Penal boxes of the Great Patriotic War. The truth about penal battalions: penal units of the USSR and Germany

There are a number of myths and legends about penal units of the Red Army in the periodical press and published literature: “penal units turned into a kind of military prison”; for them in the Soviet Army "reconnaissance in force" was invented; with their bodies, the penalty box cleared minefields; the penal battalions "were thrown into attacks on the most impregnable sectors of the German defense"; the penalists were "cannon fodder", their "lives achieved victory in the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War"; criminals were not sent to penal formations; penal battalions did not have to be supplied with ammunition and provisions; behind the penal battalions were detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with machine guns, etc.

The published material on a documentary basis reveals the process of creation and combat use of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments. They were first created in the Red Army during the Civil War. The experience of their creation was used during the Great Patriotic War. The beginning of the formation of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments was laid by order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense (NKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin dated July 28, 1942. What caused the birth of this document, christened the order "Not a step back!"?

Formation of penal battalions and companies

In the course of the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow and its general offensive that then unfolded, the enemy was driven back 150-400 km to the west, the threat to Moscow and the North Caucasus was eliminated, the situation of Leningrad was eased, the territories of 10 regions were completely or partially liberated Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht, having suffered a major defeat, was forced to switch to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front. However, many operations of the Red Army remained incomplete due to the overestimation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) of the capabilities of its troops and the underestimation of enemy forces, the dispersion of reserves, and the inability to create decisive superiority in the most important sectors of the front. The enemy took advantage of this and seized the initiative again in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942.

The miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the command of a number of fronts in assessing the situation led to new defeats of the Soviet troops in the Crimea, near Kharkov, southeast of Leningrad and allowed the enemy to launch a major offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy advanced to a depth of 500-650 km, broke through to the Volga and the Main Caucasian Range, and cut communications linking the central regions with the south of the country.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to: irretrievable - 2064.1 thousand people, sanitary - 2258.5 thousand; tanks - 10.3 thousand units, guns and mortars - about 40 thousand, aircraft - more than 7 thousand units. But, despite heavy defeats, the Red Army withstood a powerful blow and, in the end, stopped the enemy.

I.V. Stalin, taking into account the current situation, on July 28, 1942, as People's Commissar of Defense, signed order No. 227. The order stated:

“The enemy throws ever new forces to the front and, regardless of heavy losses for him, climbs forward, breaks into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizes new areas, devastates and devastates our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. Fighting is going on in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south and at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to seize the Kuban, the North Caucasus with their oil and grain wealth at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, half of Voronezh. Parts of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with disgrace.

The population of our country, which treats the Red Army with love and respect, is beginning to become disillusioned with it, losing faith in the Red Army. And many curse the Red Army because it gives our people under the yoke of German oppressors, while it itself flees to the east.

Some foolish people at the front comfort themselves by talking about the fact that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of grain. By this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the fronts.

But such talk is completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.

Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is striving to capture, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, it has become much less people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain a year and more than 10 million tons of metal a year. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower or in grain supplies. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our Motherland in every possible way.

Therefore, it is necessary to root out the talk that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is great and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be an abundance of bread. Such conversations are false and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and plants, without railways.

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.

Not one step back! This should now be our main call.

We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every patch of Soviet land and defend it to the last possible opportunity.

Our Motherland is going through hard times. We must stop and then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter what it costs us. The Germans are not as strong as it seems to the alarmists. They are straining their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, is to secure victory for us.

Can we withstand the blow, and then push the enemy back to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is getting more and more aircraft, tanks, artillery, and mortars.

What do we lack?

There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our main shortcoming. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend the Motherland.

Commanders, commissars, political workers, whose units and formations arbitrarily leave their combat positions, cannot be tolerated any longer. It is impossible to endure any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, to draw other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.

Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, every commander, Red Army soldier, and political worker must have an iron law: not a single step back without an order from the high command.

The commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, the corresponding commissars and political workers, retreating from a combat position without an order from above, are traitors to the Motherland. It is necessary to deal with such commanders and political workers as with traitors to the motherland.

This is the call of our Motherland.

Fulfilling this order means defending our land, saving the Motherland, exterminating and defeating the hated enemy.

After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline was shaken in the German troops, the Germans took some severe measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from fighters who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, put them in dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, deprived them of orders, placed them on even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins. Finally, they formed special barrier detachments, placed them behind the unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot alarmists on the spot in case of an attempt to leave their positions without permission and in case of an attempt to surrender. As is known, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have the lofty goal of defending their homeland, but there is only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, having the lofty goal of defending their outraged Motherland, do not have such discipline and endure because of this defeat.

Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, as our ancestors learned from their enemies in the past and then won a victory over them?

I think it should.

The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:

1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:

A) to unconditionally liquidate the retreating moods in the troops and with an iron fist to suppress the propaganda that we can and should allegedly retreat further to the east, that there will supposedly be no harm from such a retreat;

B) to unconditionally remove from their post and send them to the Headquarters to bring to a military court the commanders of the armies who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;

C) to form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sections of the front, to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;

C) to form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.

3. Commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without the order of the corps or division commander, take away orders and medals from them and send them to the military councils of the front for submission to a military court;

B) provide all kinds of assistance and support to the barrage detachments of the army in strengthening order and discipline in the units.

Read the order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, headquarters.

Order No. 227 does not mention the experience gained in the Civil War, but refers to the experience of the enemy, who practiced the use of penal battalions. The experience of the enemy, of course, needed to be studied and creatively applied in practice. But the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin, who during the Civil War was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts, had an idea about the creation of such formations in the Red Army.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, evaluating order No. 227, writes in the book “The Work of All Life”: “This order immediately attracted the attention of the entire personnel of the Armed Forces. I was an eyewitness of how soldiers in units and subunits heard him, officers and generals studied him. Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years in terms of the depth of patriotic content, in terms of the degree of emotional intensity ... I, like many other generals, saw some sharpness and categorical assessments of the order, but they were justified by a very harsh and anxious time. In the order, we were primarily attracted by its social and moral content. He drew attention to himself with the severity of the truth, the impartiality of the conversation between the people's commissar and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin with Soviet soldiers, from an ordinary soldier to an army commander. Reading it, each of us thought about whether we give all our strength to the struggle. We realized that the cruelty and categorical demands of the order came in the name of the Motherland, the people, and it was important not what penalties would be introduced, although this mattered, but that it raised the consciousness of the soldiers' responsibility for the fate of their socialist Fatherland. And those disciplinary measures that were introduced by the order had already ceased to be an indispensable, urgent necessity even before the Soviet troops went over to the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and encircled the Nazi group on the banks of the Volga.

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov in his “Memoirs and Reflections” noted: “In some places panic moods and violations of military discipline reappeared in the troops. In an effort to stop the fall in the morale of the troops, I.V. Stalin issued Order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. This order introduced tough measures to combat alarmists and violators of discipline, and strongly condemned "retreat" moods. It said that an iron law for active troops should be the requirement "Not a step back!". The order was backed up by intensified party-political work among the troops.”

During the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards Order No. 227 was ambiguous, as evidenced by the documents of that time. So, in a special message from the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, Senior Major of State Security N.N. Selivanovsky, sent on August 8, 1942 to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank V.S. Abakumov, it was emphasized: “Among the command staff, the order was correctly understood and evaluated. However, among the general upsurge and correct assessment of the order, a number of negative, anti-Soviet defeatist sentiments are recorded among individual unstable commanders ... ". Similar facts were cited in the report of the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front, Brigadier Commissar K. Kalashnikov, dated August 6, 1942, to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

After the issuance of Order No. 227, measures were taken to bring it to the attention of the personnel, to form and determine the procedure for the use of penal and barrage units and units. On July 29, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) A.S. Shcherbakov demanded that the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts and the heads of the political departments of the armies "personally make sure that the order of the People's Commissar is immediately brought to the attention of the units and subunits, read out and explained to all personnel of the Red Army." In turn, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, in Directive No. 360/sh of July 30, ordered the commanders of the fleets and flotillas to accept Order No. 227 "for execution and leadership." July 31 People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin signed Directive No. 1096, which ordered the military prosecutors and chairmen of the tribunals to take "decisive measures to provide the command and political agencies with real assistance in fulfilling the tasks set in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense."

Even before the publication of order No. 227, the first penal company was created in the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, 1942. On July 28, on the day of signing Order No. 227, 5 separate penal companies were created in the active army, on July 29 - 3 separate penal battalions and 24 separate penal companies, on July 30 - 2 separate penal battalions and 29 separate penal companies, and on July 31 - 19 separate penal companies. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the Volga and Dnieper military flotillas had their own penal companies and platoons.

Who formed penal battalions and companies

August 10 I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky signed Directive No. 156595, which demanded that personnel convicted of sabotage or wrecking be sent to penal tank companies, as well as send "hopeless, malicious self-seekers from tankers" to penal infantry companies. Penal companies were created, in particular, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th tank armies.

On August 15, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army A.S. Shcherbakov signs directive No. 09 "On political work to fulfill the order of the NPO No. 227 of July 28, 1942." August 26 People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov issued an order "On the tasks of the military tribunals to implement the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942." The procedure for accounting for servicemen sent to penal battalions and companies was defined in Directive No. 989242 of the General Staff of the Red Army of August 28.

September 9, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin signed order No. 0685, which demanded that "fighter pilots who evade combat with an air enemy be brought to justice and transferred to penal units in the infantry." The pilots were sent not only to penal infantry units. In accordance with the regulations developed in the same month at the headquarters of the 8th Air Army, it was planned to create penal squadrons of three types: a fighter squadron on Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft, an attack squadron on Il-2, and a light bomber squadron on U-2.

September 10, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Major General of Artillery V.V. Aborenkov issued an order according to which it was instructed to immediately send to the penal rifle battalions "guilty of negligent attitude towards the military equipment entrusted to them" from the 58th Guards Mortar Regiment.

On September 26, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Army General G.K. Zhukov approved the provisions "On the penal battalions of the active army" and "On the penal companies of the active army." Soon, on September 28, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko issued order No. 298, in which they announced to the leadership:

"one. Regulations on the penal battalions of the active army.

2. Regulations on the penal companies of the active army.

3. Staff No. 04/393 of a separate penal battalion of the active army.

4. Staff No. 04/392 of a separate penal company of the army in the field ... ".

Despite the fact that the staffs of penal battalions and companies were clearly defined by the relevant provisions, their organizational and staff structure was different.

By order No. 323 of October 16, 1942, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko, the provisions of Order No. 227 were also extended to the military districts. The direction to the penal units in accordance with order No. 0882 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko dated November 12, both those liable for military service and military personnel feigning illness and the so-called “mutilators” were subject. By order No. org / 2/78950 of the Main Organizational and Staff Directorate of the Main Executive Office of the Red Army of November 25, a single numbering of penal battalions was established.

December 4, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.S. Shcherbakov signs order No. 0931, according to which, for “a soullessly bureaucratic attitude to the material and domestic needs of political workers who are in the reserve of the GlavPURKKA at the Military-Political School named after. M.V. Frunze" were removed from their posts and sent to the active army in a penal battalion, Major Kopotiyenko, assistant head of the school for logistics, and senior lieutenant of the commissary service, Govtvyanyts, head of the school's baggage and clothing supply.

According to order No. 47 of January 30, 1943, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel-General E.A. Shchadenko, in a penal battalion for a period of 3 months, junior lieutenant of the 1082nd Infantry Regiment Karamalkin was sent to the rank and file "for criticizing, trying to slander his superiors and corrupting discipline in his unit."

According to Directive No. 97 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shadenko dated March 10, 1943, it was required “after a quick check, immediately send to penal units” former military personnel who “at one time, without resistance, surrendered to the enemy as prisoners or deserted from the Red Army and remained to live in the territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, or, being surrounded in their place of residence, they remained at home, not trying to go out with the units of the Red Army.

By order No. 0374 of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 31, 1943, it was prescribed by the decision of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front to send to penal battalions and companies "persons of the commanding staff guilty of interruptions in the food of the fighters or the lack of food for the fighters." The employees of the Special Departments did not escape the fate of the penalized. May 31 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Based on the results of checking the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, Stalin issued Order No. 0089, by which investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Soloviev were dismissed from counterintelligence agencies and sent to a penal battalion "for criminal errors in investigative work."

By order No. 413 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin of August 21, 1943, the command staff of military districts and inactive fronts was given the right to send military personnel to penal formations without trial “for unauthorized absence, desertion, failure to comply with orders, squandering and theft of military property, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and other military crimes in cases where the usual disciplinary measures for these offenses are insufficient, as well as all detained deserters of sergeants and privates who fled from units of the army in the field and from other garrisons.

Not only male military personnel, but also women were sent to penal formations. However, experience has shown that it is not advisable to send female servicemen who have committed minor crimes to penal wards. Therefore, on September 19, 1943, the directive of the General Staff No. 1484 / 2 / org was sent to the chiefs of staff of the fronts, military districts and individual armies, which demanded not to send female servicemen convicted of crimes to penal units.

In accordance with the joint directive of the NKVD / NKGB of the USSR No. 494/94 of November 11, 1943, Soviet citizens who collaborated with the invaders were also sent to penal units.

In order to streamline the practice of transferring convicts to the active army, on January 26, 1944, Order No. 004/0073/006/23 was issued, signed by Deputy Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and the Prosecutor of the USSR K.P. Gorshenin.

By order No. 0112 of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal G.K. Zhukov dated April 29, 1944, the commander of the 342nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 121st Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.A., was sent to the penal battalion for a period of two months. Yachmenev "for failure to comply with the order of the Military Council of the Army, for leaving the enemy advantageous positions and not taking measures to restore the situation, for showing cowardice, false reports and refusal to carry out the assigned combat mission."

Persons who allowed carelessness and lack of control were also sent to the penal units, as a result of which military personnel died in the rear, for example, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, signed in May 1944.

Practice has shown that in the execution of this order, significant violations were made, to eliminate which order No. 0244 was sent, signed on August 6, 1944 by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same kind of order No. 0935, concerning officers of the fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov.

Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties. On November 23, 1944, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin signed Order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (commander of the Guards Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner.

The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always successful, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, Deputy Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On March 24, 1943, Zhukov sent directive No. GUF/1902 to the front commanders, which demanded:

"one. Reduce the number of penal companies in the armies. Assemble the penalized into consolidated companies and, thus, keep them in a set, preventing them from being aimlessly in the rear and using them in the most difficult areas of hostilities.

2. In the event of a significant shortage in the penal battalions, introduce them into battle in batches, without waiting for the arrival of new penalized officers from the officers in order to cover the shortage of the entire battalion.

The regulations on penal battalions and companies noted that the permanent staff (commanders, military commissars, political instructors, etc.) were appointed to positions by order of the troops of the front and the army from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battle. This requirement, as a rule, was carried out in the active army. But there were exceptions to this rule. For example, in the 16th separate penal battalion, platoon commanders were often appointed from among the penitentiaries who atoned for their guilt. According to the regulations on penal battalions and companies, the length of service in ranks for all permanent staff, compared with the command, political and commanding staff of the combat units of the army, was halved, and each month of service in penal formations was counted when assigning a pension for six months. But this, according to the memoirs of the commanders of penal units, was not always carried out.

The variable composition of the penal battalions and companies consisted of military personnel and civilians sent to these formations for various offenses and crimes. According to our calculations, made on the basis of orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, People's Commissar of the Navy, Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of State Security, about 30 categories of such persons were identified.

So, in the orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies, the types of offenses for which military personnel and other persons could be sent to penal units, as well as the circle of persons who had the right to send the guilty and convicted to penal units, were clearly defined. In the fronts and armies, orders were also issued regarding the formation of penal units and subunits. So, by order No. 00182 of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov dated July 31, 1942, the commanding and political personnel of the 85th Infantry Division, who were "the main culprits for not fulfilling the combat mission" were sent to the front-line penal battalion, and "junior command and rank and file personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield" were sent to army penal company. On May 6, 1943, Directive No. 005 was issued by the front commander, Colonel General I.I. Maslennikova, who demanded that servicemen who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or brought to trial by a military tribunal.

The published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that commanders and chiefs did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives. This, as the study showed, concerned about 10 categories of fines:

1. Unjustly convicted, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.

2. The so-called "encirclement" who managed to escape from the "cauldrons" and go to their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.

3. Servicemen who have lost military and secret documents.

4. Commanders and chiefs guilty of "criminally careless organization of the military security and intelligence service."

5. Persons who, because of their beliefs, refused to take up arms.

6. Persons who aided "enemy propaganda".

7. Soldiers convicted of rape.

8. Civilian prisoners (thieves, bandits, repeat offenders, etc.).

9. Fraudsters.

10. Employees of defense enterprises who have committed negligence.

The published literature provides various information about equipping penal battalions and companies with weapons and military equipment. Some authors write that the penitentiaries were armed only with small arms and grenades, being "light" infantry units. Other publications provide information about the presence of captured automatic weapons and mortars in penal units. To perform specific tasks, artillery, mortar and even tank units were temporarily subordinated to the commander of the penal unit.

The fines were provided with clothing and food supplies in accordance with the standards established in the army. But, in a number of cases, according to the memoirs of front-line soldiers, there were violations in this case as well. In some publications, for example, I.P. Gorin and V.I. Golubev, it is said that in the penal divisions there were no normal relationships between the permanent and variable composition. However, the majority of front-line soldiers testify to the opposite: statutory relationships and strong discipline were maintained in the penal battalions and companies. This was facilitated by well-organized political and educational work, which was carried out on the same basis as in other parts of the active army.

Penal formations, recruited mainly from among the military personnel of various military specialties, if there was time, underwent additional training so that they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them.

According to the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study”, by the end of 1942 there were 24,993 penal soldiers in the Red Army. In 1943 their number increased to 177,694, in 1944 it decreased to 143,457, and in 1945 to 81,766. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 427,910 people were sent to penal companies and battalions. Judging by the information included in the List No. 33 of rifle units and subunits (separate battalions, companies, detachments) of the active army, compiled by the General Staff in the early 60s of the XX century, during the Great Patriotic War, 65 separate penal battalions and 1028 separate penal companies; total 1093 penalty parts. However, A. Moroz, who studied the funds of penal units stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, believes that during the war years 38 separate penal battalions and 516 separate penal companies were formed.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” states: “Penal units of the Red Army existed legally from September 1942 to May 1945.” In fact, they existed from July 25, 1942 to October 1945. For example, the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army participated in the Harbino-Girinsky offensive operation, which was carried out from August 9 to September 2, 1945. The company was disbanded on the basis of Directive No. 0238 of the headquarters of the 5th Army of October 28, 1945

Penal battalions and companies were used in the most dangerous areas

As already noted, there is much speculation about how penal battalions and companies were used. Moreover, the most common is the myth that they served as a kind of "cannon fodder". This is not true. Penal companies and battalions during the Great Patriotic War solved almost the same tasks as rifle units and subunits. At the same time, as order No. 227 prescribed, they were used in the most dangerous areas. Most often they were used to break through the enemy defenses, capture and hold important settlements and bridgeheads, and conduct reconnaissance in force. During the offensive, penal units had to overcome various kinds of natural and artificial obstacles, including mined areas of the terrain. As a result, the myth that they "cleared minefields" with their bodies gained vitality. In this regard, we note that not only penal units, but also rifle and tank units repeatedly acted in areas where minefields were located.

Penalty units, in general, staunchly and bravely acted in defense. They participated in forcing water barriers, capturing and holding bridgeheads, and in combat operations behind enemy lines.

Due to the fact that penal formations were used on the most difficult sectors of the fronts and armies, they, according to the authors of the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study”, suffered heavy losses. In 1944 alone, the total losses of personnel (killed, dead, wounded and sick) of all penal units amounted to 170,298 permanent personnel and penalized. The average monthly loss of permanent and variable composition reached 14,191 people, or 52% of their average monthly number (27,326 people). This was 3-6 times more than the average monthly losses of personnel in ordinary troops in the same offensive operations in 1944.

In most cases, the fined were released within the time limits set by the orders of the people's commissar of defense and his deputies. But there were exceptions, which were determined by the attitude of the command and military councils of the fronts and armies to the penal units. For courage and heroism shown in battles, the penalty boxers were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Barrage detachments of the Red Army

In the early days of the Great Patriotic War, the leaders of a number of party organizations, the commanders of the fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under the onslaught of the enemy. Among them - the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. So, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the retreating units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the resolution "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front line", adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the troops of the NKVD.

On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, Major of State Security A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who had penetrated the front line.

Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who operated on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th rifle and 12th mechanized corps and divisions "immediately organize detachments of barriers to detain those who fled from the front."

Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of the Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the troops of the fronts "immediately personally figure out how the frontier service is organized and give exhaustive instructions to the chiefs of the rear guard." On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Commissar of State Security, 3rd rank B.C. Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.

During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which on August 16, 1941, the Bryansk Front was created under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of the Headquarters, launched a flank attack in order to defeat the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy grouping from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko appealed to the Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5 gave such permission.

This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by the Special Departments, now the decision of the Stavka legalized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the army, so far only on the scale of one front. Soon this practice was extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which ordered each rifle division to have a "barrage detachment of reliable fighters no more than a battalion in number (calculated as one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and a few tanks or armored vehicles." The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.

On September 18, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted Decree No. 00274 “On intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of the city of Leningrad”, in accordance with which the head of the Front’s military rear defense guard was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without papers."

October 12, 1941 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. A note to Stalin in which he proposed "to organize a group of command personnel along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow" to organize the reflection of enemy tanks, which should be given a "barrage detachment to stop the fleeing." On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Decree No. 765ss on the creation of a headquarters for the protection of the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD located in the zone, police, fighter battalions and barrage detachments were operationally subordinate.

In May-June 1942, during the hostilities, the Volkhov Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd shock army, which was part of this group, detachments were used to prevent flight from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh front.

On July 28, 1942, as already noted, order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar of the 1st rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, in which the state No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the army was announced.

Barrage detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942 I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd army left the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st army left Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, V.N. Gordov was sent directive No. 170542 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “In two days, to form at the expense of the best composition barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, which arrived at the front of the Far Eastern divisions, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments are to be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162 / op on the creation within two days in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies of five barrage detachments, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three barrage. At the same time, it was ordered within two days to restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Supreme High Command No.

On October 1, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke of the poor organization of the service of detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for combat operations.

During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained servicemen fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of which 3,980 were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies and 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Office of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR of October 30, 1942, proposed using detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments were supposed to follow the infantry units and force the fighters to attack by force of arms.

Army detachments and detachments of divisions were also used during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed mass heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and alarmism. Barrage formations were widely used to combat these shameful phenomena.

In the autumn of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In Directive 1486/2/org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the troops of the fronts and the 7th separate army, it was said:

"one. In order to strengthen the strength of the rifle companies, the non-standard barrage detachments of the rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, should be disbanded.

2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NCO No. 227 of 28.7.1942, 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, each numbering 200 people, should be contained.

In the tank armies, there should not be barrage detachments.

In 1944, when the troops of the Red Army were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, they were used in full measure in the front line. This was due to the increase in the scale of atrocities, armed robberies, thefts and killings of the civilian population. Order No. 0150 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal A.M. was sent to combat these phenomena. Vasilevsky on May 30, 1944

Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. O misuse barrage detachments, it was said at the disposal of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command G.K. Zhukov dated March 29, 1943, commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In a memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ detachments”, sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General A.S. Shcherbakov noted:

"one. The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the people's commissar of defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to guard army headquarters, guard communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.

2. In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen ...

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies ...

4. The lack of control on the part of headquarters has led to the fact that in most detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have blossomed ...

Conclusion: The detachments for the most part do not fulfill the tasks specified by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various chores and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-chiefs, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army is by no means included in the function of detachments of front troops.

I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation.

However, not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them was the reason for their disbandment. By the autumn of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore, I.V. On October 29, 1944, Stalin signed order No. 0349 with the following content:

“In connection with the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

1. Separate barrage detachments should be disbanded by November 15, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” notes: “Due to the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the continued existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).

During perestroika, many different myths and rumors were born related to the period of the Great Patriotic War, one of them is about penal battalions, that only criminals were recruited there, that unarmed, undressed and hungry fighters were driven to German machine guns and many other conjectures and thoughts , so was it really? What were these penal units, what tasks did they perform, who served and fought in them?

Penal units, battalions and companies, appeared in the Red Army only in July 1942, after the release of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR N 227 of July 28, 1942, the famous order "Not a step back." It was a time when mortal danger hung over our country, German troops rushed to Stalingrad.

According to order No. 227 in the Red Army, for middle and senior command and political personnel guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, from 1 to 3 penal battalions (800 people each) were created within the front. For ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of similar violations, from 5 to 10 penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each) were created within the army. Penal units were supposed to be sent to the most difficult sectors of the front in order to give them the opportunity to atone for crimes against the Motherland with blood.

As we can see, the main difference between the penal battalions is that the command staff (senior and middle commanders, later officers) served in them, and ordinary soldiers and junior commanders (later privates, sergeants and foremen) served in penal companies.

The term of punishment was calculated from one to three months, a wound received even on the first day of being in a penal unit automatically returned the fighter to the unit to the same position, in the same military rank, so that service in the penal box when the fighting was going on was not even considered a day, but for hours, it was so deadly and dangerous.

The penal battalions were under the jurisdiction of the military councils of the fronts, the penal companies - the military councils of the armies. For the direct conduct of hostilities, penal units were attached to rifle divisions, brigades, and regiments.

Servicemen were sent to penal battalions by order of a division (corps, army, front - in relation to units of the corresponding subordination), and to penal companies - by order of a regiment (separate unit) for a period of 1 to 3 months. For the same period, they could be sent to the penal unit of persons convicted by a military tribunal with the use of a deferred execution of the sentence until the end of the war (based on Article 28-2 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, 1926). All sent to the penal units were subject to demotion to the rank and file, their awards for the time they were in the penal unit were to be transferred for storage to the personnel department of the front (army). The commanders and commissars of battalions and regiments could be sent to a penal battalion only by the verdict of a military tribunal.

Later, on September 28, 1942, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E. Shchadenko, issued Order No. 298, which announced the provisions on penal battalions and penal companies, as well as the staff of the penal battalion, penal company and barrage detachment.

According to these documents, the servicemen of the penal units were divided into permanent and variable composition. The permanent staff was recruited "from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battle." For special conditions of military service, they received appropriate benefits. The permanent composition of the penal battalion included the command of the battalion, officers of headquarters and administration, commanders of companies, platoons, political leaders of companies and platoons, foremen, clerks and medical instructors of companies. In the penal company, the commander and military commissar of the company, the clerk of the company, commanders, political instructors, foremen and medical instructors of platoons belonged to the permanent staff.

That is, the command staff of penal units did not consist of penalized units, but of specially selected commanders and political workers, since not every commander was able to manage such a specific unit as penal battalions and companies were, where it was necessary not only to be able to command correctly, but also to the decisive moment of the battle to raise and lead the penalty box to the attack.

As for the variable composition, that is, the penalty box, regardless of their previous military rank, they served as privates, and could also be appointed to the positions of junior officers. So the former colonels and captains with rifles and machine guns in their hands clearly followed the orders of lieutenants, commanders of penal platoons and companies.

Not only guilty military personnel fell into the penal units. Persons convicted by the judiciary were also sent there, however, courts and military tribunals were forbidden to send to penal units those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes, banditry, robbery, robbery, recidivist thieves, persons who had already been convicted of the above crimes in the past, as well as repeatedly deserted from the Red Army. In other categories of cases, when deciding on the suspension of the execution of the sentence with the direction of the convict to the active army, the courts and military tribunals, when making a decision, took into account the personality of the convict, the nature of the crime committed and other circumstances of the case. Not everyone was given the opportunity to atone for their guilt with blood at the front.

A year later, already in 1943, another type of penal units appeared in the Red Army, these are the so-called separate assault rifle battalions, for some reason we know much less about them. So on August 1, 1943, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. Org / 2/1348 "On the formation of separate assault rifle battalions" was issued, which prescribed: "In order to provide opportunities for command and command personnel who were long time on the territory occupied by the enemy, and who did not take part in partisan detachments, to prove their loyalty to the Motherland with weapons in their hands "These penal units were formed only from the contingents of command and command staff contained in special camps of the NKVD. At the beginning, 4 such assault battalions were formed, numbering 927 people each. Assault battalions were intended for use in the most active sectors of the front. The period of stay of personnel in separate assault rifle battalions was set at two months of participation in battles, either before being awarded an order for valor in battle or until the first wound, after which personal the composition, with good attestations, can be appointed to the field troops for the corresponding positions of the commanding staff. " Subsequently, the formation of assault battalions was continued. Their combat use, in principle, did not differ from penal battalions, although there were significant features So, unlike the penalized, those who were sent to the assault battalions were not convicted and deprived of their officer ranks. As strange as it may sound, the families of the personnel assigned to the battalions from the special camps of the NKVD were given all the rights and benefits defined by law for the families of the commanding staff of the Red Army. There was one more difference between assault battalions and ordinary penal ones, so if in penal battalions (as in penal companies) the permanent staff occupied all positions, starting with platoon commanders, then in assault battalions only the positions of the battalion commander, his deputy for political affairs were included in the permanent staff , chief of staff and company commanders. The remaining posts of the middle command staff were occupied by the fighters themselves from the personnel of the assault battalion. And in the assault battalions, appointments to the positions of commanding staff, both junior and middle, were also made after a careful selection of commanders from a special contingent.

The term of stay in the assault battalion was two months (in the penal battalion - up to three months), after which the personnel were restored to their rights. In practice, this often happened even earlier.

According to the memoirs of front-line soldiers, those who went through the penal battalions, the armament of these units was no different from the armament of ordinary rifle units. For example, the battalion consisted of three rifle companies, in which each squad of rifle platoons had a light machine gun, the company also included a platoon of company (50 mm) mortars. There was also a company of submachine gunners in the battalion, armed with PPD assault rifles, gradually replaced by more modern PPSh, and a machine-gun company, armed with not only the well-known Maxims, but also more modern, lightweight machine guns of the Goryunov system. The b-on also included an anti-tank rifle company, which was armed with multi-charged "Simonovsky" guns, as well as a mortar company - 82 mm mortars. The supply of ammunition was also uninterrupted, before the offensive, the penitentiaries often threw out gas masks in order to fill the vacated bag to the limit with grenades or cartridges. The same should be said about the organization of food, all the penalized were on the boiler allowance, like any other military organization.

In total, in the Red Army from 1943 to May 1945, in certain periods, there were up to 65 penal battalions and up to 1037 penal companies, however, these figures cannot be considered accurate, since the number of penal battalions and companies was constantly changing, they were not permanent units, some were disbanded, others were reformed, etc.

Penal units existed in the Red Army from September 1942 to May 1945. In total, 427,910 people were sent to penal units throughout the war. On the other hand, through the Soviet Armed forces during the war, 34,476.7 thousand people passed. It turns out that the proportion of military personnel who have been in penal companies and battalions is only 1.24% of the entire personnel of the Red Army.

In the course of hostilities, penal units, as a rule, performed the following tasks:

Carrying out reconnaissance in combat in order to identify firing points, lines and demarcation lines of enemy defense;

Breaking through enemy defense lines to capture and hold given lines, strategically important heights and bridgeheads;

Assault on enemy defense lines in order to perform diversionary maneuvers, create favorable conditions for the offensive of the Red Army in other directions;

Conducting "disturbing" positional battles, holding down enemy forces in a certain direction;

Fulfillment of combat missions as part of the rearguard to cover the Red Army units during the retreat to previously prepared positions.

Since the most difficult combat missions were entrusted to the penitentiaries, their losses, both for the permanent and for the variable composition of the penal units, were quite high. So, in 1944, the average monthly loss of variable composition in killed, dead, wounded and sick reached 10,506 people, permanent - 3685 people. This is 3-6 times more than the level of losses of personnel of conventional troops in the same offensive operations.

Penitentiaries who were wounded in battle were considered to have served their sentences, were restored in rank and in all rights, and upon recovery were sent for further service in regular units, and disabled people were assigned pensions from the salary of maintenance in the last position before being enrolled in a penal battalion.

The families of the dead penalized were assigned a pension on a common basis with all the families of the commanders from the salary of maintenance in the last position before being sent to the penal battalion.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, all penal units in the Red Army were disbanded, such is the history of the penal battalions, people who passed through these battalions and companies endured all the hardships, hardships and horrors of the war, while showing courage and heroism, eternal memory for them.

When writing used materials from:

http://mbpolyakov.livejournal.com/250923.html

http://liewar.ru/content/view/133/4/

http://www1.lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/PEHOTA/pylcin.txt_with-big pictures.html

What do we know about the penal units that fought for the Victory along with the regular units of the Red Army? They are shrouded in a veil of speculation and rumors. For the sake of the "red word" historical reality in other films and books is sometimes distorted beyond recognition.

Penalties - who are they?

In penal battalions and penal companies, by decision of the military tribunal, they fell for criminal and war crimes, or for violating military discipline due to cowardice. Moreover, officers were sent to penal battalions, and junior commanders and privates were sent to penal companies. All fines were subject to demotion.

Along with the military, convicted civilians also fought in penal units. But, contrary to popular rumors, neither criminals nor "political" went to the front. Not everyone was given the chance to "wash away shame with blood." The command staff consisted of military personnel who had passed a special selection, since it was not easy to manage these peculiar units.

As for the existence of women's penal battalions, there were none. Female soldiers convicted by a military tribunal were sent to the rear, and not to the front line.

How many were there?

Historians cannot name the exact number of penal units that fought on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War. The fact is that the situation is constantly changing. The term of service of the penalty box ranged from one to three months, if a person was injured, even in the first hours of his stay in the penal battalion or penal company, he was restored in rank and after the hospital continued to serve in the regular troops.

There were cases when, for outstanding military merits, a penal unit was almost completely restored to its rights, and individual, especially distinguished fighters, were awarded military awards. An example of this is the 8th OSHB of the 3rd Army, which in February 1944, during the Rogachev-Zhlobin operation, fought behind enemy lines for five days, which greatly facilitated the offensive of regular units. By personal order of Commander General A.V. Gorbatov, 600 of the 800 servicemen of the penal battalion were rehabilitated.
Thus, the number of penal units in 1943-1945. fluctuated within 60 battalions and thousands of companies.

However, the annual strength of the army and navy on the war fronts was 6-6.5 million people, while the share of penal units was virtually negligible - from 2.7 percent in 1943 to 1.3 percent in 1945.

What did they fight?

Contrary to legend, the penal battalions did not attack unarmed. According to the memoirs of front-line soldiers who passed penal battalions, their armament was no different from the armament of rifle divisions of regular units: the same PPD assault rifles and more modern PPSh, the Maxim heavy machine gun or Goryunov systems for each squad of rifle platoons, mortars, grenades. Interruptions in supply, of course, happened, but not more often than in the line troops.

Where did they fight?

Penal units, of course, were sent to the most dangerous sectors of the front, carried out sometimes impossible tasks: they carried out reconnaissance in force in order to identify weak points in the enemy’s defense; carried out raids behind enemy lines; carried out diversionary maneuvers, storming the German defense lines; covered the retreat of the Red Army. Therefore, penalty boxers died 3-6 times more, but "blood atonement" for them was a chance to restore their honest name.

For reference

For the first time such units appeared in Nazi Germany. On the Eastern Front for example, about 100 "probationary units" fought. Unlike the Soviet penalists, who returned to duty after being wounded, the Wehrmacht soldier who covered himself with shame had to fully serve the term assigned to him by the military tribunal in the penal unit.

In recent years, films and publications have begun to appear, allegedly exposing loud shocking moments in the history of the Great Patriotic War. However, at the heart of many topics disturbing the public consciousness is the banal demand of the modern market for sensational information. Penal companies and battalions became one of such controversial and controversial pages in the history of the last war. Clarity in this matter is brought both by the archive of the Second World War by the names of the participants in the disciplinary units, and by the memories of the veterans themselves. It must be said that many of those whose ancestors ended up in penal companies or battalions are far from always sufficiently aware of the details of service in special conditions, because often participants in those events preferred not to talk about what tests they had to go through.

The history of education and the foundations of the organization

Penal formations appeared in the Red Army in the summer of 1942 on the personal orders of I.V. Stalin. The need for the formation of such disciplinary units was explained by the fact that the number of soldiers and officers who committed crimes of minor gravity was impressive enough to allow this category of military personnel to serve their sentences in places of deprivation of liberty in difficult wartime. This state of affairs is confirmed by the military archive. A search by the names of those who fought in the status of a penal gives answers to questions regarding this phenomenon.
Soldiers and officers fell into disciplinary units for offenses related to the violation of the charter and failure to comply with the order, but did not entail serious consequences, as well as for cowardice, desertion, cowardice and slovenliness. Only officers were sent to penal battalions, and soldiers, sergeants and foremen were sent to penal companies. For the entire time of the conduct of hostilities, there were 65 penal battalions and a little more than a thousand penal companies. The period of stay in formations of this type was limited to 3 months (or until the first injury). Officers who ended up in penal battalions were deprived of their ranks and awards, but after their release, as a rule, they were fully restored in their rights. Nevertheless, for the heroism shown in battles, the penalty boxers were often awarded orders and medals. The archive of the Second World War by the names of the participants contains in its vaults a lot of personal files, in which there are marks about heroic episodes during service in penal battalions.
The penalty box was commanded by ordinary regular officers who did not have any penalties. Compared with the commanders of ordinary combat units, these officers had some benefits and advantages. Women who served in the Red Army and committed misconduct were not enrolled in penal units, but were sent to the rear.
There were similar disciplinary formations in the Wehrmacht army.

Truth and fiction

In cinema and modern literature, one can observe a number of blunders associated with penalty parts. These fictions are completely refuted by the military archive; searching by surnames in it clarifies many points of those events. So, for example, there is an opinion that a significant part of the fines were political prisoners and criminals, and some of them allegedly even ruled in units at the level of commanders, or rather godfathers. In fact, by definition, there could not be convicts in the penal battalions. A small number of criminal elements ended up in penal companies, but their dominance in the collectives was out of the question.

Some so-called historians like to savor the myth that the brunt of the war was carried on their shoulders by the penitentiaries. This is not true. The number of soldiers and officers who went through disciplinary battalions and companies throughout the Great Patriotic War barely exceeded 1% of the total number of all military personnel of the war period. Another thing is that the penal battalions and penal companies always found themselves in the thick of it, which is why the losses in these units significantly exceeded the average. Anyone who wants to verify this can personally look into the WWII archive; By the names of the participants in bloody battles, one can trace the combat path of the formation and, accordingly, the number of losses. It should only be remembered that soldiers from ordinary forward regiments and divisions also fought desperately next to the penalty box.

Many modern films about the war vividly demonstrate the cruelty of their own detachments, destroying those who dared to retreat without an order, and this supposedly concerned the penal units in the first place. And that's not true. Detachments really existed, but there were not as many of them as the sensational hunters write about it, and they did not have any special regulations about the penalty box. By the way, the enemy also had similar barrage units.

We also have such scholars who claim that the fighters of the penal battalions were sorely lacking in weapons and that they were fed on a leftover basis. Again fairy tales! All military units on the front line were supplied with weapons and food in the same way. Simply, breaking away from the rear support or being surrounded, any unit had difficulties with ammunition and food. Attributing this problem only to penalty parts is incorrect.

Thus, you should not be ashamed if in the process it turns out that your ancestor at some point ended up in a penal battalion or a penal company - a military archive, a search by surname in which it may well provide such information, often indicates sharp turns in the biographies of Red Army soldiers . Everyone makes mistakes, although the cost of misdeeds committed in wartime can be prohibitive. Nevertheless, many soldiers and officers who went through disciplinary units redeemed themselves with blood, and many performed feats and were even awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

When writing the article, information was used from the memories of people who passed through penal companies.

When using materials from the site, a direct link to the source is required.