.342

5. History of diplomacy, v.2, p.343

6. SEATO - South-East Asia Treaty Organization - Southeast Asia (Defence) Treaty Organization, SEATO

7. Yakovlev N.N. Washington Skylines, p.263

9. see Annexes, table 3

10. Kissinger G. Does America need an external…, p.277

11. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.309

12. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.282

13. ibid., p.278

14. ibid., p.287

15. "McNamara Belt" - a system of defensive structures equipped with modern electronic equipment to prevent the penetration of ground troops into the demilitarized zone

16. Yakovlev N.N. American War and Peace, pp.52-53

17. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.282

18. ibid., p.265

19. Kissinger G. Does America need an external…, p.276-277

Chapter II. Strength and impotence: 1965-1968

1. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, pp.271-272

2. ibid., p.282

3. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.286

4. ibid., p.278

5. ibid., p.283

6. Yakovlev N.N. War and Peace…, pp. 47-50

7. See Appendices, fig.3

8. Yakovlev N.N. War and Peace…, p.44

9. ibid., pp. 47-50

11 Cold War Flashpoints Movie 2

12. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.289

13. Vietnam in the fight, p.127

14. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.291

Chapter III. "In the quagmire": 1968-1973

1. History of diplomacy, book. 2, p.373

2. The “Guam Doctrine” covered not only the situation in Southeast Asia, but also characterized the US policy in the entire Asia-Pacific region (history of diplomacy, v. 2., pp. 265-266)

3. Vietnam in the fight, page 129

Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, pp. 317-320

4. See Appendices, Table 1

5. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.311

6. Vietnam in the fight, p.130

7. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.338

8. ibid., p.336

9. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, pp.319-320

10. Yakovlev N.N. War and Peace…, p.55

11 Cold War Flashpoints Movie 2

12. Parks D. Diary of an American soldier, p.66

13. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.322

14. Cold War Flashpoints Movie 2

15. see Appendices, fig.3

16. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes..., p. 264

17. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, page 339

18. ibid., p. 303

19. Yakovlev N.N. War and peace…, p. 63

Vietnam: Second War of the Resistance

"Such a tiny people, possessing,

probably one ten thousandth of the power of the United States!”

J. Denton, US Senator Alabama (1985)

Vietnam on the eve of the war

§ 1 The history of the national liberation struggle of Vietnam against foreign invaders

In its history, Vietnam experienced more than one invasion: the Vietnamese people went through wars with Chinese dynasties, survived 3 Mongol campaigns and Japanese imperialist aggression, and for several decades were under the yoke of French colonial rule.

& The first state to outline its territorial claims against Vietnam was, of course, China. Chinese emperors for many millennia considered the Vietnamese lands part of their vast territory. Already in 214 BC. Emperor Qin Shi Huang made the first campaign in a southerly direction, which was unsuccessful. The second campaign, led by the commander Zhao Tuo, was marked in 179 BC. conquest of Vietnam. Qin Shi Huang planned to populate the annexed territories with Chinese settlers, but Zhao Tuo decided to rule the Vietnamese lands on his own: he separated from the empire, after which he founded the state of Nam Viet in the south. However, the Han dynasty that came to power in China categorically disagreed with this state of affairs, and therefore in 112 BC. Han Emperor Wu Di moved troops to Nam Viet, and a year later the Nam Viet capital Panyu (modern Guangzhou) fell. Thus began the long reign of the Chinese dynasties of Han, Li and Tang, which was repeatedly interrupted due to frequent uprisings, some of which led to the expulsion of the Chinese from the country. However, the Chinese emperors again seized the lands of their southern neighbor. After the uprising of Khuk Thua Dhu in 906, the Vietnamese once again expelled the Chinese invaders from the country and no longer allowed the establishment of Chinese rule on their territory. The campaigns undertaken by the Song (960-1076), Ming (1368-1427), Yuan (3 Mongol campaigns against Dai Viet 1257-1288) and Qing (1788) dynasties were unsuccessful:1 in response to each aggression, the Viet launched an anti-Chinese movement, urging soldiers to repulse the invaders. 1788 summed up the centuries-old struggle for independence, during which the best features of the nation were demonstrated: heroism, patriotism, love of freedom and deep national consciousness. Since 1788, a peaceful stage of development of the state began for Dai Viet, and already in 1804 the state received its modern name - Vietnam (“South Viet”)2.

But peace did not reign in the Vietnamese territories for long: in 1858, France, having ended the war with China the day before, began to conquer the country. In 1861, French troops occupied the south of Vietnam, and on June 5, the Saigon Treaty was signed, securing French acquisitions. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese people offered fierce resistance to the colonialists until 1883, when the French managed to impose an enslaving treaty on Vietnam by force of arms, according to which it recognized the protectorate of France. In 1885, France forced China to renounce its suzerainty over Vietnam. Thus the conquest of the country was completed.

The entire history of Vietnam in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. took place in a stubborn and courageous struggle against foreign invaders; this struggle was of a national liberation character and united broad sections of the masses: the peasantry, artisans, intelligentsia, and patriotic feudal lords. Between 1886 and 1913 in Vietnam, pockets of resistance flared up every now and then (resistance in Bandin, Bakshay, Khunglin, Huong Son, Yenthen uprisings) as part of the liberation struggle under the motto "kan-vyong" - "loyalty to the emperor"3. However, all the uprisings were brutally suppressed by the French occupiers. With the defeat of the Kan-vyong movement, the era of resistance to the invaders, led by the nationalist feudal lords, ended. Vietnam turned into a raw materials appendage of France and for some time abandoned attempts to regain independence. The awakening of national consciousness among the advanced, patriotic circles of Vietnamese society is associated with the events that took place in the Far East and East Asia, namely, the Russo-Japanese war and the Xinhai revolution in China. During this period, also called the period of the "awakening of Asia", propaganda for bourgeois development unfolded in Vietnam. However, there was no unity among the patriots: one part of them insisted on the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic system, and the other on the priority expulsion of foreign invaders. The Great October Revolution had a great influence on the further course of events in Vietnam, because it was it that prompted the first Vietnamese propagandist of its ideas - Ho Chi Minh - that only the Communist Party could organize the national liberation movement of the masses.

NB On February 3, 1930, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the united Communist Party of Vietnam was established. The working class, under the leadership of its communist vanguard, assumed the leading role in the national liberation movement. In the summer of 1936, the Popular Liberation Front was deployed. But the party failed to quickly organize the popular masses in such a way as to create conditions for the expulsion of the invaders: the French colonial apparatus, with the outbreak of World War II, launched repressions against democratic forces in Indochina. Virtually all democratic organizations in Vietnam have gone underground. It seemed that it was already impossible to achieve the independence of the country. But, as they say, there would be no happiness, but misfortune helped.

& Japanese imperialist aggression 1940-1945.

As we know, Japan in World War II was one of the aggressors in general and the main aggressor in the Pacific region. Therefore, when the French government capitulated to German fascism in June 1940, "favorable" conditions developed for the fascistization of the French administration in Indochina. On September 23, 1940, the Japanese actually occupied the peninsula, although the previous government remained in place. It is noteworthy that from the very beginning, the French authorities opposed the anti-fascist movement in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and persecuted its participants. Since the French colonists were unable to protect the peoples of Indochina from Japanese aggression, the Vietnamese from the very first days of the invasion began an independent struggle against the Japanese invaders. In October-November 1940, a partisan movement unfolded, and anti-Japanese uprisings broke out almost simultaneously in a number of cities in the south of the country. Vietnam once again plunged into its familiar state of Vietnam in the struggle.

An important milestone in the Japanese-Vietnamese confrontation and in the entire subsequent history of Vietnam was the creation in May 1941 of the League of Struggle for the Independence of Vietnam - the Viet Minh League, formed on the initiative of all the country's patriotic forces without exception. The people of Vietnam, from their experience of the struggle for independence, knew that the only way to drive out the invaders was by force of arms, so the Viet Minh League set the task of creating the armed forces of the people. On the basis of several partisan detachments, the National Salvation Army was created.

· On March 9, 1945, the Japanese occupation authorities liquidated the French colonial apparatus in Vietnam. In all major cities, the Japanese disarmed the French military garrisons. Part of the French troops fled to China. Thus, the French authorities capitulated to the Japanese aggressors, giving them almost the entire country almost without resistance. But the Vietnamese people did not want to simply replace French domination with Japanese domination. He wanted freedom and independence.

The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese partisans rallied the masses, instilled in them hatred for the invaders and traitors, and raised them to fight the enemy. Thanks to active propaganda, thousands of people rushed to the partisan detachments. By March 1945, supporting armed bases were established, due to which the Viet Minh forces controlled 6 provinces of the NE. And in the period from March to August 1945, the partisan movement covered a number of other provinces: Yen Bai, Quang Yen, Ninh Binh, Kuang Ngai. By mid-1945, the Viet Minh forces, thanks to the unification of the Liberation Army and the National Salvation Army into a single National Liberation Army of Vietnam, already controlled most of the territory of Vietnam. Despite the fact that the Vietnamese people liberated their country on their own and expelled the French from its territory, the course of events was also largely influenced by the successes of the Soviet army, which clearly showed that the days of the Japanese occupiers were numbered.

On August 16, 1945, the Congress of People's Representatives was convened in Tanchao, which adopted a historic decision on a nationwide armed uprising. At the same congress, the Central Committee of National Liberation, headed by Ho Chi Minh, was elected. And on August 19, Hanoi was liberated. On August 23, an uprising broke out in Hue. During the uprising, Emperor Bao Dai issued an act of renunciation. On September 2, 1945, in Hanoi, the Provisional Revolutionary Government proclaimed the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Thus, as a result of 80 years of struggle against the French colonialists and 5 years of war with the Japanese occupiers, the Vietnamese people overthrew the colonial yoke and established a democratic republic on the basis of national independence, territorial unity and democratic freedoms.

& Franco-Vietnamese War 1946-1954

On March 2, 1946, the first session of the National Assembly of Vietnam began in Hanoi, which called on the people to direct all efforts to protect and restore the country "in order to achieve happiness." At the end of 1946, the second session of the National Assembly took place, which became historic for the Vietnamese people, because it was at it that, after a nationwide discussion, the country's constitution was adopted. In addition, on May 27, 1946, a new organization was created, wider than the Viet Minh - Lien Viet, which united all the patriots of the country. Viet Minh and Lien Viet were able to achieve genuine unity of the Vietnamese people in a short time, without which it would be impossible to repel foreign aggression4. Already in 1945, the Kuomintang army invaded the country, which was supported by the nationalist groups of Vietnam. The invaders demanded the resignation of Ho Chi Minh in favor of the abdicated Emperor Bao Dai. But the Chiang Kai-shek dominance in Vietnam did not last long: in March 1946, Chinese troops were withdrawn from the territory of the country. However, by that time, British troops had already landed in Saigon (September 1945), which released French prisoners of war who had been in custody since the time of the Japanese coup, and armed them. The latter immediately organized a series of provocative measures against the revolutionary authorities. The situation in the country was heating up.

On August 16, the French government sent an expeditionary force to the coast of Vietnam, and on August 23, a detachment of French paratroopers was dropped in Nambo. On September 20, in the south of the country, the British released another 1,400 prisoners of war from custody, who occupied Saigon on the night of September 23. And by the beginning of 1946, the French already controlled Nambo with the aim of turning it into a puppet state. In parallel, the French military leadership negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek in order to secure his consent to replace Chinese troops with French ones. In March 1946, France sat down at the negotiating table with Vietnam. And although it seemed that French troops could conquer the entire country in a short time, in fact, France was not ready to wage war on the territory of all of Vietnam. The French planned to first introduce a small contingent of troops into the NE, and then, having fortified in the north and received new military units from France, to expand the occupation and ultimately capture the entire country.

On March 6, 1946, a preliminary agreement was signed in Hanoi between France and the DRV, according to which the French government recognized the republic as a free state with its own government and army, which was part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union5. An additional convention was also attached to the agreement, providing that French troops of no more than 15,000 people would continue their presence in Vietnamese territory for the final disarmament of Japanese troops. This convention untied the hands of the French to begin intervention in Vietnam. The French command began an accelerated transfer of troops to the northern regions of Vietnam, significantly increasing their numbers. And already on July 15, 1946, French troops captured the city of Dongdang, and in early August occupied the city of Baknin. From August 1946, the French forced the capture of the coastal regions of Vietnam: Kamfa-min, Kamfa-port, Thien, Damha, Wattai. In addition, the French expeditionary force provoked a number of military incidents in Bakning, Hanoi and Haiphong, and the brutal massacres in Hongai on June 8, 1946 caused great damage to the civilian population and caused numerous casualties. In the fall of 1946, the French captured 2 strategically important Vietnamese points - Haiphong (November 22) and Lang Son (November 25). Soon, an additional contingent was introduced to Da Nang, one of the key Vietnamese ports. A serious danger hung over the DRV: the French controlled most of the means of communication and occupied most of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh vainly sent appeals to the French ministers: it became obvious that it would not be possible to resolve the issue peacefully. Therefore, the leader of the DRV appealed to the Vietnamese people to start the War of Resistance.

The beginning of the War of Resistance was marked by the heroic defense of Hanoi in February 1947. It did not end with any notable successes for both sides, but played a big role in raising the morale of the nation. Partisan detachments began to form everywhere. The National Liberation Army also fought against the colonialists. In October 1947, the Vietnamese army prevented the threat of encirclement of the city of Vietbac, defeating the French groups individually. The war took on a protracted character. The fighting was carried out mainly by guerrilla methods, since the French outnumbered the Vietnamese army in technical and numerical terms. The French themselves, unable to destroy the DRV with the help of lightning-fast offensive operations, resorted to political maneuvers and blackmail, which manifested itself in the creation of a puppet government headed by Nguyen Van Xuan in the occupied territory of Vietnam. But by that time, the French army was already faced with the increased activity of Vietnamese patriots and with financial difficulties. It was then that France took a step, which later became a bridge from the 1st War of Resistance to the 2nd. The French government turned to the United States for help, which, as we recall, created favorable conditions for the intervention of the US imperialists in the internal affairs of Vietnam. The DRV, in turn, went for rapprochement with the countries of the socialist community. By the autumn of 1950, the National Army of Vietnam, due to the development of the economic sector, had become so strong that it was able to liberate the border areas in the north of the country in a short time.

The United States tried to use the conflict to infiltrate its capital into Indochina. At the same time, America paid attention to the extraction of strategic raw materials in the south of the peninsula: in 1949-1953. 90% of the extracted rubber and 50% of tin were exported to the USA. However, French military failures alarmed the United States; therefore, in 1950, the United States, which recognized Bao Dai's government, offered the latter economic assistance under the Marshall Plan. And on December 23 of the same year, the United States and France signed an agreement on the provision of military assistance by the United States to the French army7. In addition, America sent its military mission to Vietnam, which, in essence, directed the operations of the French in that country. But, despite all the efforts of the French and American imperialists to strengthen their military positions, the tactical and strategic initiative gradually passed into the hands of the Vietnamese.

During 1951-1952. Resistance forces recaptured Hoa Binh from France and captured the valleys of the Da (Black) and Ma (Swift) rivers. And in 1953-1954. they liberated the territory of Northwestern Vietnam, with the exception of the city of Dien Bien Phu. The battle for Dien Bien Phu became the pitched battle of the entire war; the Vietnamese are proud to call it their "Stalingrad"8: it lasted 55 days (from March 13 to May 7). The People's Army of Vietnam defeated the forces of the French army, winning in every sense a historic victory, which soon brought the resistance war to a victorious conclusion. By the summer of 1954, the Vietnamese army had liberated the cities of Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh, and Fuli.

On July 20-21, 1954, agreements were signed in Geneva that summed up the War of Resistance and ensured the restoration of peace in Indochina. And on April 28, 1956, the last French soldier left Vietnamese soil.

These are the summaries which, it seems to me, should have been put in writing on President Kennedy's desk before he ordered the expansion of the American contingent in Vietnam. Of course, there is no reason to believe that the president did not receive such information, just as there is no conclusive evidence that Kennedy really had this knowledge. In any case, this would hardly have stopped the American president, but it would almost certainly have made it easier for the Pentagon to strategize, and perhaps make the war less protracted.

I focus on the 35th President of the United States not only because his actions in Vietnam set off a “chain reaction” of “Vietnamese mistakes” in Washington. Unbelievable, but true: none of the fifteen Harvard professors [among whom there were 4 historians] who surrounded the president had an exhaustive idea of ​​the mysterious Asian country into which Kennedy was going to drive American soldiers. There was no specialist familiar with the history and traditions of Vietnam in the president's entourage. In this, ex-Secretary of Defense R. McNamara sees the main reason for the defeat of the United States: “Our incorrect judgments regarding the concept of “friend or foe” reflected our deep ignorance and ignorance of the history, culture and politics of the people living in this region and the personal qualities and habits of its leaders. We could just as misjudge the Soviet Union during our frequent confrontations, such as Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East, if we didn't have "Tommy" Thompson and Kennan with their invaluable advice and guidance. For decades these leading diplomats have studied the Soviet Union, its people and its leaders, the reasons for their actions and the reactions to the steps we take…. But we did not have specialists of this level in Southeast Asia, and, as a result, we had no one to consult with when preparing draft decisions on

Vietnam"9. There was another circumstance: none of the US government and senior military officials [and primarily McNamara himself] learned from the defeat of the French in the war of 1946-54, although many of them took a direct part in the Franco-Vietnamese conflict. The Americans, in all likelihood, considered that they were quite capable of breaking the resistance of the North Vietnamese without first "probing the ground" due to their militaristic might. But they were wrong.

§ 2 Geneva Accords of 1954 and their consequences

So, Vietnam once again achieved an important victory on the path to becoming a free state. The French, who had lost over 466,000 people in Indochina and abandoned their colonial claims, were forced to negotiate with the Viet Minh leaders, led by Ho Chi Minh.

On July 20-21, 1954, agreements were signed in Geneva that were supposed to ensure peace in Indochina. During the negotiations, agreements were reached on the cessation of hostilities in the territories of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as well as agreements on the withdrawal of French troops from Indochina. In the final declaration, the negotiators pledged to "respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states and refrain from any interference in their internal affairs"10.

On the basis of the Geneva Accords, the NE Government has also proposed the following practical measures:

1) Restore normal relations and freedom of movement between North and South; create conditions for communication between various political, economic, cultural and public organizations North and South of Vietnam.

2) Start a consultative meeting of representatives of both sides to discuss the issue of holding general elections in order to unite the country.11

According to the decision of the conference participants, during July 1956, under the control of an international commission, general free elections were to be held in Vietnam. In preparation for them, a consultative meeting of representatives of both sides was to be convened to exercise the democratic freedoms of all citizens, patriotic parties and organizations.

r In the opinion of many, the most important victory of the representatives of the democratic camp was the agreement on measures that would prevent the use of the territory of Indochina for aggressive purposes in the future. Thus, for example, it was forbidden to bring troops and military-technical personnel into Vietnam, establish military bases, as well as the participation of both parts of Vietnam in aggressive alliances12. As history shows, these bans hardly stopped anyone.

As for the military component, in accordance with the Geneva Declaration, within 80-300 days, the troops of both sides were to be regrouped into the zones allocated for each of them: for the troops of the DRV - North Vietnam, for the French troops - South Vietnam.

The Geneva Accords also established a temporary demarcation line south of the 17th parallel, which, as pointed out, could not be interpreted as a political or territorial border, although in reality it was of such a nature. This line divided the country into two parts: North Vietnam with a people's democratic system, and South Vietnam (SE), headed by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, whose government was oriented towards the United States. (Ziem lived in the US for many years and came from a Catholic family).

Thus, the signing of the Geneva Accords was a great victory for the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The First War of Resistance once again proved that it is practically impossible to fight against national liberation movements when the self-consciousness and spirit of the nation are on the rise. The whole history of the state of Vietnam tells us about this, whose people, like no one else, know how to fight for independence even in the face of an enemy whose forces are many times superior to their own.

So, the people of Vietnam took a very important step towards independence - they freed themselves from the colonial oppression of France. It would seem that the next step should have been the unification of the country, and the primary measure was to overcome the demarcation line and the resistance of Ngo Dinh Diem, because the country, at someone else's whim, was divided in two. However, something soon happened that forced the Vietnamese patriots to start all over again: the Second War of Resistance began.

Two Vietnams: North and South in the struggle for independence

§ 1 Collapse of the “Winston Churchill South Asia1” regime

By 1955, Vietnam was already divided along the 17th parallel into two independent state entities: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with a socialist regime in the north, and a state with a pro-American regime in the south.

The process of formation of the pro-American regime was completed in 1956, when the French troops left Indochina after the defeat, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and under direct pressure from the United States. Even earlier, the United States forced the holding of separate elections in the SE, as a result of which a “Constitution” was adopted and a “National Assembly” was convened. On October 23, 1955, as a result of the "referendum", Emperor Bao Dai was deprived of power and removed by the American protege Ngo Dinh Diem. SE ceased to be called a monarchy and was proclaimed a republic.

Diem made every effort to prevent the natural unification of the country. And if, to the north of the demarcation line, the principles of democracy were proclaimed, then to the south, the rights of Vietnamese citizens were violated in the most cruel way, and mass repressions were carried out against the fighters for national unification.

As we remember, according to the decisions of the Geneva Conference, free elections were to be held in Vietnam by 1956, which would determine the future of the state. And in 1955, Pham Van Dong (then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV) expressed the readiness of the northern side to hold a consultative conference with representatives of the Saigon government on issues related to the organization of free general elections under the control of an international commission2 in 1956. However, the Diem government did not make contact gone; instead, Saigon resorted to outright provocation: on July 20, 1955, the headquarters of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam was attacked and the elections were disrupted.

So, when Diem came to power, he refused to comply with the terms of the Geneva Convention, abandoned reforms and launched mass terror in the puppet state. The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem had the character of a family-clan fascist dictatorship, its social support was based on the reactionary elite of the landowner-comprador and bureaucratic circles, while in Washington they planned to create a “national democracy” regime, and the separatism of the ruling elite did not appear in their plans3 . The persistent demands of the United States regarding the expansion of the social base of puppet power, if not ignored by Diem, then led to very limited results. Ngo Dinh Diem ceased to suit the States in all respects, so Vice President L. Johnson was delegated to Saigon with the aim of giving "Winston Churchill of South Asia" the last warning.

In May 1961, a joint communique was held between Johnson and Ngo Dinh Diem, at which the parties discussed the issue of US assistance to Saigon in the fight against the subversive activities of the North Vietnamese. At the same time, the "Staley-Taylor Plan" was put into effect, marking the expansion of the "special war" in Vietnam.

· "Plan Staley - Taylor" - a program of military, economic, social measures to strengthen the Saigon regime and further US interference in the affairs of the SE. The program included the bombing and defoliation of border areas, the supply of weapons, as well as the creation of a network of "strategic settlements" (a kind of concentration camps) with a military-police regime in the SE, where it was planned to drive almost all rural population.

Expanding its intervention in Southeast Asia, the United States demanded from Diem the right for American advisers in Saigon to take part in decision-making, but faced resistance from the leader of the puppet state: Ngo Dinh Diem was afraid of infringement of his dictatorial powers4.

Military defeats, the failure of the "strategic settlements" program, and growing disagreements between the Saigon elite and Washington convinced the United States that Ngo Dinh Diem's ​​stay in power as "the conductor of American ideas" ceased to satisfy them. Relations became even more aggravated when Diem decided to play on the American-French disagreements over Charles de Gaulle's proposal to declare the SE a neutral zone and France's readiness to support the interested countries of Indochina in this5. The United States tried to put pressure on Diem, but soon became convinced that the easiest way to solve the problem of the puppet regime that had arisen was to get rid of the dictator.

The first attempt to raise an uprising against the Diem regime was made as early as 1960, but it turned out to be unsuccessful and was organized by the South Vietnamese forces. In 1963, CIA leaders R. Hillsman and M. Forrestal, with the consent of Kennedy, sent a telegram to the American ambassador in Saigon, G. Lodge, who, by the way, did not immediately understand what was happening, with the order "to promote the putsch in every possible way"6. But the preparations for the coup dragged on: the conspirators in Saigon, urged on by the CIA, clearly lacked courage; Ngo Dinh Diem, who began "to suspect something", was assured that he could feel for the United States, as "behind a stone wall." Finally, on November 1, 1963, the rebellion began.

The dictator, seriously frightened, immediately connected by phone with Lodge. The experienced diplomat, although he received preliminary valuable instructions from Assistant President Bundy about his behavior with Ngo Dinh Diem, did not use them and referred to complete ignorance. Bundy intended Lodge to express "concern for Diem's ​​personal safety," but the ambassador seemed to have a presentiment [and no wonder] that lulling the vigilance of "Winston Churchill of South Asia" would hardly be necessary. Diem himself knew that, being captured by the rebels, he was unlikely to survive. And so it happened: on November 6, 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother were killed in a coup.

The United States immediately set about creating a new puppet government: a specially selected military junta was in power in the SE. Washington was already planning for the future when what happened happened. On November 22, 2 weeks after the death of Ngo Dinh Diem, the 35th President of the United States of America, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, was assassinated.

The death of the president, without a doubt, shocked Camelot, but the US government was not going to abandon the course taken in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, according to the "wonder boys", was dangerous to leave, because the situation in Indochina without the intervention of the United States would begin to develop according to the "domino principle". “Vietnam is the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia… Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and, quite obviously, Laos and Cambodia are among those who will be threatened if the red wave of communism overwhelms Vietnam,” was Kennedy’s own diagnosis. eight.

Be that as it may, the replacement of Diem by a military junta did not contribute to the emergence of positive dynamics in the struggle against the national liberation movement. As a result, with the filing of the United States in the SE from November 1963 to July 1965. more than a dozen coups took place; in search of the optimal option, various “formulas of power” were tested, in the end, the United States settled on a military dictatorship, of a “bourgeois-constitutional” persuasion, the luster of which was given by inherently fictitious “democratic freedoms”. But the puppet regime was falling apart before our eyes, despite all the efforts of the United States: a crisis was clearly emerging in the supreme power, the combat effectiveness of the army also left much to be desired. Washington soberly assessed the capabilities of the Saigon regime, but this did not lead to a revision of its foreign policy: as we remember, the “Tonkin resolution” was adopted, which marked the open intervention of the United States in Southeast Asia.

§ 2 DRV and NLF: the path to national unity

So, after the August Revolution of 1946 and the expulsion of the Japanese and French invaders, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was formed in the north of the country, headed by Ho Chi Minh.

q Ho Chi Minh - the communist leader of the national liberation movement of the Vietnamese people; in 1946-54 led the armed struggle of the Viet Minh; from 1954 until his death he led the military operations of the NE and the Viet Cong against the SE and the USA

The real name of this prominent political figure in Vietnam is Nguyen Ai Quoc, but the whole world knows him under the pseudonym "Ho Chi Minh", which means "wise" in the Vietnamese language. He began his struggle for the independence of Vietnam as early as 1919, when he lived in France, and at the Versailles Conference handed over to its participants a memorandum demanding independence for Vietnam. In 1924-25. in Guangzhou founded a communist revolutionary organization. For his revolutionary activities in Europe in 1927-1929. was sentenced to death in absentia by the French colonial authorities. He was repeatedly arrested, in 1931-34 and 1941-44. was first in the English, and then in the Chiang Kai-shek prisons. In 1944, Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam, headed the Provisional Government formed after the August Revolution of 1946, and concluded agreements with the French side that marked the independence of the DRV. In 1951, Ho Chi Minh led the Vietnamese Workers' Party, and soon became the honorary chairman of Lien Viet, which in 1954 secured the signing of the Geneva Accords. In 1956, Ho Chi Minh was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

"Uncle Ho", as he asked himself to be called, was a real favorite of his people. Ho Chi Minh really was "wise" by his life experience: he traveled a lot, spoke 5 languages ​​fluently, including Russian. Even as president of his country, he lived more than modestly. His appeals to fellow citizens to protect the fatherland did not leave anyone indifferent. And his words became a real hymn to the entire Vietnamese history: “The words of Ho Chi Minh are clear, sinking into the heart – about the most important thing, about how the people lived today. The president's penetrating voice sounded like a helmsman's call to friends sailing with him on the same ship - a call to overcome the hurricane wind and waves; and each drew support and faith from him for himself. Ho Chi Minh died in 1969 before the victory. But he was and remains the main hero of his people. And the Vietnamese people, as we remember, do not forget any of their heroes.

In the south, a pro-American regime was established, which was fought by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), supported by the communists of the North. And already by 1963, 80% of the “strategic settlements” created according to the Staley-Taylor plan were destroyed by the NLF forces. During the year, the NLF inflicted a number of defeats on the American army in the areas of Apbak, Kontum, Pleiku, Lok Ninh, and others. By July 1964, its forces already controlled ⅔ of the territory of the SE. It was then that the United States decided to go for broke and intervene directly in the affairs of Vietnam. The reason for open intervention was the so-called "Tonkin crisis". As E. Glazunov, an employee of the USSR Embassy in Hanoi, said, “the well-known Tonkin incident that took place in August 1964 caused bewilderment of the leadership of the DRV. The Vietnamese leadership remained in a state of "surprise" for several months. And only when in February next year raids on the territory of the DRV began, everyone understood that last year's episode in the Gulf of Tonkin and the current US air raids are connected.

On March 8, 1965, US Marines landed at the port of Da Nang. Washington planned to cut off the forces of the patriots of the SE from the DRV, inflicting a series of massive strikes on the territory of the latter. The American army unleashed the full power of its ultra-modern weapons on the DRV. But what could the North Vietnamese army oppose to them? Only ineffective anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. It was then that Hanoi turned to Moscow for help.

There are still legends about the assistance of the Soviet Union to the DRV. Some experts, such as the Vietnamese General Tran Van Quang, argue that the USSR's assistance was limited to the supply of military equipment to the SV and briefing on the use of this equipment. “Soviet specialists did not interfere in questions of a strategic and diplomatic nature,” said Chan Van Kuang, “as well as in the development of a plan for the conduct of the war.”11 And it really was. But the American side was sure that Russian snipers were waiting for its soldiers under every tree in the jungle. At one time, there was even a famous military song about the events of those years - “My Phantom”, in which an American pilot demands to show him “that Russian who shot him down”. Of course, no Russians were shown to the Americans, however, this version is not without foundation.

· Washington saw no difference between US military support for the Diem regime and Soviet assistance to the DRV. Once Ho Chi Minh was asked a reasonable question: “What is the difference between the help that brotherly countries give you and the help of the United States to Ngo Dinh Diem?” The answer was the following: “The countries of socialism are united and unanimous…. As for American aid, let me refer to a Japanese newspaper. “The Americans, in providing assistance, seek to sell weapons, sell stray goods and make big profits,” the newspaper wrote, “and the provision of this assistance is always accompanied by the imposition of political and military demands that are beneficial to the United States. Consequently, the loans help the ruling circles of the United States to pursue a policy of warmongering.

Be that as it may, the USSR showed itself to be a decisive ally of Vietnam. In 1965, Chairman of the Council of Ministers A.N. arrived in Vietnam. Kosygin. At a joint Soviet-Vietnamese conference, a decision was made to provide material assistance to Vietnam, as well as a decision to create a Group of Soviet military specialists on different types troops. It is curious that sometimes Soviet officers were not even told where they were being sent. They only said that they needed to “go on a business trip to a southern country with a tropical climate, where hostilities are taking place,” but domestic experts understood even without these hints that they were going to Vietnam, one of the “hot spots” of those years.

The USSR had previously provided military assistance to the South Vietnamese partisans with captured German weapons. But now, when it was already a question of a direct attack by the Americans on the independent Republic of Vietnam, a decision was made to involve high-tech Soviet weapons in the Vietnamese conflict. Thus, a new page was opened in the confrontation between Soviet and American weapons, which characterized a long period of history called the Cold War.

The training of the Vietnamese was carried out on the principle of "do as I do"; this was primarily due to the timing in which it was necessary to train Vietnamese specialists. But at first, military operations were carried out by the forces of Soviet reduced calculations, and the Vietnamese served as understudies. As the members of the Group of Soviet Specialists note, this fact at first repelled the Vietnamese - ardent fighters, made them less accommodating. The Vietnamese warriors were eager for battle and were upset if they could not shoot down a single enemy Phantom. However, the Vietnamese quickly learned from their Soviet comrades and were soon able to replace them in all positions. During the years of escalation, and after the "Vietnamization" in the sky over the DRV, 4181 American aircraft were shot down (including bombers of the B-52 type, etc.). Almost 10,000 Soviet military specialists passed through Vietnam, and the losses were negligible, largely due to the fact that the Vietnamese soldiers fought selflessly and in the heat of battle were not afraid to cover Soviet officers, even at the cost of their own lives.

Separate words deserve the patriots of North and South Vietnam, whose spirit at the initial stage of the war was planned to undermine the American "crusaders of democracy." But in reality, everything turned out differently. In the States, people who read the New York Times reports were horrified: “Always and everywhere, our soldiers expect that the next step may be the last in their lives,” the Times wrote, “suddenly tripping over some kind of wire, they can fall into a wolf pit studded with iron or bamboo points, and these points are often smeared with poison. As soon as a soldier touches another barely noticeable wire, an arrow will fall from the bowstring of the crossbow right into his chest. Stepping on a rusty nail sticking out of the ground, he can be blown up by a mine. In the pocket of a peasant shirt hanging on the wall, an infernal machine can be hidden. Even the statues on the altars explode. Items that seem like tempting souvenirs can turn out to be deadly gifts…. Recently, near Da Nang, a Marine sergeant, a very cautious and savvy man, tore down a banner with an anti-American slogan hanging by the road at the edge of the field. The explosion blew him to shreds along with the poster.”13

In such incidents, the US Army lost more people than in direct confrontation with the armed forces of Vietnam. The Americans tried to destroy the Viet Cong shelters: they fired at them with machine gun fire, sprayed poisonous gas into them and even bombed them from many meters high, but in vain! The agile, evasive Vietnamese again and again subjected American platoons to their surprise attacks, step by step they set up ingenious traps in the jungle, and the Americans each time fell into their nets and died or remained crippled for life. And although on the one hand this method of warfare looks inhumane, the Vietnamese patriots did not have a wide choice of weapons, and the Americans tested the power of all the weapons at their disposal on the Viet Cong. However, despite their noticeable lag in this component, the Vietnamese patriots had a significant advantage in such skirmishes: they "read" the situation, predicted what the enemy would do in the next moment, and the enemy did not even guess what the Viet Cong were preparing for him.

The patriots of the South and the North, although they were on opposite sides of the demarcation line, acted as a single organism. “Vietnam is one country, the Vietnamese are one people; Rivers may dry up, mountains may collapse, but this truth will never change,” said Ho Chi Minh14. So the People's Army of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of SE, although they seem to be different forces, were in fact a single whole. Therefore, when military and material assistance arrived in the SV, it also had to be transported to the fighting partisans of the South hundreds of kilometers through forests and mountains, often on their own shoulders and along complete impassability. The route that military supplies traveled to the South was called the "Ho Chi Minh Trail"15. In fact, the Ho Chi Minh Trail never ended; the Vietnamese could so quickly and invisibly approach American positions that it was believed that the "Ho Chi Minh trail" runs throughout the country.

Approximately 70 km. northwest of Saigon is the legendary Kuchi region - another stronghold of the guerrilla movement; it occupies 180 km 2 in area and during the war years was a huge underground fortress. The passages into it were so well camouflaged that they could not be detected even standing nearby. And if they were discovered, then an American soldier, perhaps the most slender, could hardly squeeze through these narrow manholes. The miniature Vietnamese succeeded without interference; they literally fell through the ground in front of the astonished Americans! In the endless underground passages, everything necessary for a stay was provided, including wells with fresh water. The total length of passages and galleries stretched for 250 km, thanks to which 16 thousand fighters could be here at the same time - a whole division. They were located at 3 levels: 3, 6 and 8 meters. The lowest level saved even from artillery fire and bombing. An extensive network of passages and manholes allowed the partisans to move freely around the area and unexpectedly appear in those places where the enemy least expected to see them. The Americans made every effort to destroy Kuti, because from the North this area is surrounded by impenetrable jungle, through which the "Ho Chi Minh trail" passed, in the South it was a stone's throw to Saigon, which posed a real threat to the latter. What the Americans did not do in order to put an end to the underground city: they flooded it with water, subjected it to shelling and bombardment, sprayed gas, but in vain! The partisans went to the lower level and waited there until the earth absorbed the poison. American soldiers nevertheless penetrated into the manholes; for those of them who survived, the memories of this became a nightmare for life. And the passages and galleries, which the Americans still managed to blow up, were restored literally overnight. Then the Americans expelled the entire civilian population from the area and turned Kuti into a continuous "death zone", setting up roadblocks around the perimeter. But this only helped during the day; at night, the Viet Cong easily “leaked” through the posts and delivered devastating blows. That was the Vietnamese war...

In 1966-67. Liberation forces disrupted a number of US military operations in the valley of the river. Mekong - one of the main guerrilla areas. At the beginning of 1967, a new front was opened in the northern part of the country, so that the American command was forced to transfer there selected units of its own and Saigon troops, which significantly weakened the front in the southern provinces. They firmly held the initiative in their hands, inflicting powerful blows on the interventionists and the puppet army in different parts of the SE. According to the Patriots, the losses of the US-Saigon troops in 1966-67. amounted to 175 thousand people, 1.8 thousand aircraft and helicopters, up to 4 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers and other equipment.

Between 1969 and 1971 there was some decline in the activity of the patriots of the South, due to the activities of the United States, which was called the policy of "appeasement" and led to certain successes. But already in the spring of 1972, the patriots launched a general offensive and inflicted a series of defeats on the American-Saigon troops, liberating the areas of Kuang Tri, Lok Ninh and An Lok, northwest of Saigon on the Central Plateau, and were also able to cut the enemy's main communications. The leadership of the DRV, meanwhile, was trying to conduct tripartite negotiations with the United States and the Republic of SE. But since the policy of “appeasement of the South” was threatened by the partisan offensive in the northwest, Nixon in May 1972 ordered a naval blockade of the DRV coast and mining its ports in order to disorganize the rear of the patriot offensive. And Washington got its way: US intervention, perceived by the DRV as a re-Americanization of the war, prevented the patriots from building on the initial success of the offensive. By the autumn of 1972, the situation on the fronts had stabilized, reflecting, on the whole, a definite balance of forces in the SE. And although the military advantage and initiative still remained in the hands of the DRV and the NLF, the US was able to stabilize its position in the SE at the last moment. And therefore, the fate of the Vietnamese conflict depended only on the outcome of the negotiations in Paris.

Notes to Part II.

Chapter I. Vietnam on the eve of the war

1. In addition to the practically incessant struggle of the Vietnamese against the Chinese aggressors, there were several other attempts to conquer Dai Viet: in particular, in 1369-1377, taking advantage of feudal civil strife, its capital Thanglong was twice captured by its southern neighbor, Thiampa.

2. Vietnam in the fight, from 14-30

3. ibid., p.32-33

4. Vietnam in the fight, p.43

5. ibid., p.69

6. Vietnam in the fight, pp.85-86

7. see Annexes, table 2

8 Hot Spots Of The Cold War Movie 1

9. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.339-340

10. Vietnam in the fight, pp.95-96

11. Ho Chi Minh Selected Articles…, p.659

12. history of diplomacy, book 1, p.341

Chapter II. Two Vietnams: North and South in the struggle for independence

1. It is a well-known fact that L. Johnson called Ngo Dinh Diem "Winston Churchill of South Asia" during his trip to Vietnam in 1961. However, in the absence of the public, he nevertheless admitted that Diem did not deserve such a name in any way. “This man is a nonentity,” Johnson said, “but we don’t have anything else here” (N.N. Yakovlev Washington Silhouettes, p. 265).

2. Vietnam in the fight, pp.101-102

3. ibid., p.112-113

4. Vietnam in the fight, p.114

5. ibid., pp. 115-116

6. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.266

7. General Nguyen Khanh - one of those who prepared the coup against Diem - soon became president of the Saigon Republic.

8. Vietnam in the fight, p.113

9. Nguyen Dinh Thi On fire, pp. 481-482

10 Cold War Flashpoints Movie 1

12. Ho Chi Minh Selected Articles…, pp.737-738

13. Nguyen Dinh Thi On fire, p.508

14. Ho Chi Minh On patriotism and proletarian internationalism, p.114

15. The "Ho Chi Minh Trail" began in northern Vietnam: it went from the 17th parallel to neighboring Laos, then, bypassing the isthmus zone between the coast of the Gulf of Tonkin and Laos, subjected to heavy bombardment 24 hours a day by the forces of the 7th Pacific Fleet, "surfaced" from the territory of Laos and walked through the territory of Cambodia, reached Svaeeng, and from there it stretched for 180 km. to Saigon.

"Pacification" of the South and the triumph of the North

“Formula San Antonio” and negotiations in Paris

We remember from history that some wars lasted for centuries. In theory, a war can go on for an arbitrarily long time, up to the complete mutual destruction of its participants. However, it was possible, rather, during the “gloomy” Middle Ages, the 20th century was already dictating its conditions. These conditions were that, having survived 2 world wars, humanity no longer wanted to allow bloody, protracted wars, but, on the contrary, sought to solve problems peacefully. And the possibilities of the warring parties are by no means unlimited. Pretty soon after the start of the Vietnam War, frightening difficulties appeared in the US Army: the collapse of parts, mutinies (soldiers killed more and more of their officers and sergeants), drug addiction ... and so on .... Even for those who were in Vietnam, but did not fight, it was obvious that something terrible was happening to the army. For Americans, the signing of the peace accords was, in a number of respects, essential to their own survival.1

But the need for negotiations became clear long before the United States had exhausted its military-strategic potential in Southeast Asia. As early as April 1965, President Johnson proposed negotiations "without preconditions" to guarantee the independence of SE. In fact, Washington sought to annul the Geneva Accords, according to which US interference in the affairs of Vietnam was unlawful. For this reason, the United States showed goodwill towards the DRV and readiness to listen to their position. But in response to the North Vietnamese "4 points", which outlined the requirements of the DRV (the withdrawal of American troops from the SE and the cessation of their interference in the affairs of the state in any form), the United States responded with "Johnson's 14 points" in January 1966, in which declared the recognition of the Geneva Accords as the basis for negotiations. However, the question of the withdrawal of American troops was bypassed, and the cessation of the bombing of the DRV was made dependent on the outcome of the negotiations.2 As we shall see, it is these 2 questions that will further determine the nature of the negotiations between the USA and the DRV.

L. Johnson made a new attempt to enter into a negotiation process with the DRV on the eve of the orders to limit the bombing of North Vietnamese territories. Critics have argued that the Johnson administration never really tackled such a delicate issue, as the initiation of peace negotiations at the very time when the United States was waging a war in the SE, albeit limited, but still. However, it was during this period that 3 attempts were made by the Johnson administration to begin the negotiation process. We are talking about the mission of the Canadian Ronning in Hanoi in the spring of 1966 and two projects code-named “Marigolds”, in the second half of 1966, and “Sunflower”, in early 1967. “It is these 3 steps towards the enemy in the hope of entering with to them in contact can serve as an illustration of our common approach to reaching an agreement in Vietnam. And they also explained the reasons for our failures,” said US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara3. And the failures boiled down to the fact that the parties could not agree on the bombing. It was these disputes that called into question the seriousness of the US intentions to start negotiations. Be that as it may, Ronning returned from Hanoi in March with a message from North Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong. The letter said that if the Americans stop the bombing "for the common good and without any conditions (meaning the formula" 4 no ")", then the SV is ready to talk.4

It seemed to Ronning that Pham Van Dong was sincere and that Hanoi really wanted to negotiate. But Washington did not see it that way. The Johnson administration had already come up with a new plan of action, it only remained to impose it on the DRV, and for this, intermediaries were needed. And those were found.

In the winter of 1967, a meeting took place between British Prime Minister G. Wilson and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin; at this meeting, a new plan for building relationships was considered - the so-called "Formula Stage A - Stage B". The essence of this formula boiled down to the following: the United States limited, and soon stopped bombing altogether in response to a decrease in the activity of the SV in the South and a decrease in the number of fighters penetrating there. It is not known how the CB would have reacted to these demands, but the fact remains: the "Stage A - Stage B" plan remained on paper. The fact is that America gave Kosygin too little time to convey this plan to Ho Chi Minh. After waiting for the time limit to expire [and Kosygin, as expected, did not meet it], the United States resumed aggressive actions against Vietnam. Negotiations were broken.

In Vietnam, at first, many did not understand what the United States was doing and why they needed all this. But, of course, the leadership of the DRV was aware that the United States was "playing negotiations", while trying to create the impression of interest in resolving the conflict. So it was:

The United States was indeed not particularly zealous in contacts with the NE, from time to time making a number of attempts to create the appearance of active diplomatic activity. At the same time, the States were developing a new strategy in the SE; however, this did not lead to success at the front: the escalation did not produce results, the Saigonians still did not want to defend their state with arms in their hands. The US needed a breather. And therefore...

The diplomatic lull did not last long, and soon the United States resumed its attempts to start a negotiating process. Already in the second half of 1967, President L. Johnson received a report from McNamara, which contained the following information:

The United States is ready to stop air and sea bombardment of the NE if this immediately leads to constructive negotiations between the representatives of the USA and the DRV. We hope that… the DRV will not take purely advantage of stopping or limiting the bombing… it goes without saying that any such move on the part of the DRV will not help us move forward together towards a joint solution to the problem, which is the purpose of the negotiations.6

The memorandum is written as politically correct as possible; nevertheless, it clearly shows that the United States, with all the desire to start the negotiation process, was ready at any moment to resume the bombing of the NE, and therefore it should have the prerogative in negotiating with the DRV. A similar state of affairs will be in Paris, when the United States, having suffered a painful defeat, will nevertheless not hesitate to dictate its terms. But the Paris Accords were preceded by a number of other events.

On August 11, 1967, the president approved the memorandum, and in pcs. Pennsylvania began a careful selection of personalities ready to act as intermediaries. There were two of them: the leftist socialist R. Aubrac, whose candidacy did not suit many not only because of his party affiliation, but also because of his friendly relations with Ho Chi Minh, and also Professor E. Markovich. On August 19, H. Kissinger was sent to Paris to meet with the mediators. As R. McNamara wrote after, the French constantly told Kissinger and his assistant Cooper, “how can they convince the North Vietnamese of the seriousness of the US intentions to start negotiations, if just in these days their bombardment reached a record level of intensity.” The French side hinted to the United States about reducing the bombing, which could be "a signal to Hanoi that their mission is taken seriously by the United

States" 7. Kissinger relayed this message to Washington, and Johnson soon issued an order to limit bombing within a 10-mile radius of Hanoi from August 24 to September 4, which was to ensure the safety of Aubrac and Markovic's go-betweens.

As absurd as it may sound that McNamara's book "Looking into the Past ..." follows the description of the above events, it is worth recognizing that even with the United States such a nuisance could happen. An unpredictable participant intervened in the matter - the weather. Omitting a number of details, the bottom line is the following: the American aircraft, which on the eve of the planned break was supposed to deliver the last series of strikes on the NE, could not do this due to cloudy weather and postponed their flight to the next day, on which it was supposed to take place pause in bombardments. There was no pause, Aubrac and Markovic were denied visas to enter the territory of the NE, the negotiations were disrupted.

However, the communication channel (also called the "Pennsylvania channel") was established and both sides left it open, which means that both the US and the DRV did not rule out the possibility of starting a negotiation process. However, even while compromising, the United States was not going to abandon the tactics of negotiating from a position of strength, and therefore American bombers continued to actively pour fire on North Vietnamese lands. The DRV, as American strategists had planned, regarded such behavior as an ultimatum and stated that “the question of resuming business contacts can only be considered after the unconditional cessation of the US bombing and all other military actions against the DRV”8.

Believing that Aubrac and Markovic did their job, namely, they provided the United States with an opportunity to reveal the "intransigence" of the DRV in negotiations, a number of presidential advisers proposed closing the Pennsylvania channel. The rest insisted on keeping the channel, assuring that "although Hanoi is not ready to negotiate at the moment, but for the sake of public opinion [the United States] must take into account any opportunity that arises in the current situation."

Therefore, on September 29, 1967, Johnson gave a lengthy speech in San Antonio, pc. Texas, developing in it the provisions of the Pennsylvania project, which has since been known as the "San Antonio formula". The essence of the project was that “if the United States stops the bombing, then only if the other side receives assurances of its readiness for constructive and immediate negotiations and provided that the SV does not take advantage of the pause for its military purposes, or, in other words, does not will expand the penetration of its citizens into the SE and increase the supply of equipment to this country”9.

And although R. McNamara considered that this was a step forward compared to other statements by the US government, this speech did not impress Hanoi: the NE regarded such a proposal as purely conditional, based on hasty decisions. The Pennsylvania Project and the "San Antonio Formula" that followed it produced no results. Nevertheless, these were already quite serious diplomatic steps towards reaching a compromise. And, as McNamara's memo to President Johnson would later say, "the significance of the Paris-Kissinger experience is that it is the only way to start a dialogue with the SW."10

So, many politicians tried their hand in the Vietnamese conflict, and each to one degree or another influenced the course of events. As a result of the entire war, leading the US Armed Forces from 1961 to 1968, R. McNamara earned a reputation as the “chief executioner”. The nation took it for granted (after all, it was he who was the Minister of Defense), without understanding whether he deserved such an attitude towards himself. The title of the reverse in its meaning was received by another politician - G. Kissinger, who became the "savior of the situation" - the main "negotiator". Once again, the Nation came to a verdict without understanding it properly: what was Henry K. doing before the negotiation process began?

q G. Kissinger - professor at Harvard University; in 1973, as national security adviser to President Nixon, he participated in peace negotiations in Paris.

One of the main omissions in the career of this outstanding politician, a man who influenced and still influences the politics of the United States, has always been considered his non-recognition at the "court" of the Kennedy brothers. The glib theoretician Kissinger was not to the taste of Camelot. By that time, the style of the “intellectual elite” circle, the center of which was the Kennedys, had already come to light; in a company where everyone knew each other, intelligence was highly valued, which had to be veiled with humor in order not to be "smart as a clever man." Even in such a highly educated society (15 professors gathered around Kennedy!) it was bad form to stand out with the power of your mind. And Kissinger immediately undertook to tediously instruct them on how to conduct politics. Kissinger had to “hone his skills” while he was in the backyard of Camelot: a superficial acquaintance with Kennedy’s foreign policy and, as a result, inadequate recommendations on it, excluded him from the SNB11 apparatus for a long time.

However, Henry K. was not at all embarrassed by this turn of events, although he regretted the missed chance to break through to the "very top" - to the presidential administration - he had to part with these ambitious plans for a while. Already in disgrace, he found a policy

"childish" administration of the president, and when Kennedy died, he said that "the loss is not great" and that Kennedy, they say, "led the country to disaster." 12

Kissinger's finest hour struck in 1969, when, along with Nixon's election victory, he instantly soared up the political ladder and climbed into the chair of the presidential assistant for national policy. And this means that the keys to US policy in relations with the USSR, China, the Middle East and, of course, Vietnam were in the hands of one person - and that person was H. Kissinger. Curiously, Nixon himself once stated that "... the country does not need a president to conduct internal affairs" and that "a president is needed for foreign policy"13. It turns out that in this situation, according to Nixon, the president was not needed at all. Kissinger had power that was hardly comparable to the capabilities of Bundy, Schlesinger or McNamara combined (unlike his predecessors, Nixon did not seek to surround himself with crowds of advisers who sometimes had many opinions on the same issue. A narrow circle of close associates was enough for him - Kissinger , Haig and Haldeman).

As already mentioned, during the period when Nixon undertook to withdraw troops from Vietnam, Kissinger decided to launch an invasion of the territory of Laos and Cambodia, which directly contradicted the accepted doctrine. However, the president supported the undertaking of his closest adviser, giving the green light to the operation, which ended in nothing. Nixonger's experiments in Indochina, whether it was a policy of "appeasement" or "psychological warfare", did not produce results, the American society protested more and more actively every day. Perhaps Kissinger and Nixon were not averse to continuing their experiments, reshaping the doctrine far and wide, but by 1973 they were backed to the wall: the country and the army needed negotiations. For this reason, Kissinger was delegated to Paris. It is impossible, of course, to assert that Kissinger made peace against his will - this was not at all the case. However, it is not worth calling him the main peacekeeper in this whole story: the United States exhausted all its arguments in the Vietnam War, and they simply had no other options.

Kissinger considered one of the main obstacles to the negotiation process to be the fact that it is difficult for America to transfer military successes to the political plane. Because the United States has traditionally viewed military power and [political] power as discrete, self-contained, and successive, it has waged wars to or from unconditional surrender, eliminating the need to establish any connection between the use of force and diplomatic moves. , or acted as if, after victory, the military no longer played any role, and diplomats were charged with the duty to fill some strategic vacuum. Therefore, the United States stopped hostilities in Korea in 1951 as soon as negotiations began, and in 1968 stopped bombing in Vietnam as the price of starting a peace conference. However, now for the United States, negotiations have become simply necessary, and Henry K. had to forget about the past and show all his outstanding diplomatic skills, because it was no longer about filling the “strategic vacuum”. Kissinger was instructed to finally end this "dirty" war, and, if possible, with an acceptable result for America.

The American government considered the negotiation process as a means to achieve its main strategic goal - to maintain a pro-American regime in the SE. Therefore, the United States, as before through the Aubrac-Markovic channel, tried to negotiate from a position of strength, combining diplomatic initiatives with dosed military actions such as interventions in Laos and Cambodia15. Through subtle diplomatic play, the States tried to present the DRV as an aggressor in order to prove that their intervention and assistance to the Saigon regime was a reaction to the "threat of attack from the North." The position of the United States during the negotiations aroused the indignation of the North Vietnamese side. Both sides ignored each other's demands, each insisting on their own opinion: America rejected the proposal of the DRV to create a coalition government in the SE and to refuse to support the Thieu regime, the DRV refused to solve the problems of the SE by holding elections under the auspices of the Saigon military junta.

Saigon's position in these disputes complemented the position of the United States and was characterized by the formula prepared by the "puppet" SE President Nguyen Van Thieu:

1. no territorial concessions to the communists,

2. no coalition with the communists,

3. no neutralism in the communist spirit,

4. no freedom for communist ideology and activities of the communist party in SE.

Do not forget that these events took place during the period of hostilities; the parties, of course, treated each other with distrust; in addition, the United States did not give up its hopes to keep the south of the country under its control as part of the “Vietnamization” program, although it diligently demonstrated the seriousness of their approach to negotiations (in particular, by the summer of 1971 they almost halved their expeditionary force in Vietnam). Therefore, at the initial stage in Paris, Kissinger filled the notorious "diplomatic vacuum", leading negotiations to a dead end when it came to the withdrawal of troops and the future of Saigon, in the hope that the situation would change. But nothing has changed.

In 1972, the diplomatic efforts of the DRV, backed up by victories at the front, led to the development of a new universal formula for solving the Vietnam problem: the DRV proposed the creation of a tripartite coalition government in the SE if the US refused to support the Thieu regime; this could have accelerated the settlement process in Indochina, which was to the advantage of the United States on the eve of the 1972 elections. Instead, however, the United States thwarted the signing of the agreements prior to Nixon's re-election for the presidency by launching an unprecedented NE bombing campaign to secure new concessions.

The firm position of the DRV, sharp protests in the world and in the United States itself, the lack of opportunities for increasing military pressure on the NE eventually forced Kissinger and Nixon to recall the need for an “honorable withdrawal from Vietnam” and agree to resume negotiations and complete them. In January, a meeting continued in Paris, at which the US was represented by presidential aide H. Kissinger, and the DRV by Le Duc Tho, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the WPV.

On January 27, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris, and on March 2, 1973, the Act on the International Conference in Vietnam, which expressed approval and support for the Paris Agreements. The ceasefire in Vietnam and US-Vietnamese negotiations also made it possible to reach a truce in Laos, and in February 1973 the process of a peaceful political settlement in that country began.

The Paris Agreement meant the cessation of imperialist aggression against Vietnam, fixed the right of the Vietnamese people to independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity; it provided for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, and also called on the United States to refrain from any future interference in the affairs of Vietnam. As for the SE, the agreement confirmed the presence of 2 administrations, 2 armies, 2 zones of control and 3 political forces (including a neutralist "third" force). Subject to the strict implementation of the military-political provisions, the Paris Agreement could become the basis for a just solution of the internal problems of the SE and the completion of the national democratic revolution by peaceful means. In this sense, the signing of the agreement in Paris was a historic victory for the Vietnamese patriots, as it changed the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East and witnessed the defeat of the US global anti-communist strategy in this region.

Shanghai Communiqué – a policy of New Thinking?

However, the Paris Agreement of 1973 was not destined to become peaceful, although it did provide for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. As has already been noted, the United States was more likely to "play negotiations" than really sought to get even once and for all with an unpopular war. And if before it was difficult to accuse the United States of anything (the United States diligently pretended to develop active diplomatic activity), then already in 1972 it became obvious that the signing of the agreement in Paris would not be the final point of the American-Vietnamese confrontation.

We are talking about the Shanghai Communiqué, an unprecedented action by American "behind-the-scenes diplomacy". G. Kissinger also became its ideological inspirer. In July 1971, he secretly traveled to Beijing to prepare for President Nixon's visit. Obviously, the politician turned to history and remembered that Indochina has always been a zone of interests of the Celestial Empire, and therefore the United States decided by Nixon's visit to start a new era in relations between the United States and China, making Vietnam a bargaining chip in the normalization of these relations. America, which had already lost all hope in Indochina, deliberately emphasized the secondary importance of the Vietnamese problem in comparison with the US-Chinese rapprochement. Kissinger himself declared: “What we are doing now with China is so grandiose and of such historical significance that the word Vietnam will only be put in a footnote when history is written.”1 If Kissinger's words are to be believed, Vietnam was a milestone for the United States even before the signing of the agreement in Paris. But this was far from the case. On the contrary, the United States, whose ambitions in Southeast Asia were close to death, used the last chance to stay in the region, and this chance was China.

How else can one explain the fact that Kissinger offered the PRC a deal, the essence of which was the following: if China stops helping Vietnam and puts pressure on it so that Vietnam agrees to the existence of the Saigon government, the United States will do everything possible to return Taiwan to China?

Negotiations between Nixon and the PRC leaders and the Shanghai Communiqué signed by them showed that the Indo-Chinese question was indeed among those discussed by the parties. The Chinese wanted a settlement of the situation in Vietnam on American terms, because, in this way, the moment of the unification of Vietnam, which was unpleasant for China, was delayed. China did not consider this prospect realistic at all2, since it was confident that the United States “will find an opportunity to both leave Vietnam and stay there at the same time”3. Looking ahead, it should be noted that the final defeat of the American-Saigon regime in 1975 did not particularly upset the PRC; China immediately began its aggression against its southern neighbor, which, however, was not crowned with success.

The United States, in turn, hoped that, with the mediation of the PRC, in 1976 they would be able to calmly begin building and strengthening the neo-colonialist American regime in the SE. The question arises: why did the United States hold on to this region so much, why was it so important to them? America, perhaps, would not have seized Vietnam with a stranglehold if in the 50s. was not defeated in Korea, and even earlier did not lose its strategic influence in China, where the Kuomintang clique, which had long enjoyed the support of the United States, was forced out to Taiwan by the Communists. For the United States, Vietnam has become, in fact, the last frontier, on which it would be possible to gradually influence the situation in Southeast Asia.

The true reasons for the joint American-Chinese action can be judged at least by how their relations developed after the communiqué and how they are developing now. If in the 70s and 80s and there were some hints of a "thaw" in relations, then in the 90s. not a trace of them remains. And the reason for this is the economic factor, namely, fierce competition in the world market. Today, the United States treats China, if not with malice, then with suspicion: the goods it produces are too cheap. Moreover, China in those years was a communist country, an ideological ally of the "evil empire" - the Soviet Union. All this suggests that the step towards the enemy for the United States was rather a temporary measure, and not the provision of a new doctrine (at least, this was the state of affairs in 1972). As for Vietnam, it is quite obvious that the parties agreed on this issue. This was vividly illustrated by the insistent advice of the Chinese leadership (1972) to the Vietnamese side at the Paris talks to agree to the idea of ​​a peace in which Nguyen Van Thieu would continue to be in power4. And a few months earlier, Chinese representatives in Vietnam had also stressed that "the overthrow of the Saigon administration is a problem that will take a long time to resolve." As we already know, the Vietnamese were forced to accept this state of affairs.

The Shanghai communiqué was not the turning point in the Vietnam War. But this does not lose its significance, since it allowed the United States to achieve two strategically important goals in Indochina. And first of all, it influenced the conditions for signing the Paris Agreement. Be that as it may, it seems to me appropriate to place this chapter next to the chapter on "The San Antonio Formula and the Paris Negotiations" rather than include it in it. Why? The thing is that in the previous chapter we dealt with official US diplomacy, through which the United States created the appearance of its participation in the negotiation process. In this chapter, we saw the operation of covert, behind-the-scenes American diplomacy, where the United States again created the appearance of a policy of compromise towards communist China, playing, as one Vietnamese politician aptly remarked, on “Chinese great-power chauvinism,”5 seeking to use 3rd force to force the DRV to accept conditions offered by the United States. And, secondly, the United States, with the help of the pressure exerted by the PRC on the DRV, and with the help of the terms of the Paris Agreement, achieved the second goal: they maintained their presence in Vietnam, despite the fact that they were forced to reduce their military contingent. It is this condition that links the content of the previous chapter with the events set forth in the next chapter.

Surrender of Saigon, end of aggression

The United States has never given up on anything easily - such is the life credo of the Americans. Therefore, even after suffering a crushing defeat in Indochina, the United States did not give up its attempts to rid the peninsula of the "red infection" - communism.

Washington, which was forced to put its signature under the Paris Agreement, actually sought to "cover the rear" - to weaken the negative consequences of its defeat, as well as to "postpone the moment" of the final defeat of the Saigon "puppets". America, contrary to all commitments, continued to encourage the Saigon militarists to violate the provisions of the Paris Agreement, as, at one time, of the Geneva Accords, especially the articles relating to the ceasefire. Also, the United States continued to recognize the Saigon regime as the only legitimate government, provided it with material and financial assistance and political support, which also contradicted the agreement. The operations of the Saigon army were managed by up to 25,000 American military advisers disguised as civilian personnel. The United States periodically made accusations against the DRV about "violations" of the Paris Agreement, trying to find a pretext for a new armed intervention in Indochina. So, in the summer of 1973, US Secretary of Defense A. Schlesinger threatened to start bombing the SV again, but the reason was never found.1

The DRV responded to the provocations of the United States and the Thieu junta: in 1974, its troops inflicted a number of heavy defeats on the Saigon army, as a result of which Thieu found itself in an even more deplorable situation than before the signing of the agreement to end the war. Nevertheless, the dictator obediently carried out the instructions to drag out the conflict.

The general offensive of the Vietnamese patriots began in the spring of 1975 in the area of ​​the river. the Mekong, during which the armed forces of the NE gained superiority over the Saigon troops; they were simply not ready to repel the offensive. Demoralized and deprived of firm leadership, the Saigon army fled from the central regions of the SE; the Americans never taught the South Vietnamese how to fight.

But even after this key defeat, the US tried to prevent the collapse of the Saigon regime. The forces of the 7th Fleet with a personnel of 140,0002 were sent to assist the Armed Forces of the Southeast as a "deterrent force"2. Washington fought off the attacks of the public with the help of official propaganda with standard arguments: "national security interests", "maintaining the country's prestige" and "fulfillment of its obligations." But the failures of the Saigon weapons caused a negative reaction not only in society, but also in Congress. President J. Ford tried in vain to obtain from Congress additional allocations for military assistance to Thieu and Lon Nol in the amount of $ 1 billion, as well as permission to use the American Armed Forces in Indochina, receiving refusal after refusal, because. the resumption of direct US intervention was fraught with the danger of a new aggravation of the situation in Southeast Asia3. All this did not allow the American president to come to the aid of the Saigon leader. And already on April 21, Thieu, trying to avoid the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem, resigned and fled Vietnam.

On April 30, 1975, the liberation forces occupied Saigon. The pro-American regime in the SE, and with it the aggressive American neo-colonialist policy, suffered a crushing defeat. Moreover, the ill-conceived US policy in Indochina, coupled with their defeat and withdrawal from Southeast Asia, caused a tendency among US allies in Asia to overestimate the importance of military-political alliances and agreements with the US.

In April 1975, the last American helicopter landed on the roof of the American embassy in Saigon. According to many experts on Vietnam, this event was one of the symbolic moments of the war. The helicopter descended in jerks, somehow very uncertainly to the point of its landing; the actions of the American Armed Forces in Indochina were just as fragmentary and uncertain, according to L. Gelb, one of the former Pentagon employees. “This balancing descent to the extreme point of our escape to some extent symbolized the fragility of the US position in the world,” Gelb said. A lone helicopter on the roof of the embassy building became a symbol of the final defeat of the US "grand strategy" in Southeast Asia, which, however, did not lead to a weakening of American positions in the world, which was feared by many experts, including Gelb himself. But skilful diplomacy and a world that still feels the breath of the Cold War all helped the United States deal with the consequences of its defeat. Therefore, the Vietnam conflict had tragic and lasting consequences in the United States and very limited results outside it. Inside the state and its society, passions boiled for a long time, which military experts preferred to call the "Vietnamese syndrome", while a series of successful actions abroad quickly restored the status quo, so that no one even thought to question the status of the United States as a world leader. Defeat in Vietnam, by definition, could not affect the position of the United States in the world [the United States was and remains a superpower]; even in the confrontation between capitalism and communism, the US lost the battle, but not the whole war. Nevertheless, the United States was forced to switch to other regions, because in Southeast Asia their image was noticeably undermined. But if in the eyes of the whole world the States were rehabilitated quickly enough, then in order to regain the lost authority in American society, Washington had to expend a lot of effort.

The reason for this was a change in the mood of the public, which threatened to turn into a national catastrophe: the Americans had lost faith in their own army! And this is in the United States - a superpower, whose armed forces for many years symbolized the power of the country and the inviolability of its position in the world. The American government threw all its efforts into rehabilitating its soldiers in the eyes of ordinary Americans: the tragedy of Songmy passed from reality into myth, and W. Colley, through the efforts of Nixon and Reagan, was turned almost into a hero. Advertising was deployed everywhere, there is no other word for it, the US army, including the appearance of films about the brave guy John Rimbaud .... But that was not the most important thing. Popular politicians and US President R. Reagan himself openly admitted that "only now the US people are beginning to realize that their soldiers fought for a just cause." Perhaps Reagan's words also reflected his personal position on the Vietnam War, but it is clear that it was more like a lifeline thrown by Washington to his army. The United States did its best to convince its people that not ruthless killers fought in Southeast Asia, but fighters for justice, but it was still quite a long time before the Nation believed it.

Notes for Part III

Chapter I. “Formula San Antonio” and negotiations in Paris

1. Yakovlev N.N. War and Peace…, pp.53-54

2. Vietnam in the fight, p.121

3. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.268

5. Vietnam in the fight, p.122

6. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.318

7. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.318

8. ibid., p.319

9. ibid., p.321

10. McNamara R. Looking into the past ..., p.319

11. Yakovlev N.N. Silhouettes…, p.245

13. ibid., p. 307

14. Kissinger G. Does America need…, pp. 207-208

15. Vietnam in the fight, pp.139-140

Chapter II. Shanghai Communiqué - a policy of New Thinking?

1. Vietnam in the fight, pp.172-173

2. For example, even before Kissinger's arrival in the PRC, Mao Zedong met with DRV Premier Pham Van Dong. In a conversation with him, Zedong cited a Chinese proverb: “If the broom is too short, it will not remove the dust from the ceiling. The Chinese will not be able to expel Chiang Kai-shek from Taiwan, so, apparently, the Vietnamese will not be able to expel the Thieu government either.” To which Pham Van Dong replied, “Our broom is quite long. We will sweep away the Saigon regime."

3. Vietnam in the fight, p.176

4. ibid., p.172

5. Vietnam in the fight, p.175

Chapter III. Surrender of Saigon, end of aggression

1. ibid., p.146-147

2. see Annexes, table 2

3. Vietnam in the fight, p.147

4. Seeing Iraq, thinking Vietnam, p.1

Conclusion. Vietnam Lessons

The secret of the victory of the Vietnamese people

The people of Vietnam have seen a lot in their entire centuries-old history: they have repeatedly tried to conquer the neighboring states, doomed them to many years of colonial bondage, caused great pain and suffering. But, with all this, nothing compares to what the Vietnamese people had to endure in the 20th century. First, Japanese invaders invaded Vietnam, having previously captured all of East Asia. And the Vietnamese, on their own, without anyone's help, expelled the aggressors from the country. Following was a protracted, bloody war with the French, who had their own colonial claims to the Vietnamese lands. Once again, the occupiers were defeated, despite increased military assistance from the United States of America. This was followed by the aggression of the United States, which inflicted a hit on the territory of Indochina with a hitherto unseen force. It would seem that the United States has the power that is capable of smashing Vietnam to pieces in a matter of moments, returning it "to the stone age." But this did not happen: the people of Vietnam, even divided according to someone else's whim, won a confident and well-deserved victory. This victory proved that under modern conditions foreign invaders who encroached on the national dignity of the people, its honor and freedom, cannot count on success - they are in for inevitable defeat. It also confirmed the indisputable fact that in our time a people that selflessly fights for freedom and relies on the international support of the progressive and peace-loving public of the whole world is invincible. The people of Vietnam have proved this truth more than once on the battlefield - in the fight against the Chinese invaders, the Japanese militarists or the American aggressors. So what is the secret of this incredibly freedom-loving nation? How could a nation that has neither military nor economic power win a series of brilliant victories over such world giants as the USA and Japan? And why did states so different in their way of life again and again attack this peaceful country, but forced to take up arms? Perhaps something unknown to them themselves forced them to return here?

From the appearance of the Vietnamese, it is difficult to guess what manifestations of stamina and height of spirit they are capable of. These short, thin people like to smile; they are always ready to help and greet friends with amazing hospitality. Perhaps the key to the Vietnamese character is in the centuries-old, dramatic history of the country and in how difficult it was for them to achieve independence. This is a people whose will no trials could break. The history of Vietnam goes back thousands of years. During this time, the Vietnamese people have accumulated colossal experience and cultivated an amazing tolerance, which, no doubt, is due to the Buddhist faith, the peaceful nature of which also left its mark on the spirit of the Vietnamese people. Wars and those who forged victory in them are rarely remembered all over the world, only on special dates. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, never forget those to whom they owe their lives in tranquility and peace. The Vietnamese who died in the war remember by name: each name can be found on the walls of the memorial temple in the partisan region of Kuti. There are no unburied or unknown soldiers in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese people, under the leadership of their party, fought a courageous struggle on three fronts - military, political and diplomatic - under exceptionally difficult conditions, and achieved outstanding results. The USA failed not because they did not have enough funds or shells, not because they lacked military equipment. The reason lies in the Vietnamese people themselves: the Vietnamese won with their heroism, their resilience and their unparalleled patriotism. This is an incredibly battle-hardened people, ready, as R. McNamara noted, to give all their strength to the struggle, “to fight and die for their homeland.” Soviet specialists who worked in Vietnam during the war also noted the character of the Vietnamese, hardened in battles and hard work: “The Vietnamese people are very hardworking, very patient people; after all, in the conditions of war, hardly anyone can live as modestly as they [the Vietnamese] lived, ”said G. Belov, head of the USSR Group of Military Specialists in Vietnam. Domestic experts also noted that “people in Vietnam are completely different”, not like us: “firstly, they are warriors to the marrow of their bones; secondly, exceptionally conscientious people. We got up early in the morning, without breakfast, and immediately took up classes. They ate only 2 meals a day. Then, throughout the day, they took military skills lessons from Soviet officers, and after their departure, they again trained on their own. Incredible dedication in everything is another secret of this nation.

R.S. McNamara, summing up the US involvement in the Vietnam War, cited several reasons for America's defeat:

1) We misjudged and still misjudge the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries (in this case, the SV and Viet Cong, supported by China and the Soviet Union) and exaggerated the danger of their actions to the United States;

2) We treated the people and leaders of SE based on our own experience. We believed that they were eager and determined to fight for freedom and democracy. And they were completely wrong about the alignment of political forces in this country;

3) After the start of military operations, when unforeseen events forced us to deviate from the planned course, we failed to capture and maintain national support - in part because we did not tell our fellow citizens frankly and without any omissions what was happening in Vietnam, and why we we act in this way, and not in some other way. We have not prepared society to understand complex events, we have not taught it to respond adequately to all changes in our political course in a distant ... country and in a hostile environment. The true strength of any state lies not in its military potential, but rather in the unity of the nation. But it is something we could not save;

4) When nothing threatens our security, then the correctness of our judgments about the true interests of other countries or peoples must certainly be tested in the process of open discussions in international forums. We neglected the extremely important principle that, in the absence of a direct threat to our security, the United States should carry out military actions in other countries only in conjunction with multinational forces, fully, and not symbolically, supported by the world community; We do not have the divine right to re-create every state according to our pattern or choice.

The arguments of the ex-Minister of Defense hardly need comments. And yet, from the above conclusions, it is worth highlighting the main one. The United States really exaggerated the danger of the situation in Southeast Asia: the victory of communism in Vietnam did not provoke a domino effect, most of the regimes in the region withstood the communist threat.

General Westmoreland saw the reason for the success of Vietnam in the increased assistance from the USSR, and there is a grain of truth in this: the military and moral support of the USSR significantly strengthened the DRV. As an anti-Soviet therapy, Westmoreland even suggested the use of "small tactical nuclear bombs" to, among other things, "the surest way to inspire something in Hanoi." The Americans, of course, could conquer Vietnam by force of arms, but they could never completely defeat it.

Despite the fact that both Westmoreland and McNamara viewed the situation from the point of view of the United States, i.e. cited the reasons for the defeat of America, and not the victory of Vietnam, they were forced to admit that the Vietnamese people had achieved success through a national liberation struggle that had taken on a massive character both in the North and in the South. “We did not and still do not realize how limited the capabilities of modern high-tech weapons and how imperfect our doctrines are in relation to national movements with their unconventional forms of struggle and a high degree of motivation for the actions of the people,” McNamara said. “We underestimated nationalism as a force that encouraged our opponents (I mean the idea of ​​the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong) to fight and die for their beliefs and values. We continue to make the same mistake in different parts of the world.”4 The more the Americans undertook operations in the spirit of Song My, the more the Vietnamese people hated the Americans. The strength of Vietnamese hatred was experienced by those who fought the partisans in the jungle, and those who were captured. The Nation's hair stood on end when it learned that its soldiers were blown up by whole platoons on tripwires in the jungle, or received the news about an American officer, not yet 30 years old, who turned gray during 1 night of being in Vietnamese captivity. * * It was really cruel. But after all, the Americans did not bring Vietnam anything but hitherto unprecedented suffering and destruction. From this point of view, Vietnamese nationalism, even if dressed in such a harsh form, was justified: if only because the United States was the attacking side - the aggressor, and the Vietnamese - the side defending itself from aggression. By any means. War always provokes cruelty, and there are no “good” and “bad” actions in it: in any case, they carry with them a large number of casualties on both sides.

Looking into the faces of ordinary Vietnamese, it is not easy to find the answer to the main question: what is it about these people that gave them the strength to win in an unequal struggle? Perhaps the answer lies in the amazing tenacity of the Vietnamese and their readiness for self-sacrifice. And also in the ability to unite into a single whole and act together. But there was something else. What many Soviet specialists interpreted as faith in their party and in proletarian internationalism. The Communist Party and the support of the socialist states really played a big role in strengthening the spirit of the Vietnamese people, but there was another factor, personified, which had a real, human appearance. It was the leader of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh.

The legendary revolutionary Ho Chi Minh was the President of the Republic of Vietnam for 23 years. On the mausoleum of Ho Chi Minh - one of the most revered places in Hanoi - his words are carved: "there is nothing more precious than freedom and independence." The mausoleum is located not far from the presidential palace, where the leader of the DRV, however, never lived: a small house was built especially for him nearby, where he spent most of his time and where he invited only his closest friends. The modesty of Ho Chi Minh was an example for the entire Vietnamese people; a cup of rice a day was enough for him. Throughout his life, he changed several dozen professions, but always remained primarily a revolutionary and politician. He knew 5 languages: he read English, French, spoke excellent Russian, even wrote poetry in Chinese. Until the end of his days, he drove an old Pobeda, given to him at one time by Voroshilov, and smoked a lot. The party even issued a special decree obliging Ho Chi Minh to stop smoking and get married. This was, perhaps, the only party resolution that he did not comply with. The Vietnamese with respect and love called him "Bak Ho" - "Uncle Ho". It was a favorite of the Vietnamese people, their symbol, their leader. It was his words that inspired the fighters to the feat, inspired the common people with confidence that the war would soon end with the victory of Vietnam and it would be possible to live the old life again.

Having traveled the path of the most difficult trials, the Vietnamese people have managed to achieve genuine independence and unity of the nation. But it came at a very high price: the land of Vietnam was defaced by countless bombardments, and many forests in the South were poisoned with poisonous gas. Hundreds of villages were razed to the ground, thousands of schools, hospitals and churches were destroyed. War memorials and cemeteries can be found everywhere in today's Vietnam. According to far from complete data, the war claimed the lives of 3 million Vietnamese, another 4 million were injured and maimed. And yet, the Vietnamese, despite huge sacrifices and suffering, managed not only to resist the frenzied onslaught of the United States, but also to defeat an incomparably more powerful rival ...

The skies over Vietnam are clear today; the peaceful course of life is not disturbed by the roar of aircraft or the sound of exploding bombs. Ho Chi Minh, whose memory the Vietnamese cherish, said: “Let our mountains and rivers and people be preserved. After we finish the war of resistance, we will again build and sow. Compatriots in the North and South will certainly be reunited. Ho Chi Minh died in 1969, several years before victory. The Vietnamese build, sow rice, raise children, and together create a new future, based on their own traditions and experience. And the descendants of those Americans who fought in Vietnam today come to numerous museums dedicated to the Vietnam conflict, and, looking at the stands and photographs, they are trying to learn lessons from this inglorious war for the United States. And although the old truth says that the main lesson of history is that no one learns from it, we would like to believe that this is not so.

Tools

======================================================

Bibliography

1. American expansionism. Modern times / Rev. ed. G. N. Sevostyanov.- M .: Nauka, 1986.– 616 p.

2. Vietnam in the fight / Comp. E. P. Glazunov.- M .: The main editorial office of oriental literature, Nauka publishing house, 1981.– 255 p.

3. History of international relations and Russian foreign policy. Textbook for universities / Under. ed. A. S. Protopopova - M .: Aspect Press, 2001. - 344 p.

4. Kissinger G. Does America need a foreign policy? / G. Kissinger. Per. from English. ed. V. L. Inozemtseva.– M.: Ladomir, 2002.– 352 p.

5. Kobelev E. Moscow - Hanoi - Saigon / E. Kobelev // Asia and Africa today. – 2005.- No. 11.- p.41-50.

6. Kolotov V. N. Lessons from Vietnam according to R. McNamara. Ideological chimeras and attempts to resolve a real conflict / VN Kolotov // East: Afr. - Asian. islands: history and modernity. - 2005. - No. 5. - pp. 136-140.

7. Krapivin M. S. Relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam / M. S. Krapivin, D. V. Mosyakov // East: Afr. - Asian. islands: history and modernity. - 2006. - No. 3. - p. 37-46.

8. Leontiev A. G. Vietnam is fighting / A. G. Leontiev. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1965. - 72 p.

9. McNamara R.S. Looking into the past: the tragedy and the lessons of Vietnam / R.S. McNamara. Per. from English. E. A. Lyubimova.– M.: Ladomir, 2004.– 409 p.

10. World in the XX century: Proc. for 11 cells. general education institutions / Ed. O. S. Soroko-Tsyupy. - 2nd ed., revised. and add. - M .: Education, 1998. - 318 p.

11. Mikheev Yu. Ya. The struggle of the people of South Vietnam for freedom and independence / Yu. Ya. Mikheev. - M .: Knowledge, 1970. - 79 p.

12. Nguyen Van Bong Saigon-67 / Nguyen Van Bong, E.P. Glazunov.– M.: Raduga, 1990.– 280 p.

13. Nguyen Dinh Thi On fire / Nguyen Dinh Thi, M. Tkachev. - M .: Progress, 1881. - 413 p.

14. Ognetov I.A. Little-known aspects of Soviet-Vietnamese relations / I. A. Ognetov // Vopr. history. - 2001. - No. 8. - p. 134-139.

15. Ognetov Y. Ho Chi Minh flew to Moscow directly from the Vietnamese jungle / Y. Ognetov // Intern. life. - 2003. - No. 8. - pp. 128-140.

16. Parks D. Diary of an American Soldier / D. Parks, A. Leontiev. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1972. - 128 p.

17. The confrontation between the anti-aircraft missile forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and American aircraft in December 1972 / Publ. prepared A. I. Khipenen // Military. - ist. journal - 2005. - No. 8. - p. 36-41.

18. Svyatov G.I. One and a half wars or more? Strategy of unrealistic deterrence / G. I. Svyatov. - M .: Thought, 1987. - 222 p.

19. Pham Thi Ngo Bik Vietnam's foreign policy during the Second Indochina War 1964-1975 / Pham Thi Ngo Bik, D.V. Mosyakov // East: Afr. - Asian. islands: history and modernity. - 2005. - p.51-62.

20. Tsvetov P. Vietnam - USA: zigzags of history / P. Tsvetov // Asia and Africa today. - 2001. - No. 10. - p.12-14.

21. Chernyshev V. American aggressors in Vietnam / V. Chernyshev.– M.: Military Publishing House, 1969.- 88 p.

22. Shchedrov I. M. Fifteen kilometers from Saigon. Report from Yuzhn. Vietnam / I. M. Shchedrov. - M .: Pravda, 1967. - 408 p.

23. Yakovlev N. N. Silhouettes of Washington. Polit. essays / N. N. Yakovlev. - M .: Izd-vo polit. Literature, 1983.- 414 p.

24. Marcus J. The long shadow of Vietnam [Electronic resource] / J. Marcus.- Access mode: http:// www. BBC. com/news/middle east/vietnamwar.htm (2007, December, 3).

25. Marcus J. Seeing Iraq, thinking Vietnam? [Electronic resource] / J. Marcus.- Access mode: http:// www. BBC. com/news/middle east/irakwar.htm (2007, December, 3).

26. Shanker T. Vietnam war "s turning point [Electronic resource] / T. Shanker. - Access mode: http:// www. history.claw. ru / it_afterwar.htm. (2007, December, 7).

Video footage

27. Hot spots of the cold war. Vietnam: the secret of victory, film 1. - TVC, 11/13/07

28. Hot spots of the cold war. Vietnam: the secret of victory, film 2. - TVC, 11/20/07

Conventions and abbreviations

Viet Cong - this is how the association of Vietnamese patriots was called in the American press

Việt Minh - Vietnam Independence League

DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Lien Viet - National Union of Vietnam

CPV - Communist Party of Vietnam

NATO - (Nord-Atlantic Treaty Organization) - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NLF - National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

PTV - Vietnamese Workers' Party

SRV - Socialist Republic of Vietnam

NE - North Vietnam

NSC - National Security Council [USA]

CIA - (Central Intelligence Agency) - Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

SE - South Vietnam

SEA - Southeast Asia

Applications

US military assistance to states conducting military operations in Indochina

including 68,800 soldiers of the "allied" troops

This meant the cessation of existence as an independent state and the loss of the possibility of conducting its own foreign policy - the "country of the South" became part of the French colonial empire. § 3. Stabilization of the French regime So, having begun the conquest of Indochina in 1858 with aggression against Vietnam, the French colonialists only by the end of the 19th century were able to suppress the heroic ...

kingdoms on earth." The origins of the philosophical and general sociological views of P.A. Sorokin, the integrity and unity of his scientific work of the Russian and American periods. Before turning directly to the American period of P. Sorokin's work, it is necessary to dwell briefly on his philosophical and theoretical origins. Of particular interest is the influence of the "Zyryansk...

But I just don't want to do it. Manly P. Hall, a 33rd-degree Freemason, perhaps one of the most authoritative on the subject, wrote in his book The Secret Destiny of America: to establish a civilized democracy among the nations of the world...all this goes on...and they still exist...

It consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter examines the place of the Pacific region in US policy in the period before the Second World War. This region has been the object of close attention of the United States since the 19th century. The chapter shows the trends in the change in the US political course in the Pacific Ocean by the beginning of the Second World War - from the policy of direct seizures to the policy of "...

Henry Kissinger

Does America need a foreign policy?

DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?

Translation from English V. N. Verchenko

Computer design V. A. Voronina

Thanks

To my children Elizabeth and David

and my daughter-in-law Alexandra Rockwell

No other person has contributed more to this book than my wife, Nancy. She has been my emotional and intellectual support for decades, and her editorial poignant remarks are only a small part of her great contribution.

I was lucky with friends and colleagues at work, with some I happened to work together many years ago in the public service, they did not refuse me advice, as well as in matters of publishing, research and just general remarks. I can never fully thank them for what they have meant to me over the years and in the preparation of this book.

Peter Rodman, my Harvard student, lifelong friend and advisor, read, revised, and helped publish this entire manuscript. And I am grateful to him for his assessments and criticism.

The same can be said for Jerry Bremer, another old colleague whose good advice and editorial comments made my understanding of the issues clearer.

William Rogers continued my education with a chapter on Latin America and legal aspects concepts of world legal practice.

Steve Grobar, professor at Brown University and former editor of the Daedalus magazine of the American Academy, has been a classmate and friend of mine since my high school days. He read the manuscript and made a number of comments, greatly improving the text and suggesting new topics for research.

Useful and important studies have been prepared by the following people: Alan Stoga specialized in Latin America and globalization; Jon Vanden Heuvel has dealt with European and American philosophical debates on foreign policy; John Bolton on International Criminal Court matters; Chris Lennon - human rights; Peter Mandeville was strict reviewer, researcher and consultant-editor of large portions of several chapters. And the help of Rosemary Neigas in collecting and annotating primary sources was simply invaluable.

John Lipsky and Felix Rohatin commented on the chapter on globalization with particular insight.

Gina Goldhammer, the editor's fine eye, read the entire manuscript several times with her usual good spirits.

Not a single person had a staff of such dedicated employees as I managed to collect. Faced with time pressure, made even worse by my illness, which interrupted the creative process, they worked tirelessly, often until late at night.

Jodi Jobst Williams was fluent in my handwriting, typing several versions of the manuscript, making many valuable editorial suggestions along the way.

Teresa Simino Amanti led this entire cycle of work, starting with the timely receipt of research results and comments, their collection and classification, making sure that the manuscript was ready by the deadline set by the publisher. She did all this with the greatest efficiency and with the same good disposition.

Jessica Incao and her staff, who had the burden of overseeing the smooth running of my office while their colleagues worked on the book, did an excellent job and did their job with great passion.

This is my third book published by Simon & Schuster, and as such, my appreciation for their support and love for their staff continues to grow. Michael Korda is both my friend and advisor in addition to being an astute editor and an unlicensed psychologist. Rebecca Head and Carol Bowie, his office staff, were always cheerful and ready to help. John Cox subtly and skillfully assisted in the preparation of the book for publication. Fred Chase did his job of preparing the book for publication with the traditional care and thought. Sidney Wolfe Cohen compiled the alphabetical index with his usual perspicacity and forbearance.

The indefatigable Gypsy da Silva, assisted by Isolde Sauer, coordinated all aspects of the literary editing and preparation of the book for publication in the publishing house. She did this with unflagging enthusiasm and infinite patience, comparable to the greatest capacity for work.

I express my deep gratitude to Caroline Harris, who is responsible for the layout of the text of the book, and George Turiansky, head of the production department of the publisher.

I alone am responsible for any defects in this book.

I dedicate this book to my children Elizabeth and David and my sister-in-law Alexandra Rockwell, who have given me reason to be proud of them and the friendship that exists between us.

America is on the rise. Empire or leader?

At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States has assumed a dominant position that cannot be compared with that of the great empires of the past. During the last decade of the last century, America's dominance has become an integral part of international stability. America has mediated disputes over key problem areas, becoming, in particular in the Middle East, an integral part of the peace process. The United States was so committed to this role that it almost automatically acted as a mediator, at times without even being invited by the parties involved—as was the case in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan in July 1999. The United States saw itself as the source and generator of democratic institutions around the globe, increasingly acting as the judge of the integrity of foreign elections and the imposition of economic sanctions or other forms of pressure when realities did not meet established criteria.

As a result, American troops were scattered all over the world, from the plains of Northern Europe to the confrontation lines in East Asia. Such "escape points", indicating the involvement of America, turned, in order to maintain peace, into a permanent military contingent. In the Balkans, the United States performs exactly the same function that the Austrian and Ottoman empires performed at the turn of the last century, namely, the maintenance of peace through the creation of protectorates placed between warring ethnic groups. They dominate the international financial system, representing the single largest fund of investment capital, the most attractive haven for investors and the largest market for foreign exports. American pop culture standards set the tone around the world, even if they sometimes cause outbursts of discontent in individual countries.

The legacy of the 1990s has created such a paradox. On the one hand, the United States has become powerful enough to be able to stand its ground and win so often that it has led to accusations of American hegemony. At the same time, American instructions to the rest of the world often reflected either internal pressures or repetitions of principles learned from the Cold War. And as a result, it turns out that the dominance of the country is combined with a serious potential that does not correspond to the many currents that influence and ultimately transform the world order. The international scene shows a strange mixture of respect and obedience to American power, which is accompanied by periodic bitterness towards their instructions and a misunderstanding of their long-term goals.

Ironically, America's superiority is often treated with complete indifference by its own people. Based on media coverage and congressional opinion—two of the most important barometers—American interest in foreign policy is at an all-time low. popular sensations than the challenge needed to raise the bar for America to achieve more than it has. The latest presidential elections were the third in a series of elections in which foreign policy was not seriously discussed by the candidates. Especially in the 1990s, when viewed in terms of strategic plans, American superiority was less emotional than a series of ad hoc decisions designed to please voters, while in the economic field, superiority was predetermined by the technological level and caused by unprecedented gains in America's productivity. All of this has given rise to an attempt to act as if the United States no longer needs a long-term foreign policy at all and can limit itself to responding to challenges as they arise.