Who was the first to use a gas attack. Chemical weapons of the First World War briefly

Chemical weapons are one of the three types of weapons of mass destruction (the other 2 types are bacteriological and nuclear weapon). Kills people with the help of toxins in gas cylinders.

History of chemical weapons

Chemical weapons began to be used by man a very long time ago - long before the Copper Age. Then people used a bow with poisoned arrows. After all, it is much easier to use poison, which will surely slowly kill the beast, than to run after it.

The first toxins were extracted from plants - a person received it from varieties of the acocanthera plant. This poison causes cardiac arrest.

With the advent of civilizations, prohibitions on the use of the first chemical weapons began, but these prohibitions were violated - Alexander the Great used all the chemicals known at that time in the war against India. His soldiers poisoned water wells and food stores. In ancient Greece, strawberry roots were used to poison wells.

In the second half of the Middle Ages, alchemy, the forerunner of chemistry, began to develop rapidly. Acrid smoke began to appear, driving away the enemy.

First use of chemical weapons

The French were the first to use chemical weapons. This happened at the beginning of the First World War. They say safety rules are written in blood. Safety rules for the use of chemical weapons are no exception. At first, there were no rules, there was only one piece of advice - when throwing grenades filled with poisonous gases, it is necessary to take into account the direction of the wind. There were also no specific, tested substances that were 100% killing people. There were gases that did not kill, but simply caused hallucinations or mild suffocation.

On April 22, 1915, the German armed forces used mustard gas. This substance is very toxic: it severely injures the mucous membrane of the eye, respiratory organs. After the use of mustard gas, the French and Germans lost about 100-120 thousand people. And during the entire First World War, 1.5 million people died from chemical weapons.

In the first 50 years of the 20th century, chemical weapons were used everywhere - against uprisings, riots and civilians.

The main poisonous substances

Sarin. Sarin was discovered in 1937. The discovery of sarin happened by accident - German chemist Gerhard Schrader was trying to create a stronger chemical against pests in agriculture. Sarin is a liquid. Acts on nervous system.

Soman. Soman was discovered by Richard Kunn in 1944. Very similar to sarin, but more poisonous - two and a half times more than sarin.

After the Second World War, the research and production of chemical weapons by the Germans became known. All research classified as "secret" became known to the allies.

VX. In 1955, VX was opened in England. The most poisonous chemical weapon created artificially.

At the first sign of poisoning, you need to act quickly, otherwise death will occur in about a quarter of an hour. Protective equipment is a gas mask, OZK (combined arms protective kit).

VR. Developed in 1964 in the USSR, it is an analogue of the VX.

In addition to highly toxic gases, gases were also produced to disperse crowds of rioters. These are tear and pepper gases.

In the second half of the twentieth century, more precisely from the beginning of 1960 to the end of the 1970s, there was a flourishing of discoveries and developments of chemical weapons. During this period, gases began to be invented that had a short-term effect on the human psyche.

Chemical weapons today

Currently, most chemical weapons are prohibited by the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The classification of poisons depends on the danger posed by the chemical:

• The first group includes all the poisons that have ever been in the arsenal of countries. Countries are prohibited from storing any chemicals from this group in excess of 1 ton. If the weight is more than 100g, the control committee must be notified.
• The second group is substances that can be used both for military purposes and in peaceful production.
• The third group includes substances that are used in large quantities in industries. If the production produces more than thirty tons per year, it must be registered in the control register.

First aid for poisoning with chemically hazardous substances

The use of poisonous gases in World War I was a major military innovation. Poisons ranged from the merely harmful (such as tear gas) to the deadly poisonous, such as chlorine and phosgene. Chemical weapons are one of the main ones in the First World War and in total throughout the 20th century. The lethal potential of the gas was limited - only 4% of deaths from the total number of those affected. However, the share is not deaths was high, and gas remained one of the main dangers for soldiers. Since it became possible to develop effective countermeasures against gas attacks, unlike most other weapons of this period, in the later stages of the war its effectiveness began to decline, and it almost fell out of circulation. But due to the fact that toxic substances were first used in the First World War, it was also sometimes called the "war of chemists."

History of Poison Gases 1914

At the beginning of use chemical substances the weapons were lachrymal irritants, not lethal ones. During the First World War, the French became the first to use gas using 26 mm grenades filled with tear gas (ethyl bromoacetate) in August 1914. However, the Allied stocks of ethyl bromoacetate quickly ran out, and the French administration replaced it with another agent, chloroacetone. In October 1914, German troops opened fire with shells partially filled with a chemical irritant against British positions on the Neuve Chapelle, despite the concentration achieved being so low as to be barely noticeable.

1915: widespread deadly gases

Germany was the first to use gas as a weapon of mass destruction on a large scale during World War I against Russia.

The first poison gas used by the German military was chlorine. The German chemical companies BASF, Hoechst and Bayer (which formed the IG Farben conglomerate in 1925) produced chlorine as a by-product of dye production. In collaboration with Fritz Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, they began developing methods for applying chlorine against enemy trenches.

By April 22, 1915, the German army had sprayed 168 tons of chlorine near the Ypres River. At 17:00 a weak east wind blew and the gas began to spray, it moved towards the French positions, forming yellowish-green clouds. It should be noted that the German infantry also suffered from the gas and, lacking sufficient reinforcements, could not use the advantage gained until the arrival of British-Canadian reinforcements. The Entente immediately declared that Germany had violated the principles international law However, Berlin retorted this statement by saying that the Hague Convention only prohibits the use of poisonous projectiles, but not gases.

After the Battle of Ypres, poison gases were used by Germany several more times: on April 24 against the 1st Canadian Division, on May 2 near the Mousetrap Farm, on May 5 against the British and on August 6 against the defenders of the Russian fortress of Osovets. On May 5, 90 people immediately died in the trenches; of the 207 admitted to field hospitals, 46 died on the same day, and 12 after prolonged torment. Against the Russian army, the action of gases, however, was not effective enough: despite serious losses, the Russian army threw the Germans back from Osovets. The counterattack of the Russian troops was called in European historiography as an “attack of the dead”: according to many historians and witnesses of those battles, Russian soldiers were only their appearance(many were mutilated after shelling with chemical shells) plunged the German soldiers into shock and total panic:

“Every living thing in the open air on the bridgehead of the fortress was poisoned to death,” recalled a member of the defense. - All the greenery in the fortress and in the nearest area along the path of the gases was destroyed, the leaves on the trees turned yellow, curled up and fell off, the grass turned black and lay on the ground, the flower petals flew around. All copper objects on the bridgehead of the fortress - parts of guns and shells, washbasins, tanks, etc. - were covered with a thick green layer of chlorine oxide; food items stored without hermetic sealing - meat, butter, lard, vegetables, turned out to be poisoned and unfit for consumption.

“The half-poisoned wandered back,” this is another author, “and, tormented by thirst, bent down to the sources of water, but here the gases lingered in low places, and secondary poisoning led to death.”

By the middle of the spring of 1915, each of the countries participating in the First World War sought to win over the advantage to its side. So Germany, which terrorized its enemies from the sky, from under water and on land, tried to find an optimal, but not entirely original solution, planning to use chemical weapons against the adversaries - chlorine. The Germans borrowed this idea from the French, who at the beginning of 1914 tried to use tear gas as a weapon. At the beginning of 1915, the Germans also tried to do this, who quickly realized that irritating gases on the field were a very ineffective thing.

Therefore, the German army resorted to the help of the future Nobel laureate in chemistry by Fritz Haber, who developed methods for using protection against such gases and methods for using them in combat.

Haber was a great patriot of Germany and even converted from Judaism to Christianity to show his love for the country.

For the first time, the German army decided to use poison gas - chlorine - on April 22, 1915, during the battle near the Ypres River. Then the military sprayed about 168 tons of chlorine from 5730 cylinders, each of which weighed about 40 kg. At the same time, Germany violated the Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed in The Hague in 1907, one of the clauses of which stated that against the enemy "it is forbidden to use poison or poisoned weapons." It is worth noting that Germany at that time tended to violate various international agreements and agreements: in 1915, she waged "unlimited submarine warfare" - German submarines sank civilian ships contrary to the Hague and Geneva conventions.

“We couldn't believe our eyes. A greenish-gray cloud, descending on them, turned yellow as it spread and scorched everything in its path that it touched, causing the plants to die. Among us, staggering, appeared French soldiers, blinded, coughing, breathing heavily, with faces of a dark purple color, silent from suffering, and behind them, as we learned, hundreds of their dying comrades remained in the gassed trenches, ”recalled what happened one of the British soldiers, who observed the mustard gas attack from the side.

As a result of the gas attack, about 6 thousand people were killed by the French and British. At the same time, the Germans also suffered, on which, due to the changed wind, part of the gas sprayed by them was blown away.

However, it was not possible to achieve the main task and break through the German front line.

Among those who participated in the battle was the young Corporal Adolf Hitler. True, he was 10 km from the place where the gas was sprayed. On this day, he saved his wounded comrade, for which he was subsequently awarded the Iron Cross. At the same time, he was only recently transferred from one regiment to another, which saved him from possible death.

Subsequently, Germany began to use artillery shells with phosgene, a gas for which there is no antidote and which, at the proper concentration, causes death. Fritz Haber continued to actively participate in the development, whose wife committed suicide after receiving news from Ypres: she could not bear the fact that her husband became the architect of so many deaths. Being a chemist by training, she appreciated the nightmare that her husband helped create.

The German scientist did not stop there: under his leadership, the poisonous substance "cyclone B" was created, which was subsequently used for the massacres of concentration camp prisoners during World War II.

In 1918, the researcher even received Nobel Prize in chemistry, although he had a rather controversial reputation. However, he never hid that he was absolutely sure of what he was doing. But Haber's patriotism and his Jewish origin played a cruel joke on the scientist: in 1933, he was forced to flee Nazi Germany to Great Britain. A year later, he died of a heart attack.

“As for me, if I were given the choice to die torn apart by fragments of an honest grenade, or agonized in the barbed wire fence, or buried in a submarine, or strangled with a poisonous substance, I would be indecisive, because between all these nice things there is no significant difference"

Giulio Due, 1921

The use of poisonous substances (OS) in the First World War was an event in the development of military art, no less important than the appearance of firearms in the Middle Ages. This high-tech weapon turned out to be a harbinger of the appearance in the twentieth century. means of warfare known to us today as weapons of mass destruction. However, the “newborn”, who was born on April 22, 1915 near the Belgian city of Ypres, was still learning to walk. The belligerents had to study the tactical and operational capabilities of the new weapon, and develop the basic methods of its use.

The problems associated with the use of a new lethal agent began at the time of its "birth". The evaporation of liquid chlorine proceeds with a large absorption of heat, and the rate of its outflow from the cylinder drops rapidly. Therefore, during the first gas launch carried out by the Germans on April 22, 1915 near Ypres, cylinders with liquid chlorine lined up were lined with combustible materials, which were set on fire during the gas launch. Without heating the cylinder with liquid chlorine, it was impossible to achieve the concentration of chlorine in the gaseous state necessary for the mass extermination of people. But a month later, when preparing a gas attack against units of the 2nd Russian Army near Bolimov, the Germans combined 12 thousand gas cylinders into gas batteries (10 – 12 cylinders in each) and, as a compressor, cylinders with compressed air up to 150 atmospheres were connected to the collector of each battery. Liquid chlorine was ejected by compressed air from cylinders for 1.5 – 3 minutes. A dense gas cloud that covered Russian positions along a 12 km long front disabled 9,000 of our soldiers, and more than a thousand of them died.

New weapons had to be used at least for tactical purposes. The gas balloon attack, organized by Russian troops near Smorgon on July 24, 1916, was unsuccessful due to an incorrectly chosen area for the gas launch (flank to the enemy) and was thwarted by German artillery. It is a well-known fact that chlorine released from cylinders usually accumulates in lowlands and funnels, forming "gas swamps". The wind can change its direction. However, not having reliable gas masks, until the autumn of 1916, the Germans and Russians went into bayonet attacks in close formation following the gas waves, sometimes losing thousands of fighters poisoned by their own OM. On the Sukha front – Will Shidlovskaya The 220th Infantry Regiment, having repulsed the German attack on July 7, 1915, which followed after the gas launch, made a desperate counterattack in the area filled with "gas swamps", and lost 6 commanders and 1346 shooters poisoned with chlorine. On August 6, 1915, under the Russian fortress of Osovets, the Germans lost up to a thousand fighters who were poisoned, advancing behind a wave of gas released by them.

New OV gave unexpected tactical results. Having first used phosgene on September 25, 1916 on the Russian front (the Ikskul area on the Western Dvina; the position was occupied by units of the 44th Infantry Division), the German command hoped that the Russian wet gauze masks, which retain chlorine well, would be easily “pierced” by phosgene. And so it happened. However, due to the slow action of phosgene, most Russian soldiers felt signs of poisoning only a day later. With rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, they destroyed up to two battalions of German infantry, which rose to the attack after each gas wave. Having used shells with mustard gas near Ypres in July 1917, the German command took the British by surprise, but they could not use the success achieved by this OV, due to the lack of appropriate protective clothing in the German troops.

The fortitude of the soldiers, the operational art of command, and the chemical discipline of the troops played an important role in chemical warfare. The first German gas balloon attack near Ypres in April 1915 fell on the French native units, consisting of Africans. They fled in panic, exposing the front for 8 km. The Germans made the right conclusion: they began to consider the gas-balloon attack as a means of breaking through the front. But the carefully prepared offensive of the Germans near Bolimov, launched after a gas balloon attack against units of the 2nd Russian Army that did not have any means of anti-chemical protection, failed. And above all, because of the resilience of the surviving Russian soldiers, who opened accurate rifle and machine gun fire on the German attacking chains. The skillful actions of the Russian command, which organized the approach of reserves and effective artillery fire, also had an effect. By the summer of 1917, the contours of chemical warfare were gradually outlined - its basic principles and tactics.

The success of a chemical attack depended on how accurately the principles of chemical warfare were followed.

The principle of maximum concentration of RH. At the initial stage of chemical warfare, this principle was not of particular importance due to the fact that there were no effective gas masks. It was considered sufficient to create a lethal concentration of OM. The advent of activated charcoal gas masks almost made chemical warfare pointless. However, the experience of hostilities has shown that even such gas masks protect only for a limited period of time. Activated carbon and chemical absorbers of gas mask boxes are able to bind only a certain amount of OM. The higher the concentration of OM in the gas cloud, the faster it "pierces" gas masks. Achieving maximum concentrations of agents on the battlefield has become much easier after the appearance of gas cannons on the warring parties.

The principle of surprise. Its observance is necessary to overcome the protective effect of gas masks. The surprise of a chemical attack was achieved by creating a gas cloud in such a short time that the enemy soldiers did not have time to put on gas masks (camouflaging the preparation of gas balloon attacks, gas launches at night or under the cover of a smoke screen, the use of gas cannons, etc.). For the same purpose, colorless, odorless, and irritating agents (diphosgene, mustard gas in certain concentrations) were used. The shelling was carried out with chemical shells and mines with a large amount of explosive (fragmentation-chemical shells and mines), which did not allow distinguishing the sounds of exploding shells and mines with explosive agents from high-explosive ones. The hiss of gas, coming out simultaneously from thousands of cylinders, was drowned out by machine-gun and artillery fire.

The principle of mass action of OM. Small losses in combat among personnel are eliminated in a short time at the expense of reserves. It has been empirically established that the damaging effect of a gas cloud is proportional to its size. Enemy losses are higher, the wider the gas cloud is along the front (suppression of enemy flank fire in the breakthrough sector) and the deeper it penetrates the enemy defenses (holding down reserves, destroying artillery batteries and headquarters). In addition, the very sight of a huge dense gas cloud covering the horizon is extremely demoralizing even for experienced and staunch soldiers. "Flooding" of the area with opaque gas makes command and control extremely difficult. Extensive contamination of the area with persistent agents (mustard gas, sometimes diphosgene) deprives the enemy of the opportunity to use the depth of his order.

The principle of overcoming enemy gas masks. The constant improvement of gas masks and the strengthening of the gas discipline of the troops significantly reduced the consequences of a sudden chemical attack. The achievement of maximum concentrations of OM in a gas cloud was possible only near its source. Therefore, it was easier to achieve victory over a gas mask using an OB that has the ability to penetrate a gas mask. To achieve this goal, two approaches have been used since July 1917:

The use of arsine fumes, consisting of particles of submicron size. They passed through the gas mask mixture without interacting with activated carbon(German chemical fragmentation shells of the "blue cross") and forced the soldiers to drop their gas masks;

The use of an agent capable of acting "bypassing" a gas mask. Mustard gas (German chemical and fragmentation-chemical shells of the "yellow cross") was such a tool.

Principle of application of new agents. Consistently using in chemical attacks a number of new weapons, still unfamiliar to the enemy and taking into account the development of his protective equipment, it is possible not only to inflict tangible losses on him, but also to undermine morale. The experience of the war has shown that reappearing on the front of the OV, with an unfamiliar smell and a special nature of physiological action, cause the enemy to feel insecure about the reliability of his own gas masks, which leads to a weakening of the stamina and combat capability of even battle-hardened units. The Germans, in addition to the consistent use of new agents in the war (chlorine in 1915, diphosgene in 1916, arsines and mustard gas in 1917), fired shells at the enemy with chlorinated wastes from chemical production, posing the enemy with the problem of the correct answer to the question: " What would that mean?"

The troops of the opposing sides used various tactical methods of using chemical weapons.

Tactical methods of gas balloon launch. Gas balloon launches were carried out to break through the enemy front and inflict losses on him. Large (heavy, wave) launches could last up to 6 hours and include up to 9 waves of gas. The gas release front was either continuous or consisted of several sections with a total length of from one to five, and sometimes more than kilometers. During the German gas attacks, which lasted from one to one and a half hours, the British and French, if they had good gas masks and shelters, suffered losses of up to 10 – 11% of the personnel of the units. The suppression of the morale of the enemy was of enormous importance during long-term gas-balloon launches. A long gas balloon launch prevented the transfer of reserves to the gas attack area, including army ones. The transfer of large units (for example, a regiment) in an area covered with an OM cloud was impossible, since for this the reserve had to go through gas masks from 5 to 8 km. The total area occupied by poisoned air during large gas balloon launches could reach several hundred square kilometers with a gas wave penetration depth of up to 30 km. No other methods of chemical attack (gas-propellant shelling, shelling with chemical projectiles) during the First World War could cover such huge areas.

The installation of cylinders for gas launching was carried out by batteries directly in the trenches, or in special shelters. Shelters were equipped according to the type of "fox holes" to a depth of 5 m from the surface of the earth: thus, they protected both the material part installed in the shelters and people carrying out gas launch from artillery and mortar fire.

The amount of explosives that had to be released in order to receive a gas wave with a concentration sufficient to disable the enemy was established empirically based on the results of range launches. The consumption of OM was reduced to a conditional value, the so-called combat norm, showing the consumption of OM in kilograms per unit length of the release front per unit of time. One kilometer was taken as a unit of front length, and one minute was taken as a unit of gas-balloon release time. For example, a combat rate of 1200 kg / km / min meant a gas consumption of 1200 kg at a one-kilometer release front for one minute. The combat standards used by various armies during the First World War were as follows: for chlorine (or its mixture with phosgene) - from 800 to 1200 kg / km / min with a wind of 2 to 5 meters per second; or from 720 to 400 kg / km / min with wind from 0.5 to 2 meters per second. With a wind of about 4 m per second, a kilometer will be covered by a wave of gas in 4 minutes, 2 km in 8 minutes and 3 km in 12 minutes.

Artillery was used to ensure the success of the release of OV. This task was solved by shelling enemy batteries, especially those that can hit the front of the gas launcher. Artillery fire opened simultaneously with the start of the gas launch. The best projectile for performing such firing was considered a chemical projectile with unstable OM. He most economically solved the problem of neutralizing enemy batteries. The duration of the fire was usually 30-40 minutes. All targets for artillery were planned in advance. If the military commander had gas-propelled units at his disposal, then after the end of the gas launch, they could make passes with high-explosive fragmentation mines in artificial obstacles built by the enemy, which took several minutes.

A. Photograph of the area after a gas release by the British during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Light streaks emanating from the British trenches correspond to discolored vegetation and mark the places where chlorine leaked from gas cylinders. B. The same area, photographed from a higher altitude. The vegetation in front of and behind the German trenches has faded, as if dried by fire, and appears in the photographs as pale gray spots. The photographs were taken from a German aircraft to identify the positions of British gas-balloon batteries. Light spots on the pictures sharply and accurately indicate the places of their installation - important targets for German artillery. According to Y. Mayer (1928).

The infantry intended for the attack concentrated on the bridgehead some time after the start of the gas launch, when the enemy artillery fire subsided. The infantry attack began in 15 – 20 minutes after stopping the gas supply. Sometimes it was carried out after an additionally placed smoke screen or in itself. The smoke screen was intended to simulate the continuation of a gas attack and, accordingly, to fetter the enemy's actions. To ensure the protection of the attacking infantry from flank fire and flank attacks by enemy manpower, the gas attack front was made at least 2 km wider than the breakthrough front. For example, when breaking through a fortified strip on a 3 km front, a gas balloon attack was organized on a 5 km front. There are cases when gas launches were carried out in a defensive battle. For example, on July 7 and 8, 1915, on the Sukha front – Will Shidlovskaya, the Germans carried out gas launches against the counterattacking Russian troops.

Tactical methods of using mortars. The following types of mortar-chemical firing were distinguished.

Small shooting (mortar-gas attack)- sudden concentrated fire lasting one minute from as many mortars as possible at a specific target (mortar trenches, machine-gun nests, shelters, etc.). A longer attack was considered inexpedient due to the fact that the enemy had time to put on gas masks.

Medium Shooting- connection of several small shootings over the smallest possible area. The shelled area was divided into areas of one hectare, and for each hectare one or more chemical attacks were carried out. The consumption of organic matter did not exceed 1 thousand kg.

Big shooting - any shooting with chemical mines, when the consumption of organic matter exceeded 1 thousand kg. Up to 150 kg of organic matter was produced per hectare within 1 – 2 a.m. Areas without targets were not shelled, "gas swamps" were not created.

Shooting for concentration- with a significant accumulation of enemy troops and favorable weather conditions, the amount of OM per hectare was increased to 3 thousand kg. Such a technique was popular: a platform was chosen above the enemy's trenches, and medium chemical mines (a charge of about 10 kg of OM) were fired at it from a large number of mortars. A thick cloud of gas "flowed" on the enemy's position along his own trenches and communication channels, as if through channels.

Tactical methods of using gas cannons. Any use of gas cannons meant "shooting at concentration." During the offensive, gas launchers were used to suppress enemy infantry. In the direction of the main attack, the enemy was fired with mines with unstable explosive agents (phosgene, chlorine with phosgene, etc.) or high-explosive fragmentation mines, or a combination of both. The salvo was fired at the moment the attack began. The suppression of infantry on the flanks of the attack was carried out either by mines with unstable explosive agents in combination with high-explosive fragmentation mines; or, with the wind outward from the attack front, mines with persistent OM (mustard gas) were used. The suppression of enemy reserves was carried out by shelling the areas of their concentration with mines with unstable explosive agents or high-explosive fragmentation mines. It was considered possible to confine ourselves to the simultaneous ejection of 100 fronts per kilometer. – 200 chemical mines (each weighing 25 kg, of which 12 kg of OM) out of 100 – 200 gas guns.

In a defensive battle, gas launchers were used to suppress advancing infantry in areas dangerous to the defenders (shelling with chemical or high-explosive fragmentation mines). Usually, the target of gas-propelled strikes were areas of concentration (hollows, ravines, forests) of enemy reserves, starting from the company level and above. If the defenders themselves did not intend to go on the offensive, and the areas where enemy reserves were concentrated were no closer than 1 – 1.5 km, then they were fired upon with mines equipped with persistent OM (mustard gas).

When leaving the battlefield, gas launchers were used to infect road nodes, hollows, hollows, ravines with persistent OM, convenient for movement and concentration of the enemy; and heights where it was supposed to place its command and artillery observation posts. Gas-propelled volleys were fired before the start of the infantry withdrawal, but no later than the withdrawal of the second echelons of the battalions.

Tactical methods of artillery chemical firing. German instructions for chemical firing of artillery assumed the following types of artillery, depending on the type of hostilities. Three types of chemical fire were used in the offensive: 1) gas attack or small chemical fire; 2) shooting to create a cloud; 3) fragmentation-chemical firing.

essence gas attack consisted in the sudden simultaneous opening of fire with chemical projectiles and obtaining the highest possible concentration of gas at a certain point with live targets. This was achieved by firing at least 100 field cannon shells, or 50 light field howitzer shells, or 25 heavy field gun shells, at the highest speed (in about one minute) from the largest possible number of guns.

A. German chemical projectile "blue cross" (1917-1918): 1 - poisonous substance (arsines); 2 - case for poisonous substance; 3 - bursting charge; four - projectile body.

B. German chemical projectile "double yellow cross" (1918): 1 - poisonous substance (80% mustard gas, 20% dichloromethyl oxide); 2 - diaphragm; 3 - bursting charge; four - projectile body.

B. French chemical projectile (1916-1918). The equipment of the projectile changed several times during the war. The most effective French were phosgene shells: 1 - poisonous substance; 2 - bursting charge; 3 - projectile body.

G. British chemical projectile (1916-1918). The equipment of the projectile changed several times during the war. one - poisonous substance; 2 - a hole for pouring a poisonous substance, closed with a stopper; 3 - diaphragm; four - bursting charge and smoke generator; 5 - detonator; 6 - fuse.

Shooting at creation gas cloud similar to a gas attack. The difference is that during a gas attack, shooting was always carried out at a point, and when shooting to create a cloud, it was always at an area. Shooting to create a gas cloud was often carried out with a "colorful cross", i.e., at first the enemy positions were fired upon with a "blue cross" (fragmentation-chemical shells with arsines), forcing the soldiers to drop their gas masks, and then they were finished off with shells with a "green cross" (phosgene , diphosgene). The artillery shooting plan indicated "aiming sites", that is, areas where the presence of live targets was assumed. They were fired at twice as intensively as in other areas. The area bombarded with rarer fire was called the "gas swamp". Skilled artillery commanders, thanks to "shooting to create a cloud", could solve extraordinary combat missions. For example, on the front sector Fleury - Thiaumont (Verdun, east bank of the Meuse), French artillery was located in hollows and hollows, inaccessible even to the mounted fire of German artillery. On the night of June 22-23, 1916, German artillery used up thousands of 77-mm and 105-mm "Green Cross" chemical shells along the edges and slopes of hollows and hollows that sheltered French batteries. Thanks to a very weak wind, a continuous dense cloud of gas gradually filled all the lowlands and hollows, destroying the French troops dug in these places, including artillery crews. To carry out the counterattack, the French command put forward strong reserves from Verdun. However, the "Green Cross" destroyed the reserve units moving along the valleys and along the lowlands. The gas veil remained on the shelled area until 6 pm.

A drawing by a British artist shows the calculation of a 4.5 inch field howitzer. - of the main artillery system used by the British to fire chemical projectiles in 1916. Howitzer battery fired by German chemical projectiles, their bursts are shown on the left side of the picture. With the exception of the sergeant (on the right), gunners protect themselves from poisonous substances with wet helmets. The sergeant wears a large box gas mask with separate goggles. The projectile is marked "PS" - that means it's loaded with chloropicrin. By J. Simon, R. Hook (2007)

Fragmentation-chemical firing was used only by the Germans: their opponents did not have fragmentation-chemical shells. From the middle of 1917, German artillerymen used fragmentation-chemical shells of the "yellow", "blue" and "green cross" in any firing of high-grade shells to increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. In individual operations, they accounted for up to half of the artillery shells fired. The peak of their use came in the spring of 1918 - the time of the big offensives of the German troops. The Allies were well aware of the German “double barrage”: one barrage of fragmentation shells advanced directly ahead of the German infantry, and the second, from fragmentation-chemical shells, went ahead of the first at such a distance that the action of the OV could not delay the advance of their infantry. Fragmentation-chemical projectiles proved to be very effective in the fight against artillery batteries and in suppressing machine-gun nests. The greatest panic in the ranks of the allies was caused by German shelling with shells of the "yellow cross".

In defense, the so-called shooting at the poisoning of the area. In contrast to those described above, it represented the calm, aimed firing of “yellow cross” chemical projectiles with a small explosive charge at areas of the terrain that they wanted to clear from the enemy or to which it was necessary to close access to him. If at the time of the shelling the area was already occupied by the enemy, then the action of the "yellow cross" was supplemented by shooting to create a gas cloud (shells of the "blue" and "green cross").

Bibliographic description:

Supotnitsky M.V. Forgotten chemical war. II. Tactical use of chemical weapons during the First World War // Officers. - 2010. - № 4 (48). - pp. 52–57.

“... We saw the first line of trenches, smashed to smithereens by us. After 300-500 steps concrete casemates for machine guns. The concrete is intact, but the casemates are littered with earth and full of corpses. This is the action of the last volleys of gas shells.

From the memoirs of Guards Captain Sergei Nikolsky, Galicia, June 1916

The history of the chemical weapons of the Russian Empire has not yet been written. But even the information that can be gleaned from disparate sources shows the outstanding talent of the Russian people of that time - scientists, engineers, military men, which manifested itself during the First World War. Starting from scratch, without petrodollars and the “help from the West” so expected today, they managed to create a military-chemical industry in just a year, supplying the Russian army with several types of chemical warfare agents (CW), chemical munitions and personal protective equipment. The summer offensive of 1916, known as the Brusilovsky breakthrough, already at the planning stage involved the use of chemical weapons to solve tactical problems.

For the first time chemical weapons were used on the Russian front at the end of January 1915 on the territory of the left bank of Poland (Bolimovo). German artillery fired about 18 thousand 15-cm howitzer fragmentation-chemical shells of the T type at parts of the 2nd Russian army, blocking the path to Warsaw of the 9th army of General August Mackensen. The shells had a strong blasting effect and contained an irritating substance - xylyl bromide. Due to the low air temperature in the shelling area and insufficient massing of fire, the Russian troops did not suffer serious losses.

A large-scale chemical war on the Russian front began on May 31, 1915 in the same Bolimovsky sector with a grandiose gas balloon release of chlorine at a front of 12 km in the defense zone of the 14th Siberian and 55th rifle divisions. Nearly complete absence forests allowed the gas cloud to move deep into the defense of the Russian troops, maintaining a damaging effect of at least 10 km. The experience gained near Ypres gave grounds to the German command to consider the breakthrough of the Russian defense already a foregone conclusion. However, the resilience of the Russian soldier and the defense in depth in this sector of the front allowed the Russian command, by bringing in reserves and skillfully using artillery, to repel 11 German offensive attempts made after the gas launch. The losses of the Russians gas-etched amounted to 9036 soldiers and officers, of which 1183 people died. On the same day, losses from small arms and artillery fire of the Germans amounted to 116 fighters. This ratio of losses forced the tsarist government to take off the "pink glasses" of the "laws and customs of land warfare" declared in The Hague and engage in chemical warfare.

Already on June 2, 1915, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Nashtaver), Infantry General N. N. Yanushkevich, telegraphed the Minister of War V. A. Sukhomlinov about the need to supply the armies of the North-Western and South-Western fronts with chemical weapons. The greater part of the Russian chemical industry was represented by German chemical plants. Chemical engineering, as a branch of the national economy, was generally absent in Russia. German industrialists, long before the war, took care that their enterprises could not be used by the Russians for military purposes. Their firms consciously protected the interests of Germany, which supplied the Russian industry with a monopoly of benzene and toluene, necessary in the manufacture of explosives and paints.

After the gas balloon attack on May 31, German chemical attacks on Russian troops continued with increasing force and ingenuity. On the night of July 6-7, the Germans repeated a gas balloon attack in the Sukha-Volya Shidlovskaya section against units of the 6th Siberian Rifle and 55th Infantry Divisions. The passage of the gas wave forced the Russian troops to leave the first line of defense in two regimental sectors (the 21st Siberian Rifle and 218th Infantry Regiments) at the junction of divisions and caused significant losses. It is known that the 218th Infantry Regiment lost one commander and 2,607 riflemen poisoned during the retreat. In the 21st regiment, only half a company remained combat-ready after the withdrawal, and 97% of the regiment's personnel were disabled. The 220th Infantry Regiment lost six commanders and 1,346 riflemen. The battalion of the 22nd Siberian Rifle Regiment, during a counterattack, crossed the gas wave, after which it folded into three companies, having lost 25% of its personnel. On July 8, the Russians restored their lost position with counterattacks, but the struggle demanded from them ever greater exertion of strength and colossal sacrifices.

On August 4, the Germans launched a mortar attack on the Russian positions between Lomza and Ostroleka. 25-cm heavy chemical mines were used, equipped with 20 kg of bromoacetone in addition to the explosive. The Russians suffered heavy losses. On August 9, 1915, the Germans carried out a gas-balloon attack, which contributed to the assault on the Osovets fortress. The attack failed, but more than 1,600 people were poisoned and "suffocated" from the garrison of the fortress.

In the Russian rear, the German agents carried out acts of sabotage that increased the losses of Russian troops from OV at the front. In early June 1915, the Russian army began to receive wet masks designed to protect against chlorine. But already at the front it turned out that chlorine freely passes through them. Russian counterintelligence detained a train with masks on its way to the front, and examined the composition of the anti-gas liquid intended for impregnation of masks. It was found that this liquid is supplied to the troops diluted with water at least twice. The investigation led counterintelligence officers to a chemical plant in Kharkov. Its director was a German. In his testimony, he wrote that he was an officer of the Landsturm, and that "Russian pigs must have reached the point of complete idiocy, thinking that a German officer could have done otherwise."

Apparently, the allies adhered to the same point of view. The Russian Empire was a junior partner in their war. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Russia did not have its own developments in chemical weapons, made before the start of their use. Before the war, even liquid chlorine was brought to the Empire from abroad. The only plant that the Russian government could count on for the large-scale production of chlorine was the plant of the Southern Russian Society in Slavyansk, located near large salt beds (on an industrial scale, chlorine is produced by electrolysis of aqueous solutions of sodium chloride). But 90% of its shares were owned by French citizens. Having received large subsidies from the Russian government, in the summer of 1915 the plant did not give the front a single ton of chlorine. At the end of August, a sequestration was imposed on him, that is, the right to govern on the part of society was limited. French diplomats and the French press raised a fuss about the violation of the interests of French capital in Russia. In January 1916, the sequestration was lifted, the society was provided with new loans, but until the end of the war, chlorine was not supplied by the Slavyansky Zavod in the quantities stipulated by the contracts.

Degassing of Russian trenches. In the foreground is an officer in a gas mask of the Mining Institute with a Kummant mask, the other two are in Moscow-style Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks. The image is taken from the site - www.himbat.ru

When, in the autumn of 1915, the Russian government tried, through its representatives in France, to obtain from the French industrialists technologies for the manufacture of combat weapons, they were denied this. In preparation for the summer offensive of 1916, the Russian government ordered 2500 tons of liquid chlorine, 1666 tons of phosgene and 650 thousand chemical shells in the United Kingdom with delivery no later than May 1, 1916. The timing of the offensive and the direction of the main attack of the Russian armies were adjusted by the allies to the detriment of the Russians interests, but by the beginning of the offensive, only a small batch of chlorine was delivered to Russia from the ordered OM, and not a single chemical projectile was delivered to Russia. Russian industry was able to supply only 150 thousand chemical shells by the beginning of the summer offensive.

Russia had to increase the production of chemical agents and chemical weapons on its own. They wanted to produce liquid chlorine in Finland, but the Finnish Senate dragged out negotiations for a year, until August 1916. An attempt to obtain phosgene from private industry failed due to extremely high prices set by industrialists and the lack of guarantees for timely fulfillment of orders. In August 1915 (i.e., half a year before the first use of phosgene shells by the French near Verdun), the Chemical Committee began the construction of state-owned phosgene plants in Ivanov-Voznesensk, Moscow, Kazan, and at the Pereezdnaya and Globino stations. The production of chlorine was organized at factories in Samara, Rubizhny, Saratov, and in the Vyatka province. In August 1915, the first 2 tons of liquid chlorine were obtained. In October, phosgene production began.

In 1916, Russian factories produced: chlorine - 2500 tons; phosgene - 117 tons; chloropicrin - 516 tons; cyanide compounds - 180 tons; sulfuryl chloride - 340 tons; chlorine tin - 135 tons.

Since October 1915, chemical teams began to be formed in Russia to carry out gas balloon attacks. As they formed, they were sent to the disposal of the front commanders.

In January 1916, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed "Instructions for the use of 3-inch chemical projectiles in combat", and in March the General Staff drew up instructions for the use of explosive agents in a wave release. In February, 15 thousand chemical shells for 3-inch guns were sent to the Northern Front in the 5th and 12th armies and to the Western Front in the group of General P. S. Baluev (2nd Army) - 30 thousand chemical shells for 3-inch guns ( 76 mm).

The first use of chemical weapons by the Russians occurred during the March offensive of the Northern and Western Fronts in the area of ​​Lake Naroch. The offensive was undertaken at the request of the Allies and was intended to weaken the German offensive on Verdun. It cost the Russian people 80 thousand killed, wounded and maimed. The Russian command considered chemical weapons in this operation as an auxiliary combat weapon, the effect of which had yet to be studied in battle.

Preparation of the first Russian gas launch by sappers of the 1st chemical team at the defense sector of the 38th division in March 1916 near Ikskul (photo from Thomas Wictor's book "Flamethrower Troops of World War I: The Central and Allied Powers", 2010)

General Baluev directed chemical projectiles at the artillery of the 25th Infantry Division, which was advancing in the main direction. During the artillery preparation on March 21, 1916, suffocating chemical shells were fired at the enemy's trenches, and poisonous shells were fired at his rear. In total, 10 thousand chemical shells were fired at the German trenches. The effectiveness of the shooting was low due to the lack of mass in the use of chemical projectiles. However, when the Germans launched a counterattack, several bursts of chemical shells fired by two batteries drove them back into the trenches and they did not make more attacks on this sector of the front. In the 12th Army on March 21, in the Ikskul area, the batteries of the 3rd Siberian Artillery Brigade fired 576 chemical projectiles, but according to the conditions of the battle, their action could not be observed. In the same battles, it was planned to carry out the first Russian gas-balloon attack on the defense sector of the 38th division (it was part of the 23rd army corps of the Dvina group). The chemical attack was not carried out at the appointed time due to rain and fog. But the very fact of preparing a gas launch shows that in the battles near Ikskul, the capabilities of the Russian army in the use of chemical weapons began to catch up with the capabilities of the French, who carried out the first gas launch in February.

The experience of chemical warfare was generalized, and a large amount of special literature was sent to the front.

On the basis of the generalized experience in the use of chemical weapons in the Naroch operation, the General Staff prepared the "Instruction for the combat use of chemical agents", approved by the Headquarters on April 15, 1916. The instruction provided for the use of chemicals from special cylinders, throwing chemical projectiles from artillery, bomb-throwing and mortar guns, from aeronautic vehicles or in the form of hand grenades.

The Russian army was armed with two types of special cylinders - large (E-70) and small (E-30). The name of the cylinder indicated its capacity: 70 pounds (28 kg) of chlorine condensed into a liquid were placed in large ones, 30 pounds (11.5 kg) in small ones. The initial letter "E" meant "capacity". Inside the cylinder there was a siphon iron tube through which the liquefied OM came out when the valve was open. The E-70 cylinder has been produced since the spring of 1916, at the same time it was decided to stop the production of the E-30 cylinder. A total of 65,806 E-30 and 93,646 E-70 cylinders were produced in 1916.

Everything needed to assemble the collector gas battery was placed in collector boxes. With E-70 cylinders, parts were placed in each such box to assemble two collector batteries. For the accelerated release of chlorine into cylinders, air was additionally pumped up to a pressure of 25 atmospheres or the apparatus of Professor N. A. Shilov, made on the basis of German trophy samples, was used. He supplied air compressed to 125 atmospheres into chlorine cylinders. Under such pressure, the cylinders were released from chlorine within 2-3 minutes. To “weight” the chlorine cloud, phosgene, tin chloride and titanium tetrachloride were added to it.

The first Russian gas launch took place during the summer offensive of 1916 in the direction of the main attack of the 10th Army northeast of Smorgon. The offensive was led by the 48th Infantry Division of the 24th Corps. The army headquarters gave the division the 5th chemical team, commanded by Colonel M. M. Kostevich (later a well-known chemist and freemason). Initially, the gas launch was planned to be carried out on July 3 to facilitate the attack of the 24th Corps. But it did not take place due to the fear of the corps commander that the gas could interfere with the attack of the 48th division. The gas launch was carried out on July 19 from the same positions. But since the operational situation has changed, the purpose of the gas launch was already different - to demonstrate the safety of the new weapon for its troops and to conduct a search. The timing of the gas launch was determined by weather conditions. The release of explosive agents began at 01:40 with a wind of 2.8-3.0 m/s at a front of 1 km from the location of the 273rd regiment in the presence of the chief of staff of the 69th division. A total of 2 thousand cylinders with chlorine were installed (10 cylinders made up a group, two groups - a battery). The gas supply was carried out within half an hour. First, 400 bottles were opened, then 100 bottles were opened every 2 minutes. A smoke screen was placed to the south of the gas launch site. After the gas launch, two companies were supposed to advance to conduct a search. Russian artillery opened fire with chemical projectiles on the ledge of the enemy's position, threatening a flank attack. At this time, the scouts of the 273rd Regiment reached the barbed wire of the Germans, but were met with rifle fire and were forced to return. At 02:55, artillery fire was transferred to the rear of the enemy. At 03:20 the enemy opened heavy artillery fire on their barbed wire. Dawn began, and it became clear to the leaders of the search that the enemy had not suffered serious losses. The division commander declared it impossible to continue the search.

In total, in 1916, Russian chemical teams produced nine large gas launches, in which 202 tons of chlorine were used. The most successful gas balloon attack was carried out on the night of September 5-6 from the front of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Smorgon region. The Germans skillfully and with great ingenuity used gas launches and shelling with chemical shells. Taking advantage of any oversight on the part of the Russians, the Germans inflicted heavy losses on them. So a gas balloon attack on parts of the 2nd Siberian division on September 22 north of Lake Naroch led to the death of 867 soldiers and officers on the positions. The Germans waited for the arrival of untrained reinforcements at the front and fired gas. On the night of October 18, at the Vitonezh bridgehead, the Germans carried out a powerful gas-balloon attack against units of the 53rd division, accompanied by a massive shelling of chemical shells. Russian troops were tired of 16 days of work. Many fighters could not be awakened, the division did not have reliable gas masks. The result - about 600 dead, but the German attack was repulsed with heavy losses for the attackers.

By the end of 1916, due to the improvement of the chemical discipline of the Russian troops and the equipping of them with Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks, losses from German gas balloon attacks were significantly reduced. The wave launch undertaken by the Germans on January 7, 1917 against units of the 12th Siberian Rifle Division (Northern Front) caused no casualties at all thanks to well-timed gas masks. The last Russian gas launch, performed near Riga on January 26, 1917, ended with the same results.

By the beginning of 1917, gas launches ceased to be effective means conducting chemical warfare, and their place was taken by chemical projectiles. Since February 1916, chemical projectiles of two types were supplied to the Russian front: a) asphyxiating (chloropicrin with sulfuryl chloride) - caused irritation respiratory organs and the eye to such an extent that it was impossible for people to stay in this atmosphere; b) poisonous (phosgene with tin chloride; hydrocyanic acid in a mixture of compounds that increase its boiling point and prevent polymerization in shells). Their characteristics are given in the table.

Russian chemical shells

(excluding shells for naval artillery)*

* Highly sensitive contact fuses were installed on chemical projectiles.

The gas cloud from the explosion of a 76 mm chemical projectile covered an area of ​​about 5 m². To calculate the number of chemical projectiles needed to shell the areas, a norm was adopted - one 76-mm chemical grenade per 40 m? area and one 152-millimeter projectile per 80 m?. Projectiles fired continuously in such a quantity created a gas cloud of sufficient concentration. In the future, to maintain the resulting concentration, the number of projectiles fired was halved. In combat practice, poisonous shells showed the greatest effectiveness. Therefore, in July 1916, the Headquarters gave the order to manufacture only poisonous shells. In connection with the landing on the Bosporus, which was being prepared, since 1916, large-caliber asphyxiating chemical shells (305-, 152-, 120- and 102-millimeters) were supplied to the combat ships of the Black Sea Fleet. In total, in 1916 the military chemical enterprises of Russia produced 1.5 million chemical shells.

Russian chemical projectiles showed high efficiency in counter-battery combat. So on September 6, 1916, during a gas launch carried out by the Russian army north of Smorgon, at 03:45 a German battery opened fire on the front lines of the Russian trenches. At 04:00 the German artillery was silenced by one of the Russian batteries, which fired six grenades and 68 chemical projectiles. At 03:40, another German battery opened heavy fire, but after 10 minutes it fell silent, having "received" 20 grenades and 95 chemical projectiles from the Russian gunners. Chemical shells played a big role in "cracking" the Austrian positions during the offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916.

Back in June 1915, N. N. Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, took the initiative to develop aviation chemical bombs. At the end of December 1915, 483 one-pound chemical bombs designed by Colonel E. G. Gronov were sent to the army. The 2nd and 4th aviation companies each received 80 bombs, the 8th aviation company received 72 bombs, the Ilya Muromets squadron received 100 bombs, and 50 bombs were sent to the Caucasian front. On that, the production of chemical bombs in Russia ceased. The valves on the ammunition leaked chlorine and caused poisoning among the soldiers. The pilots did not take these bombs on planes for fear of poisoning. And the level of development of domestic aviation has not yet allowed for the massive use of such weapons.

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Thanks to the impetus given by Russian scientists, engineers and the military during the First World War to the development of domestic chemical weapons, in Soviet times it turned into a serious deterrent for the aggressor. Nazi Germany did not dare to unleash a chemical war against the USSR, realizing that there would be no second Bolimov. Soviet chemical protection equipment was of such high quality that the Germans, when they fell into their hands as trophies, left them for the needs of their army. The wonderful traditions of Russian military chemistry were interrupted in the 1990s by a pile of papers signed by crafty politicians of timelessness.

“War is a phenomenon that should be observed with dry eyes and with closed hearts. Whether it is driven by "honest" explosives or "treacherous" gases, the result is the same; it is death, destruction, devastation, pain, horror, and all that follows. Do we want to be really civilized people? In that case, let's abolish the war. But if we fail to do this, then it is completely inappropriate to lock humanity, civility, and so many other beautiful ideals into a limited circle of more or less elegant ways to kill, devastate and destroy.

Giulio Due, 1921

Chemical weapons, first used by the Germans on April 22, 1915 to break through the defenses of the French army near Ypres, went through a period of "trial and error" in the next two years of the war. From a one-time means of tactical attack on the enemy , defended by a complex labyrinth of defensive structures, after the development of the basic methods of its use and the appearance of shells with mustard gas on the battlefield, it became an effective weapon of mass destruction, capable of solving operational-scale tasks.

In 1916, at the peak of gas balloon attacks, there was a tendency in the tactical use of chemical weapons to shift the "center of gravity" to the firing of chemical projectiles. The growth of the chemical discipline of the troops, the constant improvement of gas masks, and the properties of the poisonous substances themselves did not allow chemical weapons to inflict damage on the enemy comparable to that inflicted by other types of weapons. The commanders of the warring armies began to consider chemical attacks as a means of exhausting the enemy and carried them out not only without operational, but often without tactical expediency. This continued until the start of the fighting, called by Western historians "the third Ypres".

In 1917, the Entente allies planned to carry out joint large-scale joint Anglo-French offensives on the Western Front while simultaneously conducting Russian and Italian offensives. But by June, a dangerous situation had developed for the Allies on the Western Front. After the failure of the offensive of the French army under the command of General Robert Nivelle (April 16-May 9), France was close to defeat. Mutinies broke out in 50 divisions, tens of thousands of soldiers deserted from the army. Under these conditions, the British launched a long-awaited offensive by the Germans to capture the Belgian coast. On the night of July 13, 1917, near Ypres, the German army for the first time used mustard shells (“yellow cross”) for shelling the British troops that had concentrated for the offensive. Mustard gas was intended to "bypass" gas masks, but the British did not have them at all that terrible night. The British moved reserves in gas masks, but after a few hours they were also poisoned. Being very persistent on the ground, mustard gas poisoned the troops arriving to replace units struck by mustard gas on the night of July 13 for several days. The losses of the British were so great that they had to postpone the offensive for three weeks. According to the estimates of the German military, mustard gas shells turned out to be about 8 times more effective in destroying enemy personnel than their own "green cross" shells.

Fortunately for the Allies, in July 1917, the German army did not yet have a large number of mustard gas shells, nor protective clothing that would allow an attack on mustard-contaminated terrain. However, as the German military industry increased the rate of production of mustard gas shells, the situation on the Western Front began to change for the worse for the Allies. Sudden night shelling of the positions of the British and French troops with shells of the "yellow cross" began to be repeated more and more often. The number of poisoned with mustard gas in the Allied troops grew. In just three weeks (from July 14 to August 4 inclusive), the British lost 14,726 people from mustard gas alone (of which 500 died). The new poisonous substance seriously interfered with the work of the British artillery, the Germans easily took the “top” in the counter-gun fight. Mustard gas contaminated areas planned for the concentration of troops. Soon there were operational consequences of its use.

The photo, judging by the soldiers' anti-salt dressing, dates back to the summer of 1918. There is no serious destruction of houses, but there are many dead, and the effect of mustard gas continues.

In August-September 1917, mustard gas forced the offensive of the 2nd French army near Verdun to choke. French attacks on both banks of the Meuse were repulsed by the Germans with the shells of the "yellow cross". Thanks to the creation of "yellow areas" (this is how areas contaminated with mustard gas were designated on the map), the decline in the Allied troops reached catastrophic proportions. Gas masks didn't help. The French lost 4,430 people poisoned on August 20, another 1,350 on September 1, and 4,134 on September 24, and for the entire operation - 13,158 poisoned with mustard gas, of which 143 were fatal. Most of the disabled soldiers were able to return to the front after 60 days. During this operation, only during August, the Germans fired up to 100 thousand shells of the "yellow cross". Forming vast "yellow areas" that fettered the actions of the Allied forces, the Germans kept the bulk of their troops deep in the rear, in positions for counterattacking.

The French and British in these battles also skillfully used chemical weapons, but they did not have mustard gas, and therefore the results of their chemical attacks were more modest than those of the Germans. On October 22, in Flanders, the French units went on the offensive southwest of Laon after heavy chemical shelling of the German division defending this sector of the front. Having suffered heavy losses, the Germans were forced to retreat. Building on their success, the French punched a narrow and deep gap in the German front, destroying several more German divisions. After that, the Germans had to withdraw troops across the Ellet River.

In the Italian theater of operations in October 1917, the operational capabilities were demonstrated by gas launchers. The so-called 12th Battle of the Isonzo(Caporetto area, 130 km northeast of Venice) began with the offensive of the Austro-German armies, in which the main blow was delivered to parts of the 2nd Italian army of General Luigi Capello. The main obstacle for the troops of the Central Block was an infantry battalion, defending three rows of positions crossing the river valley. For the purpose of defense and flanking the approaches, the battalion made extensive use of the so-called "cave" batteries and firing points located in caves formed in the cliffs. The Italian unit proved to be inaccessible to the artillery fire of the Austro-German troops and successfully delayed their advance. The Germans fired a volley of 894 chemical mines from gas cannons, followed by two more volleys of 269 blasting mines. When the cloud of phosgene that enveloped the positions of the Italians dissipated, the German infantry went on the attack. Not a single shot was fired from the caves. The entire Italian battalion of 600 men with horses and dogs was dead. Moreover, some of the dead people were found wearing gas masks. . Further German-Austrian attacks copied the tactics of infiltration by small assault groups of General A. A. Brusilov. Panic ensued, and the Italian army exhibited the highest rate of retreat of any armed force involved in the First World War.

According to many German military authors of the 1920s, the Allies failed to carry out the breakthrough of the German front planned for the autumn of 1917 due to the widespread use of shells of the "yellow" and "blue" crosses by the German army. In December, the German army received new instructions for the use of chemical projectiles. different types. With the pedantry inherent in the Germans, each type of chemical projectile was given a strictly defined tactical purpose, and the methods of use were indicated. The instructions will still render a very disservice to the German command itself. But that will happen later. In the meantime, the Germans were full of hope! They did not allow their army to be "grinded" in 1917, withdrew Russia from the war and for the first time achieved a slight numerical superiority on the Western Front. Now they had to achieve victory over the allies before the American army became a real participant in the war.

In preparation for the big offensive in March 1918, the German command considered chemical weapons as the main weight on the scales of the war, which they were going to use to tip the scale of victory in their favor. German chemical plants monthly produced over a thousand tons of mustard gas. Especially for this offensive, the German industry launched the production of a 150-mm chemical projectile, called the “high-casting projectile with a yellow cross” (marking: one yellow 6-pointed cross), capable of effectively dispersing mustard gas. It differed from previous samples by a strong charge of TNT in the bow of the projectile, separated from mustard gas by an intermediate bottom. For a deep defeat of the positions of the allies, the Germans created a special long-range 150-mm projectile of the "yellow cross" with a ballistic tip, equipped with 72% mustard gas and 28% nitrobenzene. The latter is added to mustard gas to facilitate its explosive transformation into a "gas cloud" - a colorless and persistent fog that creeps along the ground.

The Germans planned to break through the positions of the 3rd and 5th British armies on the Arras-La Fère sector of the front, inflicting the main blow against the Gouzokur-Saint-Caten sector. To the north and south of the breakthrough area, a secondary offensive was to be carried out (see diagram).

Some British historians argue that the initial success of the German March offensive is due to its strategic surprise. But speaking of “strategic surprise,” they count the date of the offensive from March 21. In fact, Operation Michael began on March 9 with a grandiose artillery barrage, where the Yellow Cross shells accounted for 80% of the total amount of ammunition used. In total, on the first day of artillery preparation, over 200,000 Yellow Cross shells were fired at the targets of secondary sectors of the British front for the German offensive, but from where flank attacks could be expected.

The choice of types of chemical projectiles was dictated by the characteristics of the sector of the front where the offensive was supposed to begin. The left-flank British corps of the 5th Army occupied a sector advanced forward and therefore flanked the approaches north and south of Gouzokur. The Leuven - Gouzokur section, which was the object of an auxiliary offensive, was subjected to mustard gas shells only on its flanks (the Leuven - Arras section) and the Inshi - Gouzokur ledge, occupied by the left-flank British corps of the 5th Army. In order to prevent possible flank counterattacks and fire from the British troops occupying this ledge, their entire defensive zone was subjected to severe fire from the Yellow Cross shells. The shelling ended only on March 19, two days before the start of the German offensive. The result exceeded all expectations of the German command. The British corps, without even seeing the advancing German infantry, lost up to 5 thousand people and was completely demoralized. Its defeat was the beginning of the defeat of the entire 5th British Army.

At about 4 am on March 21, an artillery battle began with a powerful fire strike on a front of 70 km. The Gouzokur - Saint-Quentin sector, chosen by the Germans for a breakthrough, was subjected to a powerful action of shells of the "green" and "blue cross" during the two days preceding the offensive. Especially fierce was the chemical artillery preparation of the breakthrough site a few hours before the attack. For every kilometer of the front there were at least 20 – 30 batteries (about 100 guns). Shells of both types ("shooting with a multi-colored cross") were fired upon all the defensive means and buildings of the British several kilometers deep in the first line. During the artillery preparation, more than a million (!) Of them were fired at this site. Shortly before the attack, the Germans, by shelling the British third line of defense with chemical shells, placed chemical curtains between it and the first two lines, thereby eliminating the possibility of transferring British reserves. The German infantry broke through the front without much difficulty. During the offensive into the depths of the British defense, the Yellow Cross shells suppressed strongholds, the attack of which promised the Germans heavy losses.

The photograph shows British soldiers at a dressing station at Bethune on April 10, 1918, having been defeated by mustard gas on April 7-9 while on the flanks of a large German offensive on the River Lys.

The second great German offensive was carried out in Flanders (offensive on the river Lys). Unlike the March 21 offensive, it took place on a narrow front. The Germans were able to concentrate a large number of guns for chemical firing, and 7 – On April 8, they carried out artillery preparation (mainly with a "high-grade shell with a yellow cross"), infecting the flanks of the offensive extremely heavily with mustard gas: Armantière (right) and the area south of the La Basset Canal (left). And on April 9, the offensive zone was subjected to hurricane bombardment with a “multi-colored cross”. The shelling of Armantere was so effective that mustard gas literally flowed through its streets. . The British left the poisoned city without a fight, but the Germans themselves were able to enter it only after two weeks. The losses of the British in this battle by poisoned reached 7 thousand people.

The German offensive on the fortified front between Kemmel and Ypres, which began on April 25, was preceded by the setting up of a flanking mustard barrage on April 20 at Ypres, south of Meterin. In this way, the Germans cut off the main object of the offensive, Mount Kemmel, from the reserves. In the offensive zone, the German artillery fired a large number of blue cross shells and a smaller number of green cross shells. Behind enemy lines, a "yellow cross" barrier was erected from Scherenberg to Krüststraaetshoek. After the British and French, hurrying to the aid of the garrison of Mount Kemmel, stumbled upon areas contaminated with mustard gas, they stopped all attempts to rescue the garrison. After several hours of intense chemical shooting at the defenders of Mount Kemmel, most of them turned out to be gassed and out of action. Following this, the German artillery gradually switched to firing high-explosive and fragmentation shells, and the infantry prepared for the assault, waiting for the right moment to move forward. As soon as the wind dissipated the gas cloud, the German assault units, accompanied by light mortars, flamethrowers and fire from their artillery, moved on to the attack. Mount Kemmel was taken on the morning of 25 April. The losses of the British from April 20 to April 27 were about 8,500 people poisoned (of which 43 died). Several batteries and 6.5 thousand prisoners went to the winner. German losses were insignificant.

On May 27, during the great battle on the River En, the Germans carried out an unprecedented massive shelling of chemical artillery shells on the first and second defensive lines, divisional and corps headquarters, railway stations up to 16 km deep in the location of the French troops. As a result, the attackers found "the defense almost completely poisoned or destroyed" and during the first day of the attack broke through 15 – 25 km in depth, inflicting losses on the defenders: 3495 people were poisoned (of which 48 died).

On June 9, during the offensive of the 18th German army on Compiègne on the Montdidier-Noyon front, artillery chemical preparation was already less intensive. Apparently, this was due to the depletion of stocks of chemical projectiles. Accordingly, the results of the offensive turned out to be more modest.

But the time for victories for the Germans was running out. More and more American reinforcements arrived at the front and enthusiastically entered the battle. The Allies made extensive use of tanks and aircraft. And in the chemical war itself, they adopted a lot from the Germans. By 1918, the chemical discipline of their troops and the means of protection against poisonous substances were already superior to the German ones. The German monopoly on mustard gas was also broken. The Germans received high-quality mustard gas according to the complex Mayer-Fischer method. The military chemical industry of the Entente was unable to overcome the technical difficulties associated with its development. Therefore, the allies used more simple ways obtaining mustard gas - Nieman or Pope - Green. Their mustard gas was of lesser quality than that supplied by the German industry. It was poorly stored, contained a large amount of sulfur. However, its production increased rapidly. If in July 1918 the production of mustard gas in France was 20 tons per day, then by December it increased to 200 tons. From April to November 1918, the French equipped 2.5 million shells with mustard gas, of which 2 million were used up.

The Germans were afraid of mustard gas no less than their opponents. They first felt the effects of their mustard gas on "their own skin" during the famous Battle of Cambrai on November 20, 1917, when British tanks raided the Hindenburg Line. The British captured a warehouse of German "Yellow Cross" shells and immediately used them against the German troops. Panic and horror caused by the use of mustard gas shells by the French on July 13, 1918 against the 2nd Bavarian division, caused the hasty withdrawal of the entire corps. On September 3, the British began using their own mustard gas shells at the front with the same devastating effect.

British gas guns in position.

The massive chemical attacks of the British with the help of Livens gas guns made no less impression on the German troops. By the autumn of 1918, the chemical industry of France and the United Kingdom began to produce poisonous substances in such quantities that it was no longer possible to save chemical shells.

The pedantry of the German approach to chemical warfare was one of the reasons why it could not be won. The categorical requirement of the German instructions to use only shells with unstable poisonous substances to shell the point of attack, and shells of the "Yellow Cross" to cover the flanks, led to the fact that the allies during the period of German chemical training for the distribution along the front and in depth of shells with persistent and low-resistant poisonous substances, they accurately found out which areas were intended by the enemy for a breakthrough, as well as the estimated depth of development of each of the breakthroughs. Prolonged artillery preparation gave the allied command a clear outline of the German plan and ruled out one of the main conditions for success - surprise. Accordingly, the measures taken by the Allies greatly reduced the subsequent successes of the grandiose chemical attacks of the Germans. Winning on an operational scale, the Germans did not achieve their strategic goals with any of their "big offensives" of 1918.

After the failure of the German offensive on the Marne, the Allies seized the initiative on the battlefield. They skillfully used artillery, tanks, chemical weapons, their aircraft dominated the air. Their human and technical resources were now practically unlimited. On August 8, in the Amiens area, the Allies broke through the German defenses, losing significantly less people than the defenders. The prominent German commander Erich Ludendorff called this day the "black day" of the German army. The period of the war began, which Western historians call "100 days of victories." The German army was forced to retreat to the "Hindenburg Line" in the hope of gaining a foothold there. In the September operations, the advantage in the massing of chemical artillery fire passes to the allies. The Germans felt an acute shortage of chemical shells, their industry was unable to meet the needs of the front. In September, in the battles near Saint-Miel and in the Battle of Argonne, the Germans did not have enough shells of the "Yellow Cross". In the artillery warehouses left by the Germans, the Allies found only 1% of chemical shells.

On October 4, British troops broke through the Hindenburg Line. At the end of October, riots were organized in Germany, which led to the collapse of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. On November 11, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities was signed in Compiègne. The First World War ended, and with it its chemical component, which was forgotten in subsequent years.

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II. Tactical use of chemical weapons during the First World War // Officers. - 2010. - No. 4 (48). - S. 52–57.

The First World War was on. On the evening of April 22, 1915, German and French troops opposing each other were near the Belgian city of Ypres. They fought for the city for a long time and to no avail. But this evening the Germans wanted to test a new weapon - poison gas. They brought thousands of cylinders with them, and when the wind blew towards the enemy, they opened the taps, releasing 180 tons of chlorine into the air. A yellowish gas cloud was carried by the wind towards the enemy line.

The panic began. Immersed in a gas cloud, the French soldiers went blind, coughed and suffocated. Three thousand of them died of asphyxiation, another seven thousand were burned.

"At this point, science lost its innocence," says science historian Ernst Peter Fischer. According to him, if before that the purpose of scientific research was to alleviate the conditions of people's lives, now science has created conditions that make it easier to kill a person.

"In the war - for the fatherland"

A way to use chlorine for military purposes was developed by the German chemist Fritz Haber. He is considered the first scientist who subordinated scientific knowledge to military needs. Fritz Haber discovered that chlorine is an extremely poisonous gas, which, due to its high density, is concentrated low above the ground. He knew that this gas causes severe swelling of the mucous membranes, coughing, suffocation, and ultimately leads to death. In addition, the poison was cheap: chlorine is found in the waste of the chemical industry.

"Haber's motto was "In the world - for humanity, in the war - for the fatherland," Ernst Peter Fischer quotes the then head of the chemical department of the Prussian War Ministry. - Then there were other times. Everyone was trying to find poison gas that they could use in war And only the Germans succeeded."

The Ypres attack was a war crime - as early as 1915. After all, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited the use of poison and poisoned weapons for military purposes.

German soldiers were also exposed to gas attacks. Colorized photo: 1917 gas attack in Flanders

Arms race

The "success" of Fritz Haber's military innovation became contagious, and not only for the Germans. Simultaneously with the war of states, the "war of chemists" also began. Scientists were tasked with creating chemical weapons that would be ready for use as soon as possible. "Abroad, they looked with envy at Haber," says Ernst Peter Fischer, "Many people wanted to have such a scientist in their country." Fritz Haber received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1918. True, not for the discovery of poisonous gas, but for his contribution to the implementation of the synthesis of ammonia.

The French and British also experimented with poisonous gases. The use of phosgene and mustard gas, often in combination with each other, became widespread in the war. And yet, poison gases did not play a decisive role in the outcome of the war: these weapons could only be used in favorable weather.

scary mechanism

However, in the first world war a terrible mechanism was launched, and Germany became its engine.

The chemist Fritz Haber not only laid the foundation for the use of chlorine for military purposes, but also, thanks to his good industrial connections, helped to mass-produce this chemical weapon. For example, the German chemical concern BASF produced poisonous substances in large quantities during the First World War.

Already after the war with the creation of the IG Farben concern in 1925, Haber joined its supervisory board. Later, during National Socialism, a subsidiary of IG Farben was engaged in the production of "cyclone B", used in the gas chambers of concentration camps.

Context

Fritz Haber himself could not have foreseen this. "He's a tragic figure," Fischer says. In 1933, Haber, a Jew by origin, emigrated to England, expelled from his country, in the service of which he placed his scientific knowledge.

Red line

In total, more than 90 thousand soldiers died on the fronts of the First World War from the use of poison gases. Many died of complications a few years after the end of the war. In 1905, the members of the League of Nations, which included Germany, under the Geneva Protocol pledged not to use chemical weapons. Meanwhile, scientific research on the use of poisonous gases was continued, mainly under the guise of developing means to combat harmful insects.

"Cyclone B" - hydrocyanic acid - an insecticidal agent. "Agent orange" - a substance for deleafing plants. The Americans used defoliant during the Vietnam War to thin out local dense vegetation. As a consequence - poisoned soil, numerous diseases and genetic mutations in the population. The latest example of the use of chemical weapons is Syria.

"You can do whatever you want with poisonous gases, but they can't be used as a target weapon," emphasizes science historian Fisher. “Everyone who is nearby becomes a victim.” The fact that the use of poisonous gas is still “a red line that cannot be crossed” is correct, he considers: “Otherwise, the war becomes even more inhuman than it already is.”