Problems of the State Scientific and Practical Center and M. Khrunichev: Defective Managers Finish Russia Off

In 2017, the Khrunichev State Space Research and Production Center (GKNPTs) was supposed to launch the Angara-A5 heavy rocket, but this will only happen in 2018. About the reasons for the postponement of the launch of the Angara and the resumption of the operation of the Protons, about why it is necessary to expand the product line and what needs to be done so as not to be afraid of Elon Musk, - in an interview with Kommersant correspondents Ivan Safronov and Alexander Dzhordzhevich, the general director of the GKNPTs named after Khrunichev Andrey Kalinovsky.

When you headed the Khrunichev Center in 2014, you said that the enterprise was in a deplorable state. What has been fixed?

The situation was indeed difficult. The financial recovery program, which we adopted in agreement with the state corporation Roscosmos and the government, implied economic transformation within ten years - it was supposed to end by 2025. At first we were engaged in stabilization, because we did not have enough working capital even for production activities. It was the stage of 2014-2016: at that time, the state actively helped us, giving money for the production of rocket and space technology. Now there is a stage of modernization, which implies major transformations in production. I think that the final look of the production structure will be built in late 2018 - mid-2019. After that, sustainable development will begin. This year will be three years since we are implementing this program: the situation is not easy, but the process is proceeding in strict accordance with the previously adopted plans.

Why did you need a new financial recovery program then?

A number of initial conditions have changed. A new state budget for the next three years was approved, as part of this, there was a reduction in costs for a number of projects, which we had to take into account. The program has become somewhat tougher for us, but still doable.

How are relations with VEB developing, which was supposed to issue you borrowed funds in several stages? The first tranche in the amount of 12.5 billion rubles. you have received completely, and then?

After that, we received, under the guarantee of Roskosmos, two more loans from other banks for 20 billion rubles. The amount of funds originally included in the rehabilitation program, we received in full. But from other sources.

- How is the corporatization of the enterprise going?

We are at the finish line and in July this year we plan to become a joint-stock company.

- Is it true that part of the territory of the GKNPTs in Fili will be given for residential development?

We recalled 71 engines to the Voronezh Mechanical Plant. It's a lot, but it had to be done

I cannot say what plans the Moscow government has regarding this territory. But we are actively discussing the possibility of opening a technopark on the vacated lands, in which modern space technologies could be developed.

When do you expect to resume launches of launch vehicles that were suspended after the recall of the second and third stage engines due to the use of the wrong solder in them?

The first launch is planned for May 29. Initially, the commercial launch of the Echostar-21 was supposed to take place at the end of 2016 - at the beginning of 2017, but, unfortunately, the engines on this rocket were at risk. Therefore, we offered the customer to replace the Proton with one with fully serviceable engines. Just last week, we had a final meeting, at which the customer confirmed his agreement to replace the rocket.

- How many engines were recalled to the Voronezh Mechanical Plant (VMZ)?

71 engines. This is a lot. But it was necessary. In the current situation, regarding the engines, there was a purely theoretical probability of the presence of a defect. We all had the courage to say, "Let's stop and check everything."

- And how long will it take to fix?

Already in early May, the first serviceable batch will arrive from Voronezh.

- The launch program has suffered a lot?

How many launches were planned, so many remained. Everything will depend on the readiness of spacecraft: in our country, launches are often postponed not only because of problems with rockets, but also because of the unavailability of the payload that we are going to launch.

- Two "Proton-M" were not supplied by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation also because of the engines?

Yes. The missiles themselves were almost ready at the end of 2016, but as a result, we will ship them in the third quarter of 2017.

- Are you parting with VMZ with a light soul?

Well, you can’t say that as if it was a burden for us and we suffered with them ... In accordance with the plans of the state corporation, VSW is transferred to the perimeter of responsibility of NPO Energomash, on the basis of which an engine-building holding will be formed.

And will you get rid of something else, or do you need all the existing assets? Interested in the fate of the Ust-Katav Carriage Works.

The future structure implies the optimization of part of the area, but at the same time, all branches will be preserved in the production of rocket and space technology. As for Ust-Katav, in the structure of the holding it will become a center of competence for the manufacture of castings, stampings, hardware, rubber products. In the next few years, the plant will be reconstructed at the expense of the Federal Target Program for the creation of new capacities there.

Recently, Roscosmos filed another lawsuit against the Khrunichev Center for 600 million rubles, and earlier another - for 1 billion, in January - in general for more than 2 billion rubles.

We had contractual obligations for the supply of rocket and space technology and the implementation of R & D. Our obligations were not fulfilled in full, and as a result, we received claims.

- And what are the prospects for resolving this conflict?

We will try to reduce the amount of claims, we will present our arguments.

- The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not really listen to your arguments in court related to the Proton accident in 2013.

Surely we will find some compromise solutions.

- What is the current status of the Rokot conversion program?

While in operation. We are now making the last machines, the last launch will be commercial - we will launch the Sentinel-3B apparatus in the interests of the European Space Agency. Tentatively, this will take place at the end of 2017 or in the first quarter of 2018. After that, the program will end.

- Will there be a control system of the Ukrainian “Khartron” there?

Yes. Recently received from Ukraine the latest equipment for commercial launches.

- The Rokot should be replaced. What is the status of this project?

Bench tests of individual components and assemblies are now underway, after which we will assemble the first flight rocket in order to carry out its first launch in 2019. The car turned out well. One firm contract has been signed with the Korean Aerospace Institute for launch in 2020. He is still alone, but the general interest in this rocket on the commercial market is quite large.

- Is it being promoted by International Launch Services?

Yes, they have an exclusive right in general to the entire family of Angara launch vehicles.

- Will the project be implemented?

No, they rejected it. Our colleagues from Roskosmos have a new project, Phoenix, which will occupy this niche in the future.

- And what happens to the heavy one? The launch was supposed to take place this year, but it is not in the plans.

We have moved it to 2018. The reason is simple: in parallel with the development work, we were in the process of transferring production to Omsk, and we, by mutual agreement with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, decided to conduct additional tests. This is necessary to confirm the readiness of the production of the Omsk enterprise in terms of the quality of products, the stability of technological processes and the qualifications of personnel. Therefore, now we are preparing bench products. In 2017, we will complete all tests at the Central Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering and after that we will start production in Omsk.

- By the way, you carried out the modernization of production there, purchasing machines for this. Russian?

Not always.

- Did sanctions interfere with the purchase of foreign products?

- What payload will be displayed first on the Angara-A5?

Taking into account the delivery time of the launch vehicle, several payload options are being discussed with the customer. To date, no final decision has been made.

- Is it true that Angola was interested in launching its AngoSAT at Angara?

Just last week, one of SpaceX's clients approached us, asking us to consider the possibility of transferring the launch of his device from the Falcon rocket to the Proton-M

Yes, we considered this possibility with our colleagues from RSC Energia, but it was one of the options. But in the end, another type of media was chosen.

You promised that the enterprise would produce two heavy Angara-A5 rockets and one light rocket a year. Will the forecasts come true or will the dates be shifted again?

The plans have been saved. We are developing the Amur, we are entering the manned program ... Therefore, taking into account the consolidated order - the Ministry of Defense and Roscosmos - these parameters have been preserved: from 2021, two large vehicles and one small one will be produced.

- How is the work on the KVTK upper stage (oxygen-hydrogen heavy class. - Kommersant) going?

Now we are closing the previous contract. The process of submitting primary documents is underway. In the first half of this year - the beginning of the second, we must conclude a new contract for KVTK with a state corporation to continue work.

- In what year should we expect the launch?

In 2024 It was originally planned to be held in 2021, but here budget adjustments really affected the timing.

- Are the launch dates for the manned Angara-A5P the same?

Yes - in 2021, 2022 and 2023.

- Why are you preparing several new modifications of the Proton then?

When we entered the commercial launch market 15–20 years ago, the Khrunichev Center was virtually a monopolist. We had one rocket that we offered to the market, and the market adjusted to it, and not vice versa. Were we comfortable? Of course. Over time, many new players have appeared. And as soon as the market had the opportunity to use various options, they began to choose those carriers whose power is sufficient to carry their payload. There is a serious trend - spacecraft are becoming lighter. And those who used to stand in line with us with their companions weighing more than five tons, began to make devices weighing four tons. And they no longer want to pay for excess rocket power. And we have "Proton-M" as it put six tons into orbit, and six tons remained. We realized that we also need to change: it is impossible to compete with only one product in the line. More precisely, it is possible, but only if the price is artificially reduced - but you understand that it is infinitely impossible to do this. It should be taken into account that Baikonur is located much to the north of the cosmodromes of our competitors. With the same Falcon and Ariane, we are significantly losing in terms of energy only due to geography. If the "Proton" flew from the equator, then we would not have to invent anything at all, but this is from the category of "if only, if only." Therefore, a few years ago we took the first step - we changed the sales policy, differentiating customers into permanent and one-time. And now we are creating a whole family based on the Proton for various orders that may come.

- Are we talking purely about commercial orders or will you also invite government customers?

- Proton-M was also created as a commercial project, and today we also carry out federal orders on it. I think it's the right thing to have a line of machines that meet different requirements. We passed the first NTS (scientific and technical council. - “Kommersant”) at the end of 2016, and now we are preparing for the second. Since the changes from the original in the Proton Medium version are not very big, I expect that the first car will appear at the end of 2018.

- What about the Light version?

We presented it to international market, but were forced to postpone its creation. Initially, I thought that this version would be the most popular. However, after analyzing the interest of potential customers, it turned out that the greatest attention was focused on the Medium option. That is, for most customers, the payload corresponds to this particular modification. Demand dictates everything.

- Until what year will you operate Proton? Is it possible to extend their service life after 2025?

The real challenge now is the stable growth of wages. Regardless of the situation in which the company is

By the time the Angara takes off, and by 2025 it should definitely happen, then we will say goodbye to the Proton.

Are you afraid of Elon Musk?

Last week, a SpaceX client approached us asking us to consider rescheduling his spacecraft's launch from a Falcon rocket to a Proton-M. You have to work, not be afraid (laughs).

Some employees of the Khrunichev Center were worried about your arrival at the enterprise: they were afraid of layoffs, cuts in wages ...

The real challenge now is the stable growth of wages. Regardless of the situation in which the company is located. Yes, there are huge debts. Not the most highly efficient production yet, but in the first two years we managed to achieve a rapid increase in average wages: by 19.3% in 2015, by 11.4% in 2016. Last year, growth slowed down somewhat, primarily due to a decrease in production load. Plans for 2017 have not changed: we are obliged to ensure further wage growth corresponding to the level of high-tech production.

- Will the Khrunichev Center somehow participate in the implementation of the lunar program?

Undoubtedly. So far, the two-launch scheme with the help of heavy Angara-A5V missiles has not been abandoned - this is still one of the options for implementing the program that are available.

- And how do you feel about a super-heavy rocket?

Recently, with foreign colleagues, we discussed the trends in the development of the industry for the coming decades. And they honestly answer that they are going in the direction of minimizing the weight of the payload: fewer microcircuits, more efficient antennas, more compact engines. But they immediately stipulate that there is economic feasibility in combining the efforts of several large companies in creating a large spacecraft and launching it using one super-heavy rocket. And this fork will determine the shape of future launch vehicles.

The talk about the load is really very serious - 35, 50 or even 70 tons. Today, the technical potential of the country's rocket-building industry makes it possible to implement tasks of any complexity. But I think that in this project it is very important to accurately determine the goal setting.

This interview with the employees of the M.V. Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center could have been published in one media outlet, but it did not have time, since the director Andrey Kalinovsky hastily left the enterprise, having received a position in Roscosmos. Launches of Proton-M carrier rockets have successfully resumed after a one-year break. A new phase of financial recovery has begun.
But you need to know the history and essence, so I publish it on my own.

***
- When exactly (year) and from what event did the problems start at the Khrunichev State Scientific and Practical Center? What preceded this? What was the need for these changes?

Problems with the financial situation began after the acquisition of several related enterprises as branches in 2007. They were exacerbated by the accidents of 2013 and 2014, as a result of which it was decided to change the management and “improve” the enterprise ( I agree that they were not disclosed in the interview full reasons and the volume of problems at the enterprise that had developed by 2014, including due to the mistakes of the previous management - approx. ).

"Healed". No launches - no accidents. The new management was able to achieve the largest break in launches (almost a year!) In the entire history of Proton flights.

Why did the employees of the center write in their appeal that, unlike the scientific community, employees of space enterprises cannot openly fight for the salvation of their enterprises? Why can't they openly?

Employees of enterprises in the rocket and space industry are subject to various security restrictions regarding non-disclosure of information constituting state or commercial secrets. Also, management forbade employees to criticize the actions of his actions in the open press or official coverage of them by journalists. Thus, it became completely closed from criticism both from within and from outside, presenting the situation only in a favorable light for itself.

LV "Proton-M"

- The Proton-M launch vehicle has not been flying for a year. Why?

The problems associated with the launch of the EchoStar-XXI spacecraft are mainly related to two factors. Firstly, this is the suspension of production due to the ongoing process of reorganization of the plant in Moscow. The workshop is in the process of moving, the production of a number of components has been transferred to Omsk and Ust-Katav, where difficulties have arisen with its development. All this led to significant delays in the manufacturing process of the launch vehicle. Secondly, these are problems with engines for the Proton, produced at the VMZ in Voronezh. They arose due to measures to optimize production, similar to what is happening in Moscow. As a result, as A. V. Kalinovsky mentioned in his recent interview, in order to speed up the launch, it was necessary to replace the rocket with a previously launched one that was not affected by the problem with the engines.

- Decreased number of satellite launch orders. Why? What can this lead to?

The number of orders decreased due to the reduction in the production of missiles. Due to delays caused by problems with accidents and the reorganization of production started by efficient managers, the company is now unable to produce 10-12 Protons annually. And if there is no product, then there is no demand for it. In 2016, we made only three launches. But earlier their number reached 12-14, of which up to 8 accounted for commerce. Now, officially there are contracts for only 15 launches until 2023 (Kalinovsky's last interview), earlier this would have been enough only for 2 years of work.
(we note that the interview also did not disclose the detailed reasons for the decline in orders for launches of commercial spacecraft on the Proton-M, namely the decrease in competitiveness due to poor statistics on accidents and the increase in insurance premiums (in part, this led to a decrease in the cost of commercial launches on the launch vehicle " Proton-M "in dollars, in an attempt to attract customers) - approx. )

SpaceX's aggressive pricing policy has had some effect on the number of orders, but only this year they will be able to break the GKNPTs launch records (12-14 launches). So far, they have had a rather slow pace of order fulfillment, of which they have many. Therefore, our company had good chances to lure some of the customers from the end of the line to Musk, but they were missed due to the reorganization of production. At the same pace of work, we could have made about 15 more commercial launches over the past three years, but the reforms prevented this.

If there are no orders, and accordingly, the volume of output decreases, then its cost begins to grow and prices will then either have to be increased or work at a loss, including on government orders.

Three years have passed since the first launch of the new Angara rocket, and its flight tests have not yet been resumed. Why?

This is due to the reorganization of the Angara production cycle, started by the reformers. Previously, it was divided between Moscow and Omsk. In Omsk, the blocks of the first and second stages - URM-1, were to be produced, in Moscow - the block of the upper stage - URM-2, and the general assembly and testing of the rocket before being sent to the cosmodrome. Kalinovsky transferred production entirely to Omsk, at the same time making his "concentration" there as well. The current plans provide for a 50% reduction in the area of ​​the production site in Omsk. Part of the equipment from Moscow was sent to Omsk, and new equipment, including imported ones, was purchased. As a result of these moves, the production of the Angara was suspended, which caused delays in testing. A big problem in Omsk is also the fact that there was a big break in the production of missiles before work on the Angara began there. Previously, Cosmos-3M light-class missiles were produced there, but their production was curtailed in the early 90s and their launches were carried out from the remaining stocks. Continuity in personnel and experience was broken, local workers had to learn this again, as the 90s greatly undermined the personnel and production potential of Polet. There simply are not enough qualified specialists for the full production cycle of Angara.

We have almost lost the ability to launch heavy satellites on the GSO, which poses a direct threat to Russia's defense capability. Please explain how?

The conduct of modern military operations is impossible without the provision of operational and reliable communications on a global scale, which is provided with the help of low-orbit communication systems and relay satellites in geostationary orbit. To ensure the necessary bandwidth of communication lines, they have to install powerful repeaters and antennas, so that their mass currently reaches several tons. The main means of launching them into the target orbit in the USSR was the Proton-K launch vehicle with the DM upper stage, operated from the Baikonur cosmodrome. After the collapse of the USSR, he ended up on the territory of another state - Kazakhstan. Currently, Russia leases its territory, which costs more than 100 million dollars annually. If relations with Kazakhstan worsen sharply, then Russia's early withdrawal from Baikonur and the loss of the ability to quickly update its satellite constellation, both civil and military, in geostationary orbit are extremely likely. Therefore, in the early 90s, the development of the Angara began, which was supposed to replace the Proton, starting from domestic territory and using fuel components that are non-toxic to humans. Quite often I criticize it for the too northern location of the cosmodrome, which is less beneficial for launches on the GSO than the same Baikonur. But in the early 90s, the country simply did not have the money to build a new cosmodrome, and therefore had to use Plesetsk, which at that time was the most intensively used in the world - more satellites were launched from it than from Baikonur. True, it later turned out that there was no money not only for the creation of a new cosmodrome, but also for the revision of the existing one for the Angara, as well as for the development of the Angara itself, which is why it dragged on for many years. At present, due to lengthy flight design tests and problems with the development of mass production in Omsk, it is far from being able to replace the Proton. And its launches, in turn, depend on the good will of Kazakhstan, which at one fine moment may end, for example, due to a change of power, which will jeopardize our space program. At the Vostochny cosmodrome, the construction of the launch complex for the Angara should only begin, and given how much it was built for the Soyuz, it is unlikely to be completed by 2021, as planned.

- Why did employees leave the enterprise en masse?

This is mainly due to performance improvement activities carried out by effective managers. Because of them, the level of bureaucracy has sharply increased, the number of meetings held has increased significantly, and the higher the bosses, the more often they sit on them, but they still do not help the work.

The new system of remuneration has led to the fact that it has become almost impossible to get the start of work before the release of official orders or to urgently correct the issued documentation - since the amount of the bonus depends precisely on the formalized work. In fact, the activity comes down to the official closure of the so-called. "cards", and not to the actual development work new technology or maintenance of an existing one. The opinion of specialists has practically ceased to be taken into account, they simply do what they order, even if this goes against their many years of experience. A striking example of this is the new line of carriers based on Proton. Such developments are bad both in terms of technology and economic indicators, which is obvious to the employees of the design bureau, but not to the top managers of the Center. People began to experience a sense of shame for the results of their work, which does not contribute to improving the psychological climate in the organization. Management acts as an irresistible elemental force in relation to employees, with which there is no way to fight with systemic means. The trade union organization defends their interests, but only to a certain extent - everyone remembers the dismissal of the director of the RKZ, V.A. This dismissal was declared illegal by the court, but he did not succeed in returning to the enterprise and reinstating his position. There is a similar example in KB. His boss, Yu. O. Bakhvalov, was also fired due to disagreement with the position of top management regarding the Angara-A5V missile. He expressed reasonable doubts about the possibility of its rapid creation. If even such high bosses are fired, then what can we say about ordinary workers of the design bureau and the plant? In the atmosphere of despondency and hopelessness that has been created, people are either already looking for new jobs, or simply waiting to be offered to leave, as they offer three salaries with a reduction, which is at least some, but money. Many experienced specialists who could still continue to work have retired, just not to deal with all this violence against the technology they created.

MLM "Science"

Why are other employees fired? How massive are these layoffs?

Layoffs in the language of managers are called "optimization of the number of enterprises." This is partly due to the abandonment of further work on the creation of orbital station modules and satellites, which led to the re-profiling and reduction of the relevant departments, partly due to a reduction in the volume of activities carried out at the Moscow production site. For example, a course was taken to eliminate the test base located there, since the buildings occupied by it are located on the territory intended for release. It is extremely expensive to build it on the remaining territory from scratch, taking into account the extremely specific requirements for the premises where stands for testing launch vehicles, upper stages and fairings should be located. As a result, that part of the tests that was carried out at the enterprise during the development and operation of rocket technology will need to be ordered from other organizations, which will have to pay a lot of money for this.

Often, the volume of staff reductions is associated with an uncritical transfer of Western production methods to our realities. The organizational structure of aerospace enterprises in Russia and the United States have certain differences that do not allow direct comparison of their labor productivity. However, for pupils of foreign business schools there are no such barriers, and therefore they are ready to cut just for the sake of cuts. Of course, there is an obstacle in their way in the form of a labor code and collective agreements that limit the number of employees laid off for reduction. Therefore, such conditions are created at the enterprises of the Center that employees are encouraged to leave of their own free will. Only now there are not very many such people who want it because of the crisis. There are fewer and fewer jobs in the specialty for employees of space enterprises, since “optimization” takes place not only in Tsikhe, but also in RSC Energia named after V.I. S. P. Korolev and NPO them. S. A. Lavochkin, and therefore they have to look for work mainly in related industries.

In total, the number of employees of the Center decreased from 2014 to 2016 by 6 thousand people, from 33 to 27 thousand, that is, by about 20%. A significant part of their reductions are accounted for by the Moscow plant, besides, a significant part of the workers have been put out of work there, that is, they receive 2/3 of the salary, being present at the workplace and not doing any work, since it is not available from -for reducing the number of launches and transferring part of the production to Omsk and Ust-Katav. They are not burning with the desire to quit yet, although they are already being offered 5 salaries for leaving the “agreement of the parties”. With industrial enterprises in Moscow, everything is getting worse and worse, greedy developers continue to survive them, and therefore it is extremely difficult to find a new job. All this leads to a loss of qualification and demotivation of employees, which in the end can have a sad effect on the accident rate of the Center's products.

Please tell us about the financial recovery program? What is it, what are its weaknesses? Are there any strong ones?

It consists in the reorganization of serial production and the transfer of design to new principles. The main reason for the enterprise's losses was declared to be the inefficient organization of production and excess territories of the enterprises of the Center. As a means of solving this problem, their cardinal reorganization was proposed. The experts immediately raised doubts about the volume and timing of the ongoing reorganization: such large-scale changes could stop the existing production, which eventually happened. On the new principles, the work did not work out - the program was drawn up in a hurry and without reference to the specifics of the enterprise. Well, what else could be expected from a plan drawn up in two months by people who had not previously been engaged in the production of rockets? By the way, A. V. Kalinovsky also did not show himself in the old place - the plant for the production of "Superzhdetov" did not reach the planned figure of 60 aircraft per year. Its maximum was reached in the year of Kalinovsky's departure and amounted to only 37 cars, which, moreover, later required a long fine-tuning for delivery to the customer. Volumes were received only at the expense of quality. Then the output immediately fell to about 20 cars, with some increase in quality. For missiles, such a drop in quality is unacceptable - they are disposable and cannot make an emergency landing for repairs, the consequences of quality problems are fatal for them.

Please tell us how and why (as explained by the management) the production in Moscow and Omsk is being rebuilt? What are their official and unofficial goals?

A common feature of the restructuring of production in Moscow and Omsk is the territorial concentration. Both there and there the area occupied by industrial premises is minimized. The official goal of this minimization is production optimization (reducing the paths traversed by parts between workshops, increasing the load on equipment, etc.), reducing the cost of maintaining the territory (utilities) and the tax burden. There are big problems with justifying these reductions - such a reduction in space caused many questions for technologists, but no one listened to their opinion, which is why we have the current state of production.

Moreover, plans to reduce the territory in Moscow were revised and the share of the freed territory was increased from 63 to 80%, that is, the remaining share was almost halved. It is difficult to talk about any production at all on this stub, there is simply not enough space, the equipment simply will not fit.

The team has long had an established opinion about the true goals of this restructuring, namely, increasing the amount of territory suitable for development, even if this is detrimental to national security and the current activities of the enterprise. The reformers are connected with developers, and for them construction on the territory of the enterprise is an end in itself. After all, they are even ready to build up squares in Omsk, which will bring less money than Moscow ones. But even for this penny they are ready to put everything under the knife.

- Please, tell us about the situation with Proton: what has changed in the scheme of its production?

At the time of the relocation of the workshops, the manufacture of part of its components was transferred to the branches - Omsk and Ust-Katav. Moreover, in Ust-Katav, the production of certain types of components for all enterprises included in the GKNPTs was also concentrated. Moreover, they were not produced there at all before, and the transfer of production itself leads to an increase in transport costs for moving between enterprises.

As a result of the changes made, the production of Proton practically stopped, and instead of the growth in labor productivity promised by the new management, it fell, if measured in products actually manufactured and handed over to the customer.

- Cancellation of allowances and recalculation of salaries: how exactly did this happen, who was affected and what did it lead to?

The new management decided to measure labor productivity the way it used to in the old place. A. V. Kalinovsky did not have to manage the development of equipment, and therefore he applies the same approach to them as to mass production workers. This approach does not take into account the specifics of design work and actually leads to demotivation of employees.

First, they were divided into two categories: some received a slightly variable premium, others - a strong one. This division occurred depending on the functions performed by the units. The second category now received a bonus that varied greatly depending on the percentage of work formally completed. Previously, when the Center was still functioning normally, the bonus practically did not depend on how the activity was going - there were launches, there weren't - they received an average of 20 to 30% of the salary. Now she, too, has little to do with reality, unless, of course, the unit is directly related to servicing launches. The reduction in travel allowances also affected the income of employees working at the spaceport. Officially, its reason is the formation of the Customs Union, which served as the basis for reducing travel expenses in Kazakhstan (calculated in US dollars for trips abroad) to the level allocated for trips around Russia (of course, in rubles). Given the growth of the dollar, this gave them a tangible decline. As a result, many of those who were employed in the work at the cosmodrome quit.

The work performed, for calculating the premium, is measured in conventional units - standard hours, which have long been separated from physical ones. Their number received by a particular department depends both on the general fund allocated for work, and on the penetrating abilities of the department's management, the ability to prove the need for their work. As a result, before the introduction of the new wage system, there was a large imbalance in the distribution of these standard hours: on average, everything was normal in the hospital, but there were also those who had too much or too little of them. As a result, when these standard hours became money, this led to a significant stratification in terms of wages. Some were motivated to quit due to insufficient pay for their work.

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Removal of the Proton-M launch vehicle from the AsiaSat-9 spacecraft:

- Tell us about the Proton Light project. His weaknesses? State of affairs today?

The official reason for the creation of Proton-Light was the desire to reduce costs when launching satellites of a smaller mass. To do this, it was proposed to reduce the number of steps and thereby obtain some savings. Only this alteration of the rocket requires additional testing and restructuring of production, which also requires certain costs. The whole question is, will they not be more than the resulting savings? After all, this will eventually lead to a decrease in the volume of production of each modification, which means an increase in unit costs.

The first version of the Proton-Light required significant improvements: the second stage was excluded, and fuel was added to the first and third by increasing their tanks. In the case of the current third stage, this increase in fuel capacity was significant - by about 50%, which required a corresponding increase in the operating time of its engines. To do this, it was necessary to test them for a new period of work, and, if necessary, upgrade them so that they could withstand it. It is also worth noting that the last two accidents were associated with the third stage engine - in 2014 and 2015. So the cost of this upgrade option was eventually assessed as too high and it was abandoned.

But they did not give up the idea of ​​throwing out at least some step! Now it was decided to exclude not the second, but the third step. The second stage, like the first, will actually remain without major changes, which will reduce the cost of revision. There are certain doubts that, given the current state of production described above, the new missile will be ready on time. Competitors will not wait.

About debts: why and how much did they grow? Where does the company get funding from? What threatens him with huge debts?

In order to save factories on the periphery, almost killed by the dashing 90s (delays in wages, the departure of most of the employees, a small number of young people, etc.), they were included as branches in the GKNPTs. Their recovery required large financial outlays on the part of the Center, which were only partially compensated by the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Center ended up with debts to suppliers, had to take loans and its activities became unprofitable.

The reformers took loans secured by the territory, which the company is unlikely to be able to repay on time due to production problems organized by them.

Financing of the enterprise's activities is carried out largely through loans received under the guarantee of the state corporation "Roscosmos" - in 2016 alone, it received them for 40 billion rubles. The total debt to banks is already 52.5 billion rubles. There is still a little left and it will owe approximately at the level of the Superjet, which has repeatedly received funds to cover its debts from the state.

Read more about the implementation of land rights in the Filevskaya floodplain. Has the area already been given over to development? What does this mean for the company?

The territory has not yet been transferred for development, and for several reasons. First, it is the form of ownership of the enterprise. While GKNPTs im. M. V. Khrunichev is a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, that is, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, his lands cannot be redeveloped. It will be possible to dispose of the territories only after its transformation into a joint-stock company as part of the state corporation Roscosmos, which will own 100% of the shares. This is hampered by the presence of unsettled claims with customers, the total amount of which is estimated at 10.5 billion rubles.

Secondly, the liberation of the territory itself is proceeding at a rate lower than originally planned. KB "Salyut" was supposed to be one of the first to leave their old buildings, and initially it was all about moving to a new place, outside the territory of the existing site. The work of part of the design bureau units requires constant visits to the plant's workshops, the move would lead to unproductive loss of working time for trips between the two territories. Also, due to the restrictions associated with the secrecy regime, the new building must be owned by the enterprise and be equipped in a certain way for this. Such an office building costs billions of rubles, and therefore the move, which the director of the RKZ V.A. Petrik opposed in his time, and for which he was fired, eventually moved into the future.

It was also not possible to fully transport the equipment to Omsk and Ust-Katav, which in some cases led to trips of blanks from Omsk to Moscow and back, since there are no necessary equipment for a number of technological operations. The reduction in intra-shop movements resulted in parts traveling thousands of kilometers long. The buildings are still safe and sound, many of them have already been disconnected from communications and mothballed, and the process of dismantling equipment is underway in them.

- The case of Mikhail Ostroushenko: if possible, tell us what its essence is.

Mikhail Ostroushenko previously worked with A. V. Kalinovsky in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and then, as a proven shot, he was appointed by him to manage the Omsk software company Polet, where the entire production of Angara was transferred. The delays in the release of Angara, which arose as a result of the restructuring of production, attracted the attention of the prosecutor's office and the FSB. The results of their audits of economic activity at the enterprise served as a pretext for litigation.

This entry was originally posted at

And you say renovation! We read and think

I have already blogged about the difficult situation at the Center. M. V. Khrunichev, in continuation of the story, I cite a letter from the employees of the space enterprise, in which the main problems that threaten the future of the Tsikh are voiced
In fact, we are now at the point of no return. There is currently no other enterprise in Russia capable of producing heavy-class missiles in the next 10 years. And these are satellites on the GSO, and large interplanetary vehicles.
Unfortunately, unlike the scientific community, employees of space enterprises, especially those with a defense bias, do not have the opportunity to openly fight for the salvation of their enterprises. And in general it sounds very strange. This indicates a lack of functional feedback from the country's leadership, which can lead to very disastrous consequences in the near future.
Reposting and sharing this email could make a difference (or at least there's a small chance):

"GKNPTs im. M. V. Khrunichev, who celebrated his centenary last year, is in the worst crisis in its history. Neither the hard times of the revolution, nor the Great Patriotic War, nor even the 90s, could bring the enterprise to the deplorable state in which it is now.

For almost a year (since June 9, 2016) the Proton-M launch vehicle has not been flying, the number of orders for launching satellites has sharply decreased. Three years have passed since the first launch of the new Angara rocket, and its flight tests have not yet been resumed.

Employees leave the enterprise en masse, both as part of measures to “optimize the headcount” and of their own free will, as they no longer want to work under the guidance of “optimizers”. We have almost lost the ability to launch heavy satellites on the GSO, which poses a direct threat to Russia's defense capability. What is the reason? In the implementation of the financial recovery program developed and adopted for implementation by the team of "effective managers" A. V. Kalinovsky, who headed the enterprise in the summer of 2014.

Production facilities in Moscow and Omsk are being completely rebuilt. The main purpose of this restructuring is to reduce the area occupied by the enterprise, with their subsequent sale for development, both in Moscow and in Omsk. All this under the slogan of "lean production", "Lean technologies" (from the English Lean - unprofitable, unprofitable, thin (from the word bad), meager, unproductive).

As a result of the implementation of these plans, the full-fledged production of the Angara in Omsk has not been established, but in Moscow it is no longer assembled, so that as a result, the launch of the rocket into series and the replacement of the Proton with it are postponed further, and the funds for this continue to be spent.

General Director of GKNPTs im. M. V. Khrunichev Andrey Vladimirovich Kalinovsky in Omsk (photos provided by the staff of the TsIKh)

With Proton, the situation is simply deplorable - its old production has collapsed, some of the parts and blanks are now being made in branches thousands of kilometers from Moscow. Quite often, branches cannot complete the processing of the product completely on their own equipment, and for some operations it has to be transported from Omsk or Ust-Katav to Moscow, and then back. This results in wasted time and money for transportation. Part of the workers from the factory in Moscow was reduced, part was transferred to idle time by 2/3 of the salary.
They proudly refer to these measures as "reconfiguration of production and reduction of overhead costs."

In KB Salyut, which is engaged in design support for existing projects and the development of new ones, the situation is no better than at the plant. Firstly, as a result of the “development of a motivational model”, a new wage system was introduced. Canceled part of the allowances - for academic degrees and knowledge foreign language and tied the bonus to the amount of work performed. When planning, it was taken into account through standard hours, and in terms of work it has long been separated from the actual time costs, both up and down. But the standards for labor intensity were never revised, because some of the units ended up in chocolate, and some were on starvation rations with a bare salary. Of course, this led to the departure of some specialists of their own free will, and by no means pensioners. It also sharply aggravated relations between departments - no one wants to work for free. As a result, what was previously decided on the job is now done only through high authorities.

Secondly, in order to provide additional incentives for employees, it was decided to establish the so-called “individuals” in some departments. “visualization boards” are the product of the gloomy genius of Lean technologists. Only now the Japanese came up with them for conveyor production, and not for the production of such piece products as rockets, and even more so not for design work. But how can they understand this, they are not engineers! Currently, all this mess is also being converted into electronic form, stuffed into the CAD system used at the enterprise - NX from Siemens, absolutely not caring about finalizing the interface for ease of use. It takes a full-time person to run the business in this system. It is also difficult to understand how the use of a foreign program fits in with the policy of import substitution, especially in the presence of domestic analogues and for reasons of secrecy.

But despite the lack of knowledge and experience in the development of rocket and space technology, A. V. Kalinovsky and his team do not forget to generate new ideas in the field of rocket science, which is exemplified by the long-suffering Proton-Light project presented to the public last year . Having optimized the Angara and practically stopped the production of the usual Proton, they decided to mutilate it, giving rise to new versions, as if the rocket was a children's designer, and not a complex technical system. The chimerical nature of this plan was initially obvious to any competent specialist, but in order for the management to understand that the initial version was bad, and the deadlines were unrealistic, it took a year of study by the entire design bureau team, which further increased the company's debts. But Kalinovsky could not completely refuse him - and therefore, after playing a little more "cubes", they presented new version, more realistic. Why even produce chimeras based on a rocket that will only fly until 2025 and which the owners of the Baikonur Cosmodrome do not want to see further poisoning their territory of their country. But on the other hand, new contracts are already being concluded for it, although there is no rocket itself yet.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the managerial achievements of the new management. To begin with, they renamed the management structure of the Center into the "Head Office", and then spawned new departments, directorates and departments in it. Listen to how beautiful it sounds - "Director of the Directorate"! It is immediately obvious that a person is not in vain taken to work in a luxurious company car and he does not receive a large salary in vain. A. V. Kalinovsky brought some of the new managers with him from Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and recruited some in the branches of the enterprise in Omsk and Ust-Katav. And of course they are provided with solid salaries.

The structure of financial and legal services was replaced, work with suppliers and clients was reorganized. The result was that they simply do not want to have any more business with us - the work done was not paid on time, and the products ordered from us were not delivered on time. According to the balance sheet for 2016, the amount of claims against the enterprise is already 9.5 billion rubles.

In addition, the restructuring of production and the development of new projects is carried out at the expense of borrowed funds. The amount of credits and loans hanging at the enterprise, during the work of A. V. Kalinovsky, managed to double and increased from 28 billion rubles to 52 billion rubles. And the territory of the Moscow site of the enterprise is used as collateral for the loan. There are also debts to suppliers, and they are comparable in size to the debt to banks.

The total damage caused by the reformers to the state is already comparable, if not exceeding the amount of theft at the long-suffering Vostochny cosmodrome.

It is urgent to change the management of the enterprise and hold a new competition for the position CEO. It is also necessary to revise the financial recovery program and stop the corporatization process until the production is completely destroyed and the area for building is sold off. The workshops are still standing, and the team has not completely scattered, so there is still a reliable way to restore the normal operation of the enterprise.”

Stages of reduction of the territory of Qikha