Losses of the USSR in the Finnish war. Soviet-Finnish war

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then associated its plans for further advance to the east. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Germany, in accordance with the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, observed neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, given the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of their northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, at a distance of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The President of the country in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, declared: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland."

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General Halder, visited Finland. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in a future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive such a number of aircraft, which was many times more than what the Finnish air force had. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, British, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the USA built a powerful long-term fortification system, the Mannerheim Line. It was a powerful system of three lines of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The fortifications stretched in width from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. Of the total number of defensive structures, 350 were reinforced concrete, 2400 were wooden and earth, well camouflaged. Sections of barbed wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) Rows of barbed wire. Giant "wolf pits" 7-10 meters deep and 10-15 meters in diameter were dug out at the alleged breakthrough sites. For each kilometer, 200 minutes were set.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for the creation of a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name “Mannerheim Line”. Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military figure, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, he served in the Russian army. During civil war in Finland (January - May 1918) led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander in chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 - July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential election in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the Council of State Defense. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim signed a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and spoke out against Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that the mighty southern neighbor would certainly attack the small three-millionth Finland. In fact, this happened, but this could not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding Finnish statesman Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), later wrote: that it treated it rather favorably."

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time for solving this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and with Germany Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact. The Soviet government at first hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without bringing the matter to a military conflict. In October-November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union offered Finland to conclude a bilateral defensive alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for the help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would later help Finland to compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland in the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had a serious historical justification. Even Ivan the Terrible in the Livonian War sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. The Livonian War lasted for 25 years (1558-1583), but Tsar Ivan the Terrible could not achieve Russia's access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and, as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721), Tsar Peter I brilliantly completed. Russia received access to the Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortress city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the 6,000-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, "a strong pillow was arranged for St. Petersburg." Petersburg has now become reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for the subsequent offensive actions of the Russian troops in Finland.

In the autumn of 1712, Peter decides on his own, without allies, to seize Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. Here is the task that Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who should lead the operation: “To go not to ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold it, for two main reasons: first, it would be something to yield in peace, about which the Swedes are already clearly starting to talk; Another thing is that this province is the womb of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend softer. The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final beautiful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle at Cape Gangut in July 1714. The young Russian fleet for the first time in its history won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle was commanded by Peter I under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Gangut battle in importance with the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nishtad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between Emperor Napoleon of France and Emperor Alexander I of Russia, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of "friendly gift" from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will surely know about this event. Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland arose as part of the Russian Empire. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian province of Vyborg to the Grand Duchy of Finland. So it was easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province has remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. That is the background of the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also transfer the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula on lease. All this in area was 2761 sq. km. instead of Finland, a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia was offered with a size of 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would have been unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for help from the Western powers, Finland counted on separating East Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The plan of military operations was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov.

The plan of the General Staff took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications and provided for the forces and means necessary for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be redone. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and the victory would be won with little bloodshed, as they say, let's throw hats on. The plan of the General Staff was rejected. The development of a new, "correct" plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. A plan designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of at least minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. Faith in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the outbreak of war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at the time.

To start a war, not always, but often they find, or rather, create some kind of pretext. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station with German soldiers dressing up in the uniform of Polish military personnel, and so on. A somewhat lesser fantasy was the reason for the war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen. On November 26, 1939, they fired at Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and declared that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed to the great danger of a provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims to which it allegedly led. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus by 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a reply note received on November 29, the Finnish government suggested that the Soviet side come to the place and, by the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was precisely the territory of Finland that was shelled. Further, the note said that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparation, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 o'clock in the morning, units of the Red Army went on the offensive. The "unknown" war began, about which the USSR did not want not only to talk, but even to mention it. The war with Finland in 1939-1940 became a cruel test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the almost complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for waging a big war in general and a war in the difficult climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to give any complete account of this war. We will limit ourselves to describing the most important events of the war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces were to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of power on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR threw four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were deployed along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades, and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently managing this strong grouping in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful fortifications in the world at that time, which made up the "Mannerheim Line". During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in a 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to end the war with Finland victoriously within 12 days.

After replenishment with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce in nature and looked like a slow, with heavy losses in people and equipment, gnawing through the fortified Finnish positions. Commander of the 7th Army, first commander of the 2nd rank Yakovlev V.F., and from December 9 - commander of the 2nd rank Meretskov K.A. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of "commander of the 2nd rank" began to correspond to the rank of "lieutenant general"). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications withstood. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the North-Western Front, which was headed by the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army was added to the 7th Army (corporal commander V.D. Grendal). The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the start of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of ​​the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, in severe frost. Prior to the start of the fighting, senior commanders had little idea of ​​how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would attack waist-deep in snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, they came to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in the methods of storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - sheepskin coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one line of enemy defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack, the resulting “mine fear” quickly turned into “finophobia”. By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns, there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops, the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing its end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was broken by 14 February. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth - 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the entry of the Red Army into the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. The Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here temporarily stabilized. On February 26, the Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped the attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of the Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions passed through the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty in Moscow. The hard and shameful war for the USSR ended.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only in mastering the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies participated in the war: the 14th (commander Frolov), the 9th (comcors M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated almost along the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on the front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, more than a thousand kilometers long. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull off part of the Finnish forces from the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. If successful, Soviet troops in the southern sector of this front line could break through to the north of Lake Ladoga and reach the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. The Soviet troops of the central sector (Ukhta region), also in case of success, could go to the area of ​​the Gulf of Bothnia and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both areas, the Soviet troops were defeated. How could it be possible in a harsh winter, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed network of roads, without reconnaissance of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities, to advance and defeat the Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activities in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? It does not require marshal wisdom and more combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short Soviet-Finnish war with the Soviet troops, there were many tragedies and almost no victories. During the fighting north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snowy coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, the Soviet divisions stretched out along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the possibility of maneuver, fell victim to small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes more, if you count the prisoners. Here is a specific example. The 18th division (56th corps of the 15th army) was surrounded by the Finns in the first half of February 1940 along the road from Uoma to Lemetti. She was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. Soldiers were not trained to act in winter conditions in Finland. Parts of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the encircled garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th division, with the permission of the Headquarters, began to exit the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded. With heavy losses, the fighters broke out of the encirclement. The soldiers carried the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashov in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its flag, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon shot by the verdict of the tribunal, the commander of the 56th corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial number of 117 thousand people. There are many similar examples from that “unknown” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But the territorial acquisitions did not increase the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 threw back the Soviet troops to the pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. The troops, at the cost of great bloodshed, gained some experience in modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership was convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, concrete measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops, to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was some decline in the pace of repression against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions unleashed by him against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational measures immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal of Klim Voroshilov, a well-known political figure, Stalin's closest ally, "the favorite of the people," from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Timoshenko did not show special military talents, rather, on the contrary, he showed military leadership weakness. However, for the most bloody operation for the Soviet troops to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and cost incredibly large sacrifices, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Timoshenko's activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among the Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

The official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died of wounds - 65384
missing - 19690 (of which over 5.5 thousand prisoners)
wounded, shell-shocked - 186584
frostbite - 9614
got sick - 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, captured, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of the Hero ...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered its neighbors, Norway and Sweden, to let Anglo-French troops through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing to be drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership suggested continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to stop the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

The relations of the USSR with England and France deteriorated sharply because of the help of these countries to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish war, England and France planned to bombard the oil fields of the Soviet Transcaucasus. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb the oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as the oil berths in Batumi. They only had time to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they went to the Batumi region to photograph the oil berths, but were met by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened in late March - early April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of German troops in France, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aircraft were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"

The main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 13/3/1940:

The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.

Soviet tank BT-5

Soviet tank T-28

The offensive of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence data on the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the forces allocated to break through the "Mannerheim Line" turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations near Lake Tolvajärvi.

Until the end of December, attempts to break through continued, which did not bring success.

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. She was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeija kunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.

The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland Task Force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was advancing from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy defenses for 35-45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo region, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists are trying to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (down to -40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +2 to -7°C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not fall below 23 ° C. Frosts down to 40°C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts interfered not only with the attackers, but also with the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions of December 15, 1939 testify to the depth of the snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet tank T-26

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was the massive use by the Finns against Soviet tanks of Molotov cocktails, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail”. During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Molotov cocktail from the Winter War

During the war, the Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim line

The Mannerheim Line (fin. Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive strike from the USSR. The line was about 135 km long and about 90 km deep. It is named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish war in December 1939, when the Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in autumn, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification works. At that time much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorm Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, coined the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives examined the structures.

History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, the construction itself continued intermittently until the start of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.

The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.

Work on the defense plan was continued by German Colonel Baron von Brandestein (O. von Brandenstein). It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.

In October 1919, a new defensive line plan was developed. It was led by the chief of the general staff, Major General Oskar Enkel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.

According to this plan, in 1920-1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine-gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then came a three-year break and the issue of resuming work was raised only in 1927.

The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They took on the greatest scope in 1932, when under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabricius, six two-pipe pillboxes were built.

fortifications

The main defensive strip consisted of a system of defense units extended in a line, each of which included several wood-and-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed on the main defensive line extremely unevenly: the gaps between the individual nodes of resistance sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If the account is kept from the coast of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in this order:

DOT scheme:

"N" - Humaljoki [now Ermilovo] "K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] "N" - Nyayukki [non-existent]
"Ko" - Kolmikeeyala [non-existent.] "Nu" - Hyulkeyala [non-existent.] "Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
"Sk" - Summakyla [non-beings.] "La" - Lähde [non-beings,] "A" - Eyyräpää (Leipäsuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankylä [now Mushroom] "Ma" - Sikniemi [not being.] "Ma" - Myalkelya [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [non-existent] "No" - Noisniemi [now Cape] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Cell [now Portovoe] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense units of various degrees of power were built on the main defensive strip. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:

"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinsky] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinsky] "Le" - Leviyainen [non-existent]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulia-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Luyukulya [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The knot of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3–4.5 kilometers and 1.5–2 kilometers in depth. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine-gun and artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.

Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between nodes of resistance. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one to three shooters.

Shooting cells were covered with armored shields with visors and loopholes for firing. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line rested against the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The basis of the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered with large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. Rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere in the forests. The Belgian General Badu wrote: "Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia."

Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim Line" are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and the second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap on a Finnish bunker

The pillboxes of the first generation were small, one-story, for one or three machine guns, they did not have shelters for the garrison and internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

Second-generation pillboxes were dubbed by the Finnish press as "million" or millionaire pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded one million Finnish marks. In total, 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, who obtained additional appropriations from the country's parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified pillboxes was Sj4 "Poppius", which had loopholes for flanking fire in the western casemate and Sj5 "Millionaire", with loopholes for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers pierced the entire hollow with flank fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. The bunkers of flanking fire were called the Le Bourget casemate, after the name of the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some pillboxes in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into casemates for flanking fire, while the frontal embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of flanking fire were well-camouflaged with stones and snow, which made it difficult to detect them, in addition, it was almost impossible to break through the casemate with artillery from the front. "Million" pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were gun, mainly flanking action. The usual armament of pillboxes were Russian 76-mm cannons of the 1900 model on casemate machines Durlyakher and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in buildings of the first period, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, lack of rigid reinforcement in buildings of the first period.

The strong qualities of the pillboxes consisted in a large number of firing embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanked the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as tactically correct location structures on the ground, in their careful disguise, in the rich filling of gaps.

Destroyed bunker

Engineering barriers

The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots, which were somewhat different from Soviet slingshots or Bruno's spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were supplemented by anti-tank ones. Nadolbs were usually placed in four rows, two meters from one another, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with barbed wire, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned simultaneously into anti-personnel ones. The most powerful obstacles were at a height of 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhbolotny and Sumy nodes of resistance. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. In order to undermine the gouge, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three to four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front line of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and bunkers was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of the settlement and were built of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to build about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of barbed wire along the main defense line. In practice, when, in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive zone and began to make attempts to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using the then in service Finnish army several dozen obsolete light tanks "Renault", proved to be untenable in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often undermined the gouges with explosive charges, thereby arranging passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious shortcoming, of course, was good review lines of anti-tank gouges from distant artillery positions of the enemy, especially in open and flat areas of the terrain, such as, for example, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Sj (Summa-Jarvi) defense hub, where the main defensive line was breached on February 11, 1940. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the gouges were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank gouges there were rows of barbed wire.

Terijoki government

On December 1, 1939, the Pravda newspaper published a message stating that the so-called "People's Government" had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. AT historical literature Kuusinen's government is usually referred to as "Terijoki", since it was located, after the start of the war, in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.

On December 2, negotiations were held in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.

The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to the Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, significant territories in Soviet Karelia were transferred to Finland and monetary compensation was provided. The USSR also undertook to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if none of the parties announced its termination a year before the expiration of the contract, it was automatically extended for another for 25 years. The treaty came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned "as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki."

In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.

It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and therefore was no longer in charge of the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION TOV. MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENvoy Mr. WINTER

Accepted Com. Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to start new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Tov. Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government" which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could be no question of any negotiations with this "government" now. The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen

The "People's Government" was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing the decay in the army and in the rear.

Finnish People's Army

On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanland", which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District, began.

By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (it was sewn from khaki-colored cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; allegations that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats was used from it).

This "people's" army was to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military backbone of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word“ communists ”is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power”, which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.

Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd FNA SD carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units participated in the battles for Lunkulansaari and in the capture of Vyborg.

When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government faded into the background and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations began in January on the issue of concluding peace, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legal government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from different countries peace. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (the "Swedish Volunteer Corps"), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers were also citizens of many other states, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the "Russian People's Detachments", formed by the Finns from among the captured Red Army soldiers. But since work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities, only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in hostilities.

Preparing for the offensive

The course of the hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, the poor preparedness of command personnel, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in the winter in Finnish conditions. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and the beginning of February, the troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods were developed for overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods for dealing with defensive structures, and personnel were trained. To storm the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. Enormous work was carried out in the border regions to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.

To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the divisions of the first echelon were assigned groups of destruction artillery (AR) consisting of one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns with a caliber of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

The Finnish side during this period also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland [source not specified 198 days]. About 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers fought on the side of the Finns, mostly from the Scandinavian countries.

Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish machine gun M-31 "Suomi":

TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. Formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, then in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of guerrilla warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly at night, and after the attacks went into the forest, where bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the greatest danger was represented by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken through forward were constantly surrounded and broke through backwards, often abandoning equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known, in particular, the history of the 44th division of the 9th army. Since December 14, the division has been advancing from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, strongly stretched along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but the division commander A. I. Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse composition. More than a thousand people from among the personnel who left the encirclement were wounded or frostbite, some of the wounded were captured, because they were not taken out during the flight. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced by a military tribunal to death and shot publicly in front of the division line.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov sank (probably hit a mine). S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

The crew of the submarine "S-2"

On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were accommodated in three settlements of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Intersettlement of the Pryazhinsky District, in the settlement of Kovgora-Goymay of the Kondopozhsky District, in the settlement of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky District. They lived in barracks and without fail worked in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was inflicted in the direction of the Sum. Art preparations also began. From that day on, daily for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko brought down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but aptly. Therefore, Soviet gunners had to abandon the most effective direct fire and conduct from closed positions and mainly in areas, since reconnaissance of targets and adjustment were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but could not succeed.

On February 6, the offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both to the west and to the east.

On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.

On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

Since the attacks of the Soviet troops on the Summa region did not bring success, the main blow was moved to the east, to the Lyakhde direction. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery preparation and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.

During three days of intense fighting, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th - to Vyborg. The Finns offered fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

(To be continued)

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Manpower

By the end of November 1939, Finland had concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army interacted with and was supported by the Finnish navy and coastal defense forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were connected to the army's payroll of 337 thousand people as a military force:

The paramilitary formations of the Shutskor and "Lotta Svärd" - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of human forces involved in the war from Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

The 150,000-strong Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to help Finland was also preparing and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - the beginning of March 1940, the arrival of which only thwarted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed, possessed everything necessary. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 warships of the Navy.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent her weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition.

90% of the financial aid came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavia.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its prefloor, main and rear lanes and defense units.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bedding) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, channels) of Finland, combined with high-tech engineering structures to create a defense line capable of giving multi-layered fire on the advancing enemy (at different levels and at different angles), along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, blockages, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and floors of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. A forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three lanes of the "Mannerheim Line" there were over 1,000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

The space between the fortifications, as well as the foreground in front of the entire "Mannerheim Line" were literally covered with solid military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire barriers, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete gouges. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, all roads for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were arranged - funnels 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 mines were set for each linear kilometer. Forest blockages reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish War Plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the approach of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega line lake

E. Directions of hostilities and the command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north of it, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Kyakisalmi) - Sortavala - Laymola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later he was replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the active army of Finland.

Chief of Staff of the Headquarters - Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is General of the Swedish Army Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In the fighting on the entire 1500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, at the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

The regular strength of the ground forces: 916 thousand people. They include: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal and engineering troops.

The ground forces were supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million people of the personnel of the Red Army and the Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary replenishment during the war to replace the dead and wounded, over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three "D" type boats, seven "Shch" type boats, six "M" type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) North and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

Commander of the 7th Army - Commander of the 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and the defense in depth of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not enough not only to break through them, but even to destroy the deep and extremely difficult fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield during the fighting.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they did not manage to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally intended, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor hindering the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely severe winter of 1939/40, with its frosts down to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in waging war in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army.

The course of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" itself.

In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.

1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

2. Troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and total absence settlements in this part of Finland.

3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into the enemy’s territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:

5. Waging heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the "Mannerheim Line", which happened in different sectors of the offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.

In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.

Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).

Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko.

Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov (since December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Commander V.D. Grendal (since March 2, 1940 - commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev (since February 12, 1940).

8. The troops were significantly reorganized and strengthened central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army):

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 RGK artillery regiments, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 RGK artillery regiments, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, covertly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line itself. Within a month, the system of the "Mannerheim Line" itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.

Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy.

The destruction of the front line and the depth of the enemy's defense was also caused by aviation. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budyonnovka, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, sheepskin coats, felt boots. The front received 2,500 mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, the troops worked out new technology assault, the front received the latest tools to undermine pillboxes and bunkers, to storm powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.

11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 8.00, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army also went on the offensive, the tanks of which approached the Muola-Ilves junction.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command expected that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and in the conditions of the coming spring it had a unique system of flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland would be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which would enable England and France to deliver to Finland 150 thousandth expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Lieutenant General K.L., Chief of the Main Staff of the Finnish Army, was appointed Commander of the Vyborg District. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At that time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, all hoping that Western assistance would be in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position made it necessary to wage war until the last minute and led to huge losses, both on the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Side losses*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter
What was in the fortieth year
Killed in Finland on the ice.

Lying somehow clumsily
Childishly small body.
Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew off.
It seemed that the boy was not lying,
And still running
Yes, the ice held the floor ...

In the midst of a great war cruel,
From what - I will not apply my mind -
I feel sorry for that distant fate,
As if dead, alone
Like I'm lying
Frozen, small, dead,
In that war, not famous,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of those killed - 65,384 people.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss in the troops during the period of hostilities - 391.8 thousand people. or, rounded, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish "Blue and White Book" of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war is 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.е. 20%, while Soviet losses are 40% of those involved in operations, or, in other words, 2 times higher in percentage terms.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and losses from 1990 to 1995. reduction of Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Apothecary in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while the data of the Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V. N. From the Cool Peace to the Winter War: Finland's Eastern Policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state un-t. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter war 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ros. acad. Sciences, Inst. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Resp. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehvilyainen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: A selection of materials //Rodina. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons from a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- S. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: by doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541s. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Names. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [per. from English. V. D. Kaidalova]. - M. : Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa : talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla:, 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: S. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Used materials from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Used materials from the book: Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

The Soviet-Finnish war for a long time remained a "closed" topic, a kind of "blank spot" (of course, not the only one) in Soviet historical science. For a long time, the course and causes of the Finnish war were hushed up. There was one official version: the policy of the Finnish government was hostile to the USSR. The documents of the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TsGASA) remained unknown to the general public for a long time.

This was partly due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War ousted the Soviet-Finnish from the minds and studies, but at the same time, they tried not to resurrect it on purpose.

The Soviet-Finnish war is one of the many tragic and shameful pages in our history. Soldiers and officers "gnawed through" the Mannerheim line, freezing in summer uniforms, having neither proper weapons nor experience of war in the harsh winter conditions of the Karelian Isthmus and Kola Peninsula. And all this was side by side with the arrogance of the leadership, confident that the enemy would ask for peace in 10-12 days (that is, they hoped for Blitzkrieg *).

Random photos of nature

It did not add to the USSR any international prestige or military glory, but this war could teach the Soviet government a lot if it had the habit of learning from its own mistakes. The same mistakes that were made in the preparation and conduct of the Soviet-Finnish war, and which led to unjustified losses, then, with a few exceptions, were repeated in the Great Patriotic War.

There are practically no complete and detailed monographs on the Soviet-Finnish war containing the most reliable and up-to-date information about it, with the exception of a few works by Finnish and other foreign historians. Although they, in my opinion, can hardly contain complete and up-to-date information, since they give a rather one-sided view, as well as Soviet historians.

Most of the hostilities took place on the Karelian Isthmus, in the immediate vicinity of St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).

When visiting the Karelian Isthmus, you constantly come across the foundations of Finnish houses, wells, small cemeteries, then the remains of the Mannerheim line, with barbed wire, dugouts, caponiers (how we loved to play “war games” in them!), Then at the bottom of a half-overgrown funnel you will stumble upon bones and a broken helmet (although this may be the consequences of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War), and closer to the Finnish border, entire houses and even farms have been preserved that they did not have time to take away or burn.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 (104 days), received several different names: in Soviet publications it was called the "Soviet-Finnish War", in Western publications - "Winter War", among the people - " The Finnish War", in publications of the last 5-7 years, it also received the name "Unfamous".

Reasons for the start of the war, preparation of the parties for hostilities

According to the "Non-Aggression Pact" between the USSR and Germany, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR.

The Finnish nation is a national minority. By 1939, the population of Finland was 3.5 million people (that is, it was equal to the population of Leningrad at the same time). As you know, small nations are very concerned about their survival and preservation as a nation. "The little people can disappear, and he knows it."

Perhaps this can explain its secession from Soviet Russia in 1918, the constant desire, even somewhat painful, from the point of view of the dominant nation, to protect its independence, the desire to be a neutral country during the Second World War.

In 1940, in one of his speeches, V.M. Molotov said: "We must be realistic enough to understand that the time of small peoples has passed." These words became a verdict in the fate of the Baltic states. Although they were said in 1940, they can be fully attributed to the factors that determined the policy of the Soviet government in the war with Finland.

Negotiations between the USSR and Finland in 1937 - 1939.

Since 1937, on the initiative of the USSR, negotiations have been held between the Soviet Union and Finland on the issue of mutual security. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish government, then the USSR offered Finland to move the border a few tens of kilometers north of Leningrad and lease the Hanko peninsula for a long time. Instead of Finland, a territory in the Karelian SSR was offered, several times larger than the exchange one, but such an exchange would not be beneficial for Finland, since the Karelian Isthmus was a well-developed territory, with the warmest climate in Finland, and the proposed territory in Karelia was almost wild , with a much harsher climate.

The Finnish government was well aware that if it was not possible to agree with the USSR, war was inevitable, but it hoped for the strength of its fortifications and for the support of Western countries.

On October 12, 1939, when World War II was already underway, Stalin suggested that Finland conclude a Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, modeled on the pacts concluded with the Baltic states. Under this pact, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to be stationed in Finland, and Finland was also invited to make an exchange of territories, as discussed earlier, but the Finnish delegation refused to conclude such a pact and left the negotiations. From that moment on, the parties began to prepare for hostilities.

Reasons and goals for the participation of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war:

For the USSR, the main danger was that Finland could be used by other states (most likely Germany) as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. The common border between Finland and the USSR is 1400 km, which at that time was 1/3 of the entire northwestern border of the USSR. It is quite logical that in order to ensure the security of Leningrad, it was necessary to move the border further from it.

But, according to Yu.M. Kilin, author of an article in No. 3 of the International Affairs magazine for 1994, while moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus (according to negotiations in Moscow in 1939) would not solve the problems, and the USSR would not have won anything, therefore the war was inevitable.

I would still like to disagree with him, since any conflict, be it between people or countries, arises from the unwillingness or inability of the parties to agree peacefully. In this case, this war was, of course, beneficial for the USSR, as it was an occasion to demonstrate its power, to assert itself, but in the end everything turned out the other way around. The USSR in the eyes of the whole world not only did not begin to look stronger and more invulnerable, but on the contrary, everyone saw that it was a "colossus with feet of clay", unable to cope even with such a small Army as the Finnish one.

For the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish War was one of the stages of preparation for a world war, and its expected outcome, in the opinion of the military-political leadership of the country, would significantly improve the strategic position of the USSR in Northern Europe, and also increase the military-economic potential of the state, correcting disproportions national economy, resulting from the implementation of largely chaotic and ill-conceived industrialization and collectivization.

From a military point of view, the acquisition of military bases in the South of Finland and 74 airfields and landing sites in Finland would make the positions of the USSR in the North-West practically invulnerable, there would be an opportunity to save money, resources, time would be gained in preparing for a big war, but in at the same time it would mean the destruction of the independence of Finland.

But what does M.I. think about the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war? Semiryaga: "In the 20-30s, many incidents of a different nature took place on the Soviet-Finnish border, but usually they were resolved through diplomacy. Clashes of group interests on the basis of the division of spheres of influence in Europe and the Far East by the end of the 30s created a real the threat of a global conflict and on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

At that time, the main factor that predetermined the Soviet-Finnish conflict was the nature of the political situation in Northern Europe. For two decades after Finland gained independence as a result of the October Revolution, its relations with the USSR developed in a complex and contradictory way. Although between the RSFSR and Finland on October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was concluded, and in 1932 the “Non-Aggression Pact”, which was later extended to 10 years.

Reasons and goals for Finland's participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

"During the first 20 years of independence, it was believed that the USSR was the main, if not the only threat to Finland" (R. Heiskanen - Major General of Finland). "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland; the Finnish people ... are forever a friend of Germany." (First President of Finland - P. Svinhufvud)

In the Military Historical Journal No. 1-3 for 1990, an assumption appears about such a reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War: "It is difficult to agree with the attempt to lay all the blame for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War on the USSR. In Russia and Finland, they understood that the main culprit of the tragedy it was not our peoples and not even our governments (with some reservations), but German fascism, as well as the political circles of the West, who benefited from the German attack on the USSR.The territory of Finland was considered by Germany as a convenient springboard for an attack on the USSR from the North. historian L. Woodward, Western countries intended to use the Soviet-Finnish military conflict to push Nazi Germany to war against the USSR. (It seems to me that a clash of two totalitarian regimes would be very beneficial for Western countries, since it would undoubtedly weaken both the USSR and Germany, which were then considered sources of aggression in Europe. The Second World War was already underway and a military conflict between the USSR and Germany could lead to dispersal forces of the Reich on two fronts and the weakening of its military operations against France and Great Britain.)

Preparing the parties for war

In the USSR, supporters of a forceful approach to solving the Finnish question were: People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mekhlis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria. They opposed negotiations and any preparations for war. This self-confidence was given to them by the quantitative superiority of the Red Army over the Finnish (mainly in the amount of equipment), as well as the ease of introducing troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939.

"The hat-throwing moods led to the fact that serious miscalculations were made in assessing the combat readiness of Finland."

On November 10, 1939, Voroshilov was presented with the estimated data of the General Staff: "The material part of the armed forces of the Finnish Army is mainly pre-war models of the old Russian Army, partially modernized at military factories in Finland. The rise of patriotic sentiment is observed only among young ages."

The initial plan of military operations was drawn up by Marshal of the USSR B. Shaposhnikov. According to this plan (highly professionally drawn up), the main military operations were to be carried out in the coastal direction of Southern Finland. But this plan was designed for a long period and required preparation for war within 2-3 years. The implementation of the "Agreement on Spheres of Influence" with Germany was required immediately.

Therefore, at the last moment before the start of hostilities, this plan was replaced by a hastily drawn up "Meretskov plan", designed for a weak enemy. Military operations according to this plan were carried out head-on in the difficult natural conditions of Karelia and the Arctic. The main stake was placed on a powerful initial blow and the defeat of the Finnish Army in 2-3 weeks, but the operational concentration and deployment of equipment and troops was poorly provided with intelligence. The formation commanders did not even have detailed maps of the combat areas, while Finnish intelligence determined with high accuracy the main directions of the Red Army's strikes.

By the beginning of the war, the Leningrad Military District was very weak, as it was considered as secondary. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of August 15, 1935 "On the development and strengthening of areas adjacent to the borders" did not improve the situation. The condition of the roads was especially deplorable.

In the course of preparations for the war, the Military-Economic Description of the Leningrad Military District was compiled - a document unique in its informativeness, containing comprehensive information on the state of the economy of the North-West region.

On December 17, 1938, when summing up the results at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, it turned out that there were no stone-paved roads, military airfields on the proposed territory of hostilities, the level of agriculture was extremely low (Leningrad region, and even more so Karelia - areas of risky farming, and collectivization almost destroyed what had been created by the labor of previous generations).

According to Yu.M. Killina, blitzkrieg - lightning war - was the only possible one in those conditions, and at a strictly defined time - the end of autumn - the beginning of winter, when the roads were the most passable.

By the forties, Karelia became the "patrimony of the NKVD" (almost a quarter of the population of the KASSR by the 39th year were prisoners, on the territory of Karelia were the Belomorkanal and Soroklag, which contained more than 150 thousand people), which could not but affect its economic condition.

The logistical preparation for the war was at a very low level, since it is almost impossible to catch up in a year for what was lost in 20 years, especially since the command flattered itself with hopes of an easy victory.

Despite the fact that preparations for the Finnish war were carried out quite actively in 1939, the expected results were not achieved, and there are several reasons for this:

Preparations for the war were carried out by different departments (Army, NKVD, people's commissariats), and this caused disunity and inconsistency in actions. The decisive role in the failure of the logistical preparations for the war with Finland was played by the factor of the low controllability of the Soviet state. There was no single center involved in preparing for the war at all.

The construction of roads was carried out by the NKVD, and by the beginning of hostilities the strategically important road Svir - Olonets - Kondushi was not completed, and the second track was not laid on the Murmansk - Leningrad railway, which significantly reduced its capacity. (The construction of the second track has not been completed yet!)

The Finnish war, which lasted 104 days, was very fierce. Neither the People's Commissar of Defense nor the command of the Leningrad Military District at first imagined the peculiarities and difficulties associated with the war, since there was no well-organized intelligence service. The military department approached the preparation of the Finnish war not seriously enough:

Rifle troops, artillery, aviation and tanks were clearly not enough to break through the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and defeat the Finnish Army. Due to the lack of knowledge about the theater of operations, the command considered possible application heavy divisions and tank troops in all areas of combat operations. This war was fought in the winter, but the troops were not sufficiently equipped, equipped, supplied and trained to conduct combat operations in winter conditions. The armament of the personnel was mainly heavy weapons and there were almost no light pistols - machine guns and company 50-millimeter mortars, while the Finnish troops were equipped with them.

The construction of defensive structures in Finland began already in the early 1930s. Many countries of Western Europe helped in the construction of these fortifications: for example, Germany participated in the construction of a network of airfields capable of accommodating 10 times more aircraft than was in the Finnish Air Force; the Mannerheim line, the total depth of which reached 90 kilometers, was built with the participation of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.

The troops of the Red Army were highly motorized, and the Finns had tactical and rifle training at a high level. They blocked the roads, which were the only way for the Red Army to advance (it’s not particularly convenient to attack in a tank through forests and swamps, and what are the boulders on the Karelian Isthmus 4-5 meters in diameter!), And attacked our troops from the rear and flanks. For action in off-road conditions in the Finnish Army, there were ski troops. They carried all the weapons with them on sleds and skis.

November 1939 troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border with Finland. The initial advance was quite successful, but the Finns launched a highly organized sabotage and partisan activity in the immediate rear of the Red Army. The supply of the troops of the LVO was disrupted, the tanks got stuck in the snow and in front of obstacles, "plugs" from military equipment were a convenient target for shooting from the air.

The whole country (Finland) has been turned into a continuous military camp, but military measures continue to be taken: mining is being carried out on the waters off the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the population is being evacuated from Helsinki, armed groups are marching in the Finnish capital in the evenings, blackouts are being carried out. The militant mood is constantly warmed up. There is a clear decline. This can be seen at least from the fact that the evacuated residents return to the cities without waiting for the "air bombardment".

Mobilization costs Finland colossal funds (from 30 to 60 million Finnish marks per day), workers are not paid wages everywhere, the discontent of the working people is growing, the decline of the export industry and the increased demand for products of defense industry enterprises are noticeable.

The Finnish government does not want to negotiate with the USSR; anti-Soviet articles are constantly published in the press, blaming the Soviet Union for everything. The government is afraid to announce the demands of the USSR at a meeting of the Sejm without special preparation. From some sources it became known that in the Sejm, most likely, there is opposition to the government ... "

Beginning of hostilities: Incident near the village of Mainila, November 1939, Pravda newspaper

According to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located one kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly shot from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven cannon shots were fired, which resulted in the death of three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander and the wounding of seven Red Army soldiers and one junior commander.

To investigate the incident, the head of the 1st department of the district headquarters, Colonel Tikhomirov, was summoned on the spot. The provocation caused a wave of indignation in the units located in the area of ​​​​the Finnish artillery raid.

Exchange of notes between the Soviet and Finnish governments

Note of the Soviet government on the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units

On November 26, in the evening, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov received the envoy of Finland A.S. Irie-Koskinen and handed him a note from the USSR government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units. Accepting the note, the Finnish envoy announced that he would immediately communicate with his government and give an answer.

"Mr Messenger!

On November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located one kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven cannon shots were fired, which caused casualties among Soviet soldiers.

The Soviet government, informing you of this, considers it necessary to emphasize that during the negotiations with Mr. Tanner and Paaskivi, it pointed to the danger posed by the concentration of a large number of regular Finnish troops near the border in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad.

Now, in connection with the fact of the provocative artillery shelling of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland, the Soviet government is forced to state that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad not only poses a threat to the city, but also represents a hostile act towards the USSR, which has already led to an attack on Soviet troops and victims.

The Soviet government does not intend to fan this outrageous act of attack by parts of the Finnish Army, perhaps poorly controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like to see such outrageous acts no longer take place.

In view of this, the Soviet government expresses a strong protest against what happened and offers the Finnish government to immediately withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus by 20-25 kilometers and prevent the possibility of a repeat of the provocation.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov.

“In connection with the alleged violation of the Finnish border, the Finnish government conducted an investigation, which established that the shots were fired not from the Finnish side, but from the Soviet side, near the village of Mainila, located at a distance of 800 meters from the Finnish border.

Based on the calculation of the speed of sound propagation from seven shots, it could be concluded that the guns from which the shots were fired are located at a distance of 1.5-2 kilometers to the South-East from the place of their rupture ... Under such circumstances, it seems possible that this is an unfortunate a case that occurred during training exercises that took place on the Soviet side and entailed human casualties. As a result, I consider it my duty to reject the protest expressed in your letter and state that the hostile act against the USSR of which you speak was not carried out by the Finnish side.

Regarding the statements made to Tanner and Paaskivi during their stay in Moscow, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the immediate vicinity of the border on the Finnish side, mainly border troops were stationed. There were no guns of such range that their shells would fall on the other side of the border in this zone at all.

Although there is no specific motive for withdrawing troops from the border line, my government is nonetheless ready to start negotiations on this issue(on the mutual withdrawal of troops).

In order to leave no ambiguity about the alleged incident, my government proposes that a joint investigation be carried out in accordance with the "Convention of Frontier Commissioners" of September 24, 1928 ... "

A.S. Irie-Koskinen

"The response of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Government of November 26, 1939 is a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Government of Finland towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between the two countries to an extreme, namely:

Denial of the fact of shelling and an attempt to explain the incident by "training exercises" of the Soviet troops.

The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and Finnish troops, while this would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops directly to the outskirts of Leningrad.

This is a violation of the terms of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland in 1932.

In view of this, the Soviet government considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the "Non-Aggression Pact" concluded by the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the Finnish government.

A New Look

triumphant defeat.

Why hide the victory of the Red Army
in the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov's version.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of Soviet military history. The huge Red Army failed to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland Marshal Mannerheim - the winner of the "winter war"?

Preparing for War: Stalin's Plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began at the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko as a naval base on a long-term lease. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice as large in size, but not suitable for economic activity and useless in a strategic sense.

A Finnish government delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes...

Otto Kuusinen is Stalin's candidate for the Finnish leaders.

A group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left - O. Kuusinen

Chronicle of the "winter war"

However, the performance did not work. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, the Soviet troops ran into stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the backbone of Mannerheim's army.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

The results of the war: victory or defeat.

So those are the basic facts. Having remembered them, now we can try to analyze the results of the "winter war".
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland was in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.

The historian is at war with... the computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
and so on.
And each time the smart computer answered:

IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such relief
and so on...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army offensive in the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the simulation of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" without taking into account climate and relief.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish "Mannerheim Line" was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally oversaw the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the offensive - fire preparation
first explosion: air, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: air, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent ...
third explosion...

But the Red Army in 1939 did not have nuclear weapons!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the "Mannerheim Line" without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer peremptorily answered:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer recognized the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons as IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times ...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even after long battles, even at the cost of huge human casualties - but still in February 1940, the "Russian soldiers", who were mockingly gossip at the Fuhrer's headquarters, did the impossible - they broke through the "Mannerheim Line".
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was an ill-considered adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet "eagles".
But militarily, the "winter war" demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even the IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was not understood by Hitler and the company, many military experts did not understand, and modern historians did not understand after them.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler's assessment of the results of the "winter war". So, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the "Russian soldiers" and did not repeat about the "weakness" of the Soviet troops. When Stalin suggested that they end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without long disputes they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke with great respect about the Red Army. He considered the Soviet troops modern and efficient and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to see the courage of the soldiers of the Red Army. Marshal at the forefront.

Shortly after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, weapons Soviet army. We had no idea even approximately what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. That's why it was misjudged...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps, we would have been horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed offensive against the Bolsheviks ...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"... We misjudged the Bolshevik strength of resistance, we had the wrong numbers and based our entire policy on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his miscalculation.

References.

• Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English. Smolensk, 1994
• Mary W. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. from the Swedish M., 1997
• Picker G. Hitler's Table Talk. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
• Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the backdrop of a diary. M., 1994
• Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why did the Soviet Union program the Second world war. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC PICKING
on the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov